In Defense of the Little Guy

In the wake of the 2000 presidential election, many pundits and voters blamed Ralph Nader for what they perceived as his role in preventing the victory of former Vice President Al Gore ‘69. In their view, Nader drew away votes that would have otherwise been cast for Gore and could have altered the outcome of the extraordinarily close contest. Despite a later study by Harvard Professor B.C. Burden that largely disproved this theory, the controversy illustrates an important feature of American party politics: the abundance of obstacles faced by third-party candidates seeking electoral equality. Third-party candidates represent a viable and principled choice for Americans to express their views; as a result, votes for third parties should be regarded as informed decisions based on political values, rather than meaningless ones based on overly idealistic sentiments.

Objections to third-party candidacies that rest on their tendency to “steal votes” seem to invoke a cynical and underdeveloped view of democratic choice. Democracy is founded on the principle that citizens should choose governments for themselves from among the assorted options; with more options available for selection, therefore, citizens would have greater freedom and flexibility in choosing the leader they most desire. Instead of being restricted to one or two broadly comparable administrations, they would have the liberty to choose from an additional candidate who may be better suited to address their concerns.

In addition to providing another option for voters with specific concerns, the very participation of third-party candidates in campaigns helps to better inform voters and establish a higher level of political discourse. During debates, three candidates with three sets of ideas about governing policies would provide more information to the average voter—and more insights into their opponents’ plans—than would a smaller pool of candidates. Debating with additional opponents enables candidates to explore the nuances of their ideas, defining and distinguishing themselves from a broader field. Having an additional candidate with a well-considered platform compels both politicians and voters to engage more fully with their own ideals and define their political standards.

Finally, there is some value in casting a principled vote for a third-party candidate whose views are closest to one’s own, even if that candidate stands little chance of winning the election. The concept of principled voting is a lost one in American politics; drones of citizens vote for the most charismatic candidate, often without carefully considering the policy implications of their decisions. A recent study by Boaz Shamir indicates that voting preferences are closely correlated with a candidate’s perceived charisma, while Daniel Benjamin performed a behavioral analysis suggesting that “undecided voters choose based on [the charisma that the candidates exude].”

In contrast, third parties are often organized around a coherent set of ideological goals; the Libertarian Party, for example, defines “smaller government” and “lower taxes” as its primary objectives, and the party’s website actually refers to the group as “the Party of Principle.” Voters expressing support for such parties necessarily have a concern for their ideological motives, rather than for their candidate’s charisma or charm. Since this, after all, is the goal of democratic voting—for citizens to vote for, and presumably elect, those representatives whose values and policy preferences will most accord with their own—third-party voters are likely closer to an ideal of democratic decision-making than mainstream party voters ever will be.

Yet objections still arise: A vote for a third-party candidate can counterproductively split votes with the elector’s second-best choice. For example, in the 2000 election, 38 percent of those who voted for Nader would have voted for Gore if Nader had not run, while only 25 percent would have voted for Bush. However, in taking away from Gore’s totals by casting their vote for the Green Party, Nader’s supporters may have prevented their second-best choice from winning the election; the Nader voters ensured that the candidate whose policies were most oppositional to their own was placed in office.

Ignoring the mathematical inaccuracy of the notion that Nader took away enough votes to cost Gore the election, this counterargument poses a difficult choice for the voter. Undoubtedly, the more rational decision is to cast the vote for Gore and ensure that the second-best option takes office. But the principled one is to vote for Nader and the values he represents.

Instead, citizens constantly find themselves choosing between the “lesser of two evils,” picking the choice that offends their values least rather than the one that corresponds to them most. Every citizen has to remember that their vote is their voice and an expression of their values; if their views accord most closely with those of third-party candidates, they should be encouraged to express their support through their vote. Instead of claiming that those supporting third-party candidates are throwing away their vote, we need to recognize the principles behind these votes and the values that they express. In doing so, we uphold the very ideals that make a vote valuable in the first place—its expression of a voice and the opinions that lay behind it.

Peter M. Bozzo ’12, a Crimson editorial writer, is a government concentrator in Eliot House.