No Fair

Fairness is a concept central to how we view society and our interactions with each other. It deals with the idea of normative judgment at its most general, of evaluating actions or conditions based on an idea of justice and an ideal state of things.

Children learn about fairness at a much earlier age than other philosophical concepts such as freedom or equality. Whether it comes from a child complaining that it is not fair that their older sibling receives greater privileges or from a kindergarten teacher explaining why pupils must take turns using a particular toy, “fair” carries with it the nebulous but compelling guarantee of moral righteousness.

This is a useful device for parents and teachers who must constantly explain themselves to younger individuals who may not necessarily be prepared for or interested in hearing a lengthy digression on the various factors involved in the adult’s decision. It acts as a shortcut that relies on previously existing trust in (or at least deference to) the individual using it.

This is all well and good in the context of interaction between adults and children due to the latter’s lack of experience and neurological development. But what about interaction between adults? Surely the simple assertion that something is fair should not suffice to convince a reasoning individual of its moral rectitude?

Before thinking about common usage of the word “fair,” consider the fact that the Merriam-Webster dictionary has 11 definitions of just the adjective form of the word. While the precise meanings vary significantly (from “marked with impartiality and honesty” to “superficially pleasing”), 10 out of the 11 (with “not dark” being the exception) have positive meanings. This makes it difficult to claim that any particular instance in which the word “fair” is used is incorrect.

How, then, is the political and commercial usage of “fair” affected by this ambiguity? Take one especially common example: that of “fair-trade” consumer products. Ranging from handpicked agricultural commodities to all manner of basic assembled good, fair -trade products rely on the assumption that that the terms of the economic interaction between merchants and workers are wholly just.

This, no doubt, is true. However, it carries the problematic implication that the terms of commerce involved in products not branded as “fair-trade” are unfair. While child labor or coercion are certainly used in the production of many common products, “fair trade” also implicates those enterprises that employ neither of these tactics but merely pay low wages. Is this really unfair? Unfortunately for the workers, yes, but not indicative of wrongdoing on the part of the merchants or consumers.

This brings us to the central bit of contradiction and confusion in the use of the word “fair”; the question of equality vs. contracts. On the one hand, it appears immediately unfair that many people live their entire lives in absolute poverty while others enjoy all the luxuries of modern society, especially when the work done by those in poverty appears much more difficult than that of the rich. On the other hand, outside interference in mutually beneficial and voluntary economic activity between adults to the detriment of one or more of these individuals can also be easily called unfair.

For this reason, calling policies such as tax structures or economic regulation “fair” or “unfair” is nearly meaningless, the equivalent of a mere personal endorsement.  It imparts no real information to its audience and tacitly insults their intelligence by assuming that its usage will sway their opinions. It is nevertheless an effective tool in generating support for a policy, a fact to which its popularity among politicians can attest. Those wishing to be honest and forthright in the presentation of their ideas should avoid calling them fair unless other, more substantive modifiers are included.

After all, we’re not children.

Christopher M. Lehman ’13 is a Crimson business associate in Currier House. His column appears on alternate Wednesdays.