Talking with the Taliban

The figures of failure are stark: 10 years of war, thousands dead, a broken country further battered by billions of dollars worth of weapons as a result of the war in Afghanistan. The successes construct another narrative: fleeting signs of a democracy, a heightened emphasis on human rights and equality, and the undermining of the forces that destroyed the Twin Towers and took shelter with the former Afghan leadership. So, while any sign that the war in Afghanistan may end is an uplifting one, our emerging relationship with Taliban is one we should view skeptically.

Afghanistan has always been a wild place, with the kind of terrain and diversity that impedes easy military victories. Since the time of Alexander the Great, invasion of the country has often proved remarkably difficult for Arabs, Brits, Soviets, and other invaders. Thus, some may feel that the United States should take advantage of any chance to exit the country, even if it means compromising with the Taliban. In fact, many of our allies in the region, including the corrupt government of Afghanistan (led by Hamid Karzai) and Pakistan (where members of the renegade Inter-Services Intelligence actively support the insurgency) are urging a diplomatic approach to the totalitarian Taliban.

While this diplomacy is still its early stages, the strategy is problematic for a variety of reasons. First, it raises questions about the very purpose of this war. The stated goals of capturing Osama bin Laden and eliminating the group that sheltered Al-Qaeda are both in jeopardy. Hurriedly ending the war without capturing bin Laden or eradicating the Taliban would throw the justifications for this war into question.

Additionally, before granting concessions to the Taliban, we should remember that theirs is a radical movement capable of incredible oppression and violence. The Taliban has not proven friendly to democracy and thus threatens any progress on efforts to promote liberal democratic leadership and values abroad. The Taliban operates under the essentialist belief that its brand of Islam is the only right one. Given this, the Taliban is not likely to compromise, and the fanatical views of its members threaten the freedom and safety of any who dissent.

Afghan history should also teach us another lesson: Hastily withdrawing troops can have very devastating consequences. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did this in 1989 after 10 years of war, and the results were catastrophic. Civil war between government forces and the Pakistan-backed Hezb-e Islami consumed the country, leading to the eventual rise of the Taliban. This history should be close to the American conscience, because America played a role in the withdrawal by sponsoring the anti-Soviet mujahideen—who among its members included future leaders and supporters of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Leaving an unstable Afghanistan to the mercy of conflicting factions cannot end well.

Unfortunately, our choices in Afghanistan are limited. The easy way out is to cobble together some faulty resolution and scramble from a country we helped ruin, thus continuing a tradition that has been recent Afghan history. The more difficult path is to intensify the resources that are being contributed to winning this war, to send an adequate number of troops and materials to protect and rebuild the country, and to pressure Pakistan to end its support of our enemies. The war in Afghanistan is a necessary war against the fanaticism that has broken our world in the past and will do so again if we do not see it through to some reasonable standard of victory.

Arush F. Sarwar ’13, a Crimson editorial writer, lives in Leverett House.