The End of Appeasement

It’s time for us to face the facts—all of Pakistan’s attempts at appeasing the Taliban have been a failure, and there’s no reason to expect any differently in the future.

The most recent concession came in February, when the Pakistani government accepted a peace agreement with Taliban elements active in its Swat Valley to allow Sharia law in the region. Predictably, the Taliban reneged on the agreement and encroached further on the nation’s capital, Islamabad. Another attempt to open negotiations on new terms earlier this month also failed. With such a record on its hands and the Taliban growing increasingly brazen in its maneuvers, the Pakistani government must reevaluate its policy. With the help of the international community, it can and should use all of its military resources to bring down the Taliban.

While Pakistan does have some soldiers already in place, they are too few and inadequately organized. While it may be impractical for us to stretch our defense forces even more to send troops to Pakistan, U.S. intelligence resources and military advisers would drastically increase the effectiveness of the Pakistani army. The recent deployment of 24 U.S. military advisors to Pakistan to train the Pakistani military in counterinsurgency tactics is a good start. Promising proposed legislation in Congress also calls for $7.5 billion in non-military aid to Pakistan over the next five years to spur economic growth and development, with another $7.5 billion over the following five years. As Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, puts it himself, “I am thankful for the support that I got and thankful to the people of America to give their tax dollars to us. But I need more support.”

The U.S. intelligence community can also actively work in the area by gathering information about the Taliban’s movements, targets, and tactics as well as recruiting allies against the Taliban. Promisingly, President Obama has continued the use of President Bush’s use of CIA covert operations and even increased them in some areas. The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta, confirmed this in an interview, saying that the agency’s campaign against militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas was the “most effective weapon” the Obama administration had to combat al Qaeda’s top leadership.

These strategies will admittedly not come cheap. Though there are some ways to cut costs—implementing a World War II-style lend-lease act with the Pakistani government, for example, in which arms are provided for the purpose of combating the Taliban with the expectation that they will be returned—any international effort is bound to have significant costs. Illogical though it may seem to give foreign aid during a recession period, though, Americans should be prepared to contribute significant funds to Pakistan. Destroying the Taliban is an expensive investment now, but will yield large dividends in safety and stability in South Asia. Stability in the region benefits us by lessening the influence and power of extremist groups that are ardently anti-American.

The onus should not fall on the U.S. alone, however. One reason why Pakistan is hesitant to mobilize its army is due to fears of backlash from its bordering country, India. Tensions in Kashmir, simmering for decades, will not be resolved overnight. But considering the urgency of the crisis in Pakistan, a moratorium on troop deployment to the Kashmir region should be an immediate priority. Improbable as it is, the Indian government should supply some foreign aid to Pakistan to aid in its attempts at a change of policy.

Other countries can also lend a hand. In addition to helping provide the Pakistani military with money, arms, advising, and artillery, the international community could help with air strikes should Pakistan request them and mobilize an international coalition of troops to put down the insurgents. With limited economic capital, the international community should not entangle itself unnecessarily in wars. But the rare request in times of crisis from the Pakistani government should not fall on deaf ears.

All of these measures are crucial and should be put into motion immediately, for Pakistani national security is directly linked to the success of the democratization efforts in Pakistan and in the region. Negotiating with a group as radical as the Taliban is an exercise in futility—with a little help from its friends, the Pakistani government can and should continue mobilizing its military to take back the country for its citizens.


Anthony J. Bonilla ’12, a Crimson editorial writer, lives in Wigglesworth Hall.