Five Years of War in Iraq

Most Americans would agree that five years of war in Iraq have done great damage to their country in terms of loss of lives, money, and international reputation—even if a slim majority remains confused about what to do next.

But what of the Iraqis themselves? Perhaps if Secretary Rumsfeld’s plan for an invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein, install a government of exiled politicians, and quickly withdraw had not been superseded by dreams of whole-scale political reconstruction, some of the damage might have been averted. True, there were not enough American troops to have prevented much of the looting of ministries and other offices. True too that there would have been considerable popular opposition to an American-backed administration, especially from the al-Qaida militants who were already beginning to infiltrate the country. Yet it is easy to imagine that many—if not most—Iraqis now believe that it would have been much better if they had been allowed to settle post-invasion matters themselves rather than to have to watch passively as the British and American occupiers made mistake after damaging mistake at their country’s expense.

At the same time, it should be remembered that the invasion did indeed bring definite advantages to some. These include the Kurds, now safe and relatively secure in their largely autonomous and well-protected enclave in the northeast. They also include some Shiites who gained freedom from persecution and opportunities to advance their interests after the invasion—benefits that may still seem to outweigh the danger and destruction going on all around them. Think of those, for example, who were able to take advantage of the recent American disarmament of Sunni fighters in Baghdad to seize Sunni homes, thus turning Baghdad into an almost exclusively Shiite city. And then of course there are the heads of the mafia-type gangs and networks—many which first came into existence as a result of international sanctions and then the “Oil for Food Program” of 1990—who continue to benefit enormously from the opportunities for lucrative smuggling both in and out of Iraq, as well as smuggling drugs and other lucrative products transiting from the east.

Yet, for the majority of Iraqis, the future is bleak indeed. More than two million—most of them middle-class professionals—have left the country, with another two million internally displaced. This means that, for those who remain, the numbers of doctors, professors, university teachers, engineers and technicians available to them sinks by the day. Meanwhile, central government has more or less ceased to exist, leaving the provision of social services to local sectarian strong-men and their militias who allocate these services on a mainly religio-political basis. In short, most Iraqis now live in localities governed by groups with insistent religious agendas.

What remains? Two things seem clear. First, setting aside their sometimes murderous internal difficulties, the Iraqis outside Kurdistan have shown little inclination to divide their country, still believing a united Iraq to be the only viable long-term solution. Second, there is no way in which a continued American presence can make any substantial improvement to the effectiveness of Iraqi national government. Thus, the Americans are simply postponing the day in which the Iraqis themselves have to address their own problems in their own way. Whatever happens, there will be conflict and confusion when the Americans leave, with a fierce struggle for control of resources mediated by an army and police force who hold uncertain loyalty to their political masters. So with nothing to be gained by staying, there can be little to lose by fixing a date for the withdrawal of troops—certainly in no more than a couple of years—thus forcing the Iraqi leaders to take responsibility for their own destiny, bloody though this may turn out to be.

Iraq, perhaps for better, but probably for worse, has become a state with a sectarian political system much like that of Lebanon. This means that, in any election, the majority of people will vote along sectarian lines to elect leaders of their own community. It is then the task of these same leaders to reach a consensus amongst themselves over power-sharing and the division of government resources. The fact that Iraq possesses huge revenues from oil should, in ideal circumstances, make this process that much easier.

Just as important, there is no doubt that the leaders of the main political groups understand this necessity for a coalition perfectly well. The trouble is that have they no reason to strive hard to implement such an arrangement right now, as they are unable to control their followers outside Baghdad’s Green Zone, where they live, and uncertain regarding the terms and conditions under which the American military will choose to leave. To make matters worse, the presence of American military power makes the job of the central government more difficult still; U.S. military commanders on the ground are busy undermining its power by diverting major resources to local agents like the Awakening Councils in Anbar province. If you are a political leader, better to avoid difficult decisions, rather than take steps that will alienate some part of your anticipated future constituency.

Iraq is a broken country with a broken government. Whatever happens, it will take years, and perhaps decades, to put it all together again. In such circumstances it is foolish to imagine that there can be a victory for anyone. The best that we can hope for is that the process of national reconciliation set in train by an American withdrawal will be as speedy and as limited in its violence as the present grim circumstances allow.

Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard College. He is the author of “State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East.”

For comprehensive coverage of the Iraq War's impact at Harvard five years later, check out The Crimson's Iraq Supplement.