Still Cruel, Far Too Usual

Cries from global leaders—including Pope Benedict XVI, former President Jimmy Carter and Archbishop Desmond Tutu—have brought the unusual case of Troy Davis into the national spotlight. Davis, who claims he was wrongly convicted of shooting a police officer in Savannah, Georgia in 1989, has seen seven out of the nine witnesses who pointed to him recant their testimonies in recent years. A long series of appeals over the past 19 years left the Supreme Court as his last hope to save him from his execution, which was scheduled for Sept. 23.

Yet this past Tuesday, the Supreme Court refused to hear or even comment on the case—a bold statement by omission that reinforces our contention that the death penalty is flawed. The applicability of the death penalty is unjustifiable given the extreme uncertainty in the case of Davis, or in any case for that matter. So long as a fallible justice system remains, the death penalty will be an unjust means of punishing criminals.

Three primary, practical arguments exist against a state-imposed death penalty. First, the finality of the death penalty undermines procedural considerations and the possibility of revisiting new evidence. Since the introduction of DNA testing, 200 individuals who were convicted of violent crimes have been exonerated in the U.S. Although this figure may seem small, only cases with biological evidence that was still “intact” could be reviewed, and many prior convictions have yet to be revisited. According a recent study in The Columbia Law Review, key factors in the convictions of innocent individuals were false testimony and faulty forensic science. In 61 cases, individuals had exhausted appeals, leaving Governors’ pardons as the only available option despite compelling DNA evidence of their innocence. Such facts show the clear fallibility of the criminal justice system and make the irreversible nature of the death penalty particularly unnerving.

Given that our justice system is premised on the belief, “innocent until proven guilty”—a concept that concludes it is better to let 10 criminals free than to kill one innocent person—it seems wrong to risk taking an innocent life. But the larger question might be: Is the death penalty even an ineffective deterrent? In fact, experts on criminology tend to reject such notions as a flawed understanding of being tough on crime versus evidence-based reasoning about what works. Lawrence Sherman—Professor of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania—explained in an article for The Daily Pennsylvanian: “There’s no evidence that the death penalty does anything to reduce homicides.”

Linked to this flawed belief in ‘deterrence’ is the common perception that putting a criminal to death is less costly than lifetime imprisonment. Again, this notion is unsubstantiated: The death penalty is more burdensome for the state. For example, in California, it costs an average of $90,000 more per inmate to confine an inmate to death row compared to the costs of a maximum security prisons where those sentenced to life without possibility of parole most often serve their sentences.

Such arguments raise meaningful objections to the practice of state-inflicted death. The possibility of flawed outcomes, the lack of evidence for deterrence, and the burdensome cost of death row all speak to the amoral nature of the punishment. In the case of Troy Davis, the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear this case is an understandable one, grounded in the belief that Davis received “due process by the law.” As an apolitical body, the Supreme Court should remain immune to political pressure. Yet, it is regrettable that their decision has functionally cleared the way for Davis’ execution.