Moderation with Iran

The United States is certainly right to condemn Iran for its progress in enriching uranium. Undeniably, nuclear proliferation, regardless of which country promotes it, destabilizes the world and increases the likelihood of mass destruction and death of the kind witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, it is difficult to conceive how the U.S. government can justifiably berate Iran without any qualifications. Not only does the perennial complaint that the nuclear-armed US should lower its own nuclear stockpiles remain valid, but the Bush Administration has provided Iran with even more reasons to acquire nuclear weapons capability in the short term.

By demonizing Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil,” then launching a dubiously justified unilateral invasion of its neighbor and fellow “Axis” member, the U.S. thoroughly rattled the Iranian leadership, causing it to dread it may be next. Predictably, recent reports of U.S. attack plans and longstanding rumors of a “small” tactical nuclear arms program do not help.

Rather than compelling Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions with threats of unilateral force—perpetuating precisely the fear that drove Iran to accelerate its longstanding program—the U.S. government should take a wiser, subtler approach.

The rash and belligerent President Ahmadinejad has succeeded in alienating many of the more prudent establishment Iranian politicians such as former President and current Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani. The U.S. should push for a UN-approved deal involving a degree of diplomatic and commercial rapprochement plus nonaggression guarantees in exchange for Iranian compliance. The firebrand president will likely oppose this offer, yet it is America’s best chance of appealing to and strengthening the hands of the moderates chafing under his leadership. The political clout of these moderates is undermined by a hard-line U.S. position.Reassured by the reasonable, non-aggressive intentions of the United States and buttressed by a citizenry willing to reconcile with the U.S., they might seize the initiative to effect a more cautious and receptive Iranian position.

Of course, the U.S. should not entirely discard all punitive or coercive policy options, including the possibility of inflicting disarming air strikes upon Iran in case the strategy fails and an Iranian nuclear weapon becomes imminent. However, it is still far from that point, so conditional guarantees against attack are advisable.

The United States must be very careful about a war with Iran for a number of reasons. First, given that nuclear facilities are multiple, hidden, and situated near urban centers, they would be all but technically and morally impossible to obliterate. Second, there are the continuing burdens (not to mention the lessons) of Iraq to consider.

Third, a war with Iran would completely undermine what is now the Gulf’s best hope for liberal democracy. Iran, though a theocracy, is already a quasi-representative system with competitive though not quite free elections. It contains a youthful, educated, and generally pro-American population and a vibrant civil society, and its clerical leaders are increasingly forced to accommodate to these realities.

If Iran is reassured, it could be only a matter of time before a pro-U.S. stance is adopted, and the quest for a now-primarily anti-U.S. nuclear deterrent dropped. True, eroding an entrenched autocracy and dispelling nationalist predilections for a nuclear state are not simple tasks. Yet the solution lies in appealing to Iran’s strong interest in reconciling with the U.S. Bullying and demonizing only undermines both these objectives.



Taro Tsuda ’07, a Crimson editorial editor, is a government concentrator in Pforzheimer House.