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Over the past 15 years, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly important actors in Russia. They are deeply involved in development work, environmental protection, human rights, and many other issues. However, the resurgence of Kremlin authoritarianism has lead to the suppression of NGOs—and all forms of independent civil society—which risks radicalizing marginalized elements of Russian society.
Despite their useful social work, NGOs are seen by the Russian government as a challenge to its power. The government’s attempts to suppress independent actors in Russia have multiplied dramatically over the last few years. Numerous arbitrary closings of NGOs have been complemented by legislation—allegedly against terrorism—that actually suppresses NGOs. These newly adopted laws target vocal national NGOs, international NGOs operating in Russia, and their donors. And private businessmen who donate to NGOs can lose their businesses and even their freedom. For example, Michael Khodorkovsky, once one of Russia’s richest oligarchs, was jailed after supporting independent NGOs and opposition political parties. Unfortunately, although Russia is moving towards authoritarianism, powerful international actors still have yet to protest this alarming tendency.
These behaviors are clear signs that Russia has not escaped its history; Soviet perceptions and behaviors are pervasive in Russian society. In a way, the “collapse” of the USSR is a misnomer: many elements of Soviet life still persist. Soviet control affected—and its legacy continues to affect—almost all aspects of citizens’ lives, their business and political relations, ownership of property, perceptions of foreigners (or outsiders), interpretation of foreign governments’ motives, and attitudes to social action. This is particularly true of Russian’s views on public actions. In Soviet times, participation in sanctioned public activities was almost mandatory; non-participation could lead to ostracism while participation often had clear benefits.
With this cultural background, this vestigial Soviet mindset, contemporary Russians often do not understand how public activity can be independent of the government’s control and not motivated by self-interest. Therefore many people easily believe the fairy-tales told by state officials, political analysts, and the mass media of NGO’s alleged “hidden” motives or their espionage goals. From the Soviet-era point of view, NGO’s activities look suspicious.
Even more so than individual Russian citizens, the military, police, and security services are suspicious of independent NGO activity. And these forces, which tend to be comfortable under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, have powerful positions in contemporary Russian politics. Largely through these military and security forces, and under the aegis of the “war against terrorism,” the Kremlin has created its own loyal and controllable “civil society” while suppressing independent civil society.
Because of this infringement of civil liberties and suppression of all independent forces, Russia faces the threat of an increase in extremism; if all avenues for legitimate dissent are eliminated, extremists become the only real independent actors. Russia’s current power structure is unable to free itself of the old paradigm: “to govern is to control and to manipulate.” Open and equal discussion—prerequisites for and results of a vibrant NGO environment—is a sign of weakness in such paradigm.
In 2005, the consequences of closing the avenues of legitimate dissent became evident in the capital of the North Caucasian provence of Kabardino-Balkaria. Although most of the local population practices Islam, regional authorities used arrests and beatings, closures of mosques, and limits on religious practice in public places to suppress Islam. These actions radicalized many young Muslims, who came to see armed revolt as the only means of protecting their religious freedom. As a result, the Nalchik airport, military, police and Federal Security Service buildings came under attack in October, and the city was under siege for several days. Dozens of people were killed or injured. The attack was put down by federal forces but the roots of the issue remain unaddressed.
The Western world has a stake in democracy in Russia, its presumed ally in the fight against international terrorism. It should not give up on reform in Russia—by tacitly consenting to the oppression of NGOs—now. Western citizens should press their governments to cease ignoring Russia’s human rights abuse. Human rights issues cannot be ignored for the sake of global security and economy—especially because they are closely related to both. Russian civil society can survive without international financial support, but not without political support.
The work carried out by NGOs may be, after all, the most important means of developing the rule of law in Russia.
Both authors are fellows at the Sakharov Program on Human Rights at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Arkadiy Leybovskiy is a historian from Krasnodar. Kirill Babichenko is an attorney from Velikiy Novgorod and serves on the Commission of Human Rights in the Novgorod region.
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