Mission Unaccomplished

On December 12, Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi said of the suffering endured by his country, “There is light at the end of the corridor.” Indeed, there might be; it’s just not at the end of the corridor we’re currently walking down. The Iraq Study Group report confirms what is obvious: The course of action we are on is the wrong one and demands alteration. The Bush administration should heed the advice of the Baker commission’s report and begin to gradually and systematically withdraw troops from Iraq.

Real accomplishment in Iraq has never reached the level posited by the Bush administration in March 2003. The expectations for a post-occupation Iraq have gradually dissolved from establishing a citadel of democracy in an otherwise tumultuous Middle East to securing a nation that simply does not cower under the threat of widespread terrorism. At this point, there is no good possible outcome in Iraq: It is now a matter of bad or worse.

Presently, sectarian violence is the biggest threat to stability in Iraq. Earlier this week, 70 Iraqi citizens were killed when a truck loaded with wheat exploded in a crowd of Shiites looking for work. A team of Iraqi and American epidemiologists estimates the “excess death toll” in Iraq at around 655,000 since March 2003. Because continuing to send troops to Iraq has not proven to have a stabilizing effect on the region, the Baker commission’s suggestions should be carefully considered.

The American public has realized this, even if the president has not. According to a CBS poll, public approval of George W. Bush’s handling of Iraq is at an all-time low, with only 21 percent approving of his current policy. The Iraq Study Group—a bipartisan body—declared in its report last week that the situation in Iraq is “grave and deteriorating.”

Although the report is bipartisan, both Democrats and Republicans are sure to have reservations about its proposals. Democrats—many of whom support a sudden, total withdrawal of troops—may be critical of the report’s gradual approach to disengagement. On the other hand, the report confronts the failure of the Bush administration’s current policy head-on. But it is imperative that both parties realize the salience of the report and the truth in its reasoning. An immediate withdrawal will result in a power vacuum in Iraq and would open the door to escalated sectarian violence and Saudi military support of Sunni insurgents.

The timetable set by the report dictates that all combat bridges “not necessary for force protection” could be removed by the first quarter of 2008. By proposing systematic disengagement without the restriction of an inflexible timetable, the report’s proposed policy is both practical, and we hope it will prove to be effective.

There is an urgent need for a change in policy. Bush declared on Tuesday that he will wait until after the holiday season to speak on policy changes in Iraq; as he waits, Iraqi civilians and American soldiers will continue to suffer under a mission with no clear plan for success.

The Bush administration needs to follow through on its promises to thoughtfully consider the Baker commission’s report and give weight to its suggestions. Morale is not growing, stability is not increasing, and people continue to die. It is about time that the U.S. acknowledge the need for policy reformation in Iraq.