The Shadow of Doubt

The executive branch has dispatched a rotating group of approximately 150 senior civil managers from major federal departments to ensure the continuity of government services in the case of a nuclear attack on Washington D.C. Although the move was prompted by Sept. 11, the shadow government will remain in place indefinitely. It is both essential and proper that the federal government plan for its survival in the case of a terrorist attack, but it must do so more transparently and thoroughly.

The United States enjoyed a decade between the fall of the USSR and Sept. 11 during which the threat of nuclear destruction seemed remote. While the fear of terrorism never went away—it hardly could between Oklahoma City, the Kenya and Tanzania bombings and the U.S.S. Cole—it never seemed more than a remote threat. Sadly, America is in a new era, and the government must plan ahead. For instance, according to recent press reports, the intelligence community believed for a number of weeks last October that terrorists had obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear device and planned to smuggle it into New York City. Washington, of course, also faces a very high threat of being targeted with weapons of mass destruction.

In the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11 it was right of President George W. Bush to temporarily evacuate senior civil servants from Washington to be in position to oversee their regional department offices. But it was overly hasty of the executive branch to indefinitely implement a shadow government without consulting all of the leaders of Congress. The failure of the Bush administration to inform all top congressional leaders of the plan is indicative of the administration’s broader problem with transparency.

There are two issues the shadow government would have to deal with if ever called upon. The first would be to make sure essential networks—energy, transportation and civil order—are able to continue with as little disruption as possible. The second is to reconstitute the federal government. There is a difference in the amount of secrecy that should be involved in planning how the separate objectives would be achieved.

The executive branch need not publicize plans for continuing basic government services beyond a small number of key officials who would actually implement them. But it is vital that the executive branch work with Congress to develop a plan to reconstitute all branches of government in the wake of a catastrophic attack. This includes how a new Congress would be elected if the capitol were destroyed and how the Supreme Court would be selected if a number of the justices were killed. In the case of a nuclear attack on Washington, Americans would be quite reasonably nervous about their safety and about the future of the republic. Some of that fear could be assuaged with a clear, public plan to tell Americans what directives they should expect, and from whom, in the event that crucial government institutions were destroyed.

The federal bureaucracy must be resilient in the face of terror. All vital federal agencies must be able to function effectively without Washington and even without one or two other major cities. This will certainly come at a large cost, but it is better than the alternative. For as alarming and expensive as such plans will be, it is better to plan for tragedy than to be unprepared when it strikes.