The End of Yugoslavia

There seems to be some confusion about national identity in the Balkans. Last week’s “Yugoslavia” is now a relic—today there are “Serbia and Montenegro.” Still confused? You should be. The new name is unwieldy, trying to express everything that needs to be said in a single breath. Beyond that, it dismisses the ethnic identities of two distinct peoples: Serbs and Montenegrins.

This change in name is not a diplomatic triviality. In some ways, it is the inevitable outcome of the demand by the European Union (EU) for unity where there has been division. The decision to change the name of “Yugoslavia” to “Serbia and Montenegro” is a shallow response to the EU’s continued requests. Despite the pretense of a united confederation, internal divisions are nevertheless abundant: they are deep-seated and ethnically provoked. The new name fabricates a sense of unity—it is a forgery of stability.

It’s hard to see how “Serbia and Montenegro” shines any more brightly than the “Yugoslavia” it replaces. Indeed, the term Yugoslavia—let alone the concept it represents—is still active in the diplomatic lexicon. Continued reference to Yugoslavia undermines the force of the change.

Apparently, it is no secret that there has not been any real “end” of Yugoslavia. This change just recasts yesterday’s Yugoslavia as today’s dual-republic—recognizing the differences between its peoples in name only. Of course, this begs the question as to why the West, particularly the EU, is so overjoyed at the recent turn of events.

The EU’s enthusiasm for the new confederation is simple: a “united” Serbia and Montenegro undermines the Montenegrin independence movement. Although these secessionists constitute a marginal number of the 600,000 Montenegrins in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, they are, nevertheless, an incendiary force. And increasingly the West has feared that they might start a fire in the Balkans, particularly among the Hungarians in Vojvodina or the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, who have twice the ethnic representation of the Montenegrins. By aligning Montenegro once again with Serbia, the EU can maintain the status quo—a fate much preferred to separation, which would come only with war and further hand-wringing for the EU.

This EU-authored decree has come to pass because of the political carrot of membership in the EU. In truth, though, it has only been the promise of a carrot. Although the EU constantly refers to membership as an eventuality—as a means of rallying support for the confederation—its sincerity is questionable. To what extent is the EU seriously considering the new confederation for admission into the union? Even if it is, by every technical measure, a democracy, can it possibly maintain “rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities”—secondary conditions for entrance? By fostering the artificial unity of the confederation, the EU is actually ensuring that Serbia and Montenegro falls short. So long as ethnic divisions exist, continued instability is certain and membership is out of reach.

After all, the EU’s “long-term goal is to bring all the democracies of Europe together.” This goal cannot dwarf the EU’s foremost concern: to maintain shared security. Given this modus operandi, it seems implausible to expect that the EU will take in Serbia and Montenegro as one of its own.

But the EU certainly has ambition beyond self-preservation; now the EU “has the potential to become a political power too.” Even if Serbia and Montenegro does not gain admission into the union, its democratization reflects the EU’s expanding sphere of influence. The EU’s authority grows with the call for Serbia and Montenegro to “harmonize” its economic policies with those of the bloc even though officially the republics will maintain “considerable economic and political autonomy.” It speaks to the power of the union that the economic autonomy of the new republic can be reduced to the will of the EU—even as Serbia and Montenegro remain on its fringe.

So what does the end of Yugoslavia actually mean? Above all, it highlights the increasing power of the EU. For now, the union and its Western allies have temporarily avoided the costs of a war. The EU is buying itself time by promising the Montenegrins that a new era is upon them. But this most recent move is just fanning latent flames toward independence. After all, the confederation is an impossible project, built upon the much-touted idea that Montenegro, a “separate” republic, would have “equal powers with Serbia.” This integration could more accurately be called political assimilation.

Christine A. Telyan ’04 is a social studies concentrator in Eliot House.