Rethinking Phase Two

“Afghanistan is just the beginning of the war against terror,” declared a resolute George W. Bush on Nov. 21. Now that the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance has all but defeated the Taliban, all eyes are fixed firmly on Washington, waiting to find out where Phase Two of the war on terror will take us.

Many observers are already pointing to Iraq. “Phase two,” writes Tom Donnelly, in The Weekly Standard, “is a euphemism for Iraq. As the campaign in Afghanistan has progressed, a consensus has emerged that it is high time to remove Saddam Hussein from power.”

Although Donnelly overstates the point, he is not far from the mark. From the outset, many Pentagon officials, most notably Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, vociferously supported ousting the Taliban and Hussein in one swift stroke. And although initially hesitant, the State Department now seems to cautiously support the idea. Secretary of State Colin Powell has warned that countries “such as Iraq” should not think that we will be “unconcerned” about their chemical and biological weapons stockpiles. At the same time, U.S. diplomats appear to be forging closer ties with the exiled Iraqi National Congress. It could be only days before U.S. military personnel find themselves back in the Persian Gulf.

On the other hand, there are more than a few hurdles to overcome before Washington can set its sights on Baghdad. For one thing, we are already at war with Iraq, and have been since 1990. Worldwide support for that war (sanctions and periodic bombardment of Iraq) has been dwindling over the last decade, and a new offensive will not be warmly received in many corners of the world.

More importantly, the coalition against terror that effectively isolated the Taliban will likely fall apart at the seams if we bring the war to Iraq. Arab governments could barely subdue their citizens when U.S. warplanes began attacking the Taliban. And Afghanistan—although Muslim—is not even an Arab country. It will be more difficult to build a convincing case against Iraq, especially since most of the Arab world is convinced that the current U.S.-enforced sanctions against Iraq are a campaign to murder Iraqi children.

Nevertheless, winning over Arab leaders is not impossible. If Washington can promote a just peace in Israel and Palestine, it will accumulate enough good will in the Middle East to do just about anything it wants with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Bear in mind that this time around, Washington will have to do more than merely pay lip service to the desirability of an independent Palestine; it will have to put forth a substantive plan for a Palestinian state.

Still, building the coalition is not even half the battle. Even if the Bush administration were magically able to promote justice for the Palestinians while not upsetting the pro-Israeli lobby, taking the war to Iraq poses another set of problems. Suppose our forces topple Saddam Hussein? Then what? Observers have duly noted that the Northern Alliance might not be much better than the Taliban. But at least there was an opposition in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the only people with any political clout are Saddam’s allies and his cronies. Taking the war to Iraq will require intensive diplomatic acrobatics, a lot of luck and some divine intervention.

Fortunately, if our goal is to eradicate terrorism, there is no need to bring the war to Iraq—or any other country for that matter. The Bush administration’s approach to this war is fundamentally flawed: it presumes that the way to destroy a terrorist network is to steamroll an entire country and punish thousands of people who hate the terrorists as much as we do. We should not delude ourselves into believing that the battlefield success in Afghanistan vindicates the administration’s view. Sure, a conventional military campaign can get rid of a nasty government, but it will not wipe out a terrorist network that operates in dozens of countries and can easily change its base of operations? Al Qa’ida is an organized crime ring, and we should fight it accordingly. If an organized crime ring had a cell in Brooklyn, you wouldn’t send a bomber to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge, demolish its water treatment plan or shell residential neighborhoods in the hope that some of your ammunition might kill a few enemy operatives. The same logic should apply to Somalia, Sudan, Iraq or any other country believed to be helping or harboring terrorists.

So how do you fight organized crime? Spare the civilians, and with less fanfare, infiltrate the terrorist cells and destroy them from the inside. “More effective than military operations,” writes Buttenwieser University Professor Stanley Hoffmann, “are likely to be the instruments of police and counterintelligence, including the patient collection of information, the silent penetration of cells, the cutting-off of financial support, the dismantling of the communications used by the networks.”

And this is where America’s strengths come into play. Many people bemoaned the fact that the World Trade Center terrorists walked freely among us. But patriotic Americans can, potentially, walk easily among Al Qa’ida operatives—easily enough to sabotage their operations. I refer to the thousands of Arab- and Muslim-Americans who came forward when U.S. intelligence agencies recently requested the services of Arab speakers. There are, undoubtedly, many brave Arab- and Muslim-Americans who would be willing to work with the CIA and FBI to take down Al Qa’ida from the inside, especially if it meant that we would not have to pulverize another nation. In addition to being more effective and less brutal than bombing campaigns, it would also vindicate the rhetoric of our leaders who have stressed American pluralism and unity since the Sept. 11 tragedies.

It would be nothing short of a resounding moral victory if the United States worked with its Muslim and Arab citizens to defeat the force that hijacked Islam for its evil ends. It would avoid another bloody war and it would deliver a message more powerful than our biggest bombs.

Nader R. Hasan ’02 is a government concentrator in Lowell House. His column appears on alternate Wednesdays.