What We Should Have Done

As America moves from shock, to grief, to revenge, there is an ever-increasing onus on our leaders and experts to explain the tragic events of Sept. 11. While everyone seems to have a slightly different version about why disaster struck and what might have been done to prevent it, most of these explanations fall squarely into one of two camps. Elements of the right argue that Islam is a violent religion whose followers are bent on destroying America. They hold up CNN footage of a small cheering group of hooligans in the West Bank as proof that all Arabs are waging war on America.

The left’s explanation is less racist, but also misguided. It argues that Washington’s abysmal foreign policy record is responsible for the events of Sept. 11. It points to the sanctions that are responsible for the deaths of 1.5 million Iraqi children, as well as our government’s unwavering support for Israel, which has caused decades of unnecessary suffering for the Palestinians. They suppose that if Washington had pursued more humane policies towards Iraq and Palestine, then maybe there would not be so many angry terrorists.

Admittedly, the sanctions against Iraq ought to be regarded as a crime against humanity. And yes, America’s unconditional support for Israel’s apartheid policies has angered many people around the world. But Osama bin Laden is not a champion of Palestinian rights, nor is he concerned with the children of Iraq. Osama bin Laden is not fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims around the world. Instead, he fights to validate an interpretation of Islam that is offensive to most Muslims. Ask him why he wages war on America and he will tell you what he told an ABC News correspondent in 1998—that he declared war on America because U.S. soldiers are occupying the Muslim holy lands of Saudi Arabia.

If America had been a fairer broker in the Middle East peace process or if America had lifted sanctions against Iraq, the world would be a better place, but Osama bin Laden would still be waging war on America. And if there were no U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden and his band of fanatics would find some other reason to justify their attacks.

Those who wish to understand the tragic events of Sept. 11 should look no further than the mountainous war-zone where Osama bin Laden makes his home today. It is Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban that has provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and allowed him to set up his terrorist training camps. And although there was probably very little America could have done to curb Osama bin Laden’s fanatical beliefs, Washington had a plethora of opportunities to rein in Afghanistan from the fringes of global isolation and prevent terrorism from taking root in this war-ravaged country.

The Taliban did not come to power overnight, nor were they always our enemies. At the height of the Cold War, they were heroes in the eyes of the West. They belonged to the Afghan mujahideen (freedom fighters) who—with the help of $3 billion dollars worth of U.S. weapons, CIA intelligence and logistical support—succeeded in forcing the Soviets out of Afghanistan. But when the Cold War ended, the factions that made up the mujahideen turned against themselves in a struggle for power. Common sense suggested that we stay in Afghanistan to clean up the mess we created, but our policymakers in Washington told us that Afghanistan was no longer our problem. As a result, the Taliban emerged triumphant from this civil war and continues to rule Afghanistan with a heavy hand.

Still, there were a number of occasions over the past decade when Washington could have redeemed itself and prevented the Taliban from solidifying their hold on power. By 1996, the world had already learned of the Taliban’s viciousness—how it beat women for showing their faces in public and how it stoned to death even petty criminals. Back then, the so-called Northern Alliance was still a force to be reckoned with and still controlled the capital city of Kabul. But support for the Taliban continued to grow and the two sides fought fiercely. Everyone knew that the Northern Alliance needed outside support in order to repel Taliban attacks. Yet once again, the Washington turned the other cheek, and Kabul fell to the Taliban in September 1996.

Fast-forward to October 1999. Osama bin Laden is already on the FBI’s “Most Wanted” list for bombing U.S. embassies in Africa and U.S. intelligence knows that he is hiding in Afghanistan. When the Taliban refuses to turn over bin Laden, the U.S. takes its case to the United Nations Security Council and pleads for sanctions. Still smarting from their Cold War defeat, the Russians are eager to isolate Afghanistan from the international community and throw their support behind the U.S. initiative. The resolution passes and Afghanistan is effectively cut off from the rest of the world.

Under sanctions, the Taliban could not get the supplies it needed to maintain control over Afghanistan. So it turned to its old friend who had been such a faithful ally during the Cold War—Osama bin Laden. U.N. sanctions made bin Laden the second biggest benefactor of the Taliban (second only to Pakistan). Not only does he provide substantial financial support to the Taliban, but he also provides thousands of loyal war veterans—both of which have been essential as the Taliban continues to battle Afghan rebels in the northern part of the country. It is no wonder that the Taliban have been loyal to bin Laden despite intense international pressure—when the world turned its back on the Taliban, he was the only one willing to offer a helping hand.

We should have had the foresight to realize that a marriage between a fanatical government and a fanatical multimillionaire would spell disaster for the rest of the world. But we should have had the foresight to address the Taliban problem long before Osama bin Laden came into the picture. We should have helped Afghanistan recover from the Cold War. Having missed that chance, we should have utilized diplomatic channels to bring Afghanistan back into the fold of the international community. Instead, we isolated it with economic sanctions, forcing it to rely on a millionaire terrorist for help. Nobody in Washington wanted to take responsibility for destroying a country and our callousness has come back to haunt us.

Nader R. Hasan ’02 is a government concentrator in Lowell House. His column appears on alternate Wednesdays.