Fighting for Minds

“We are supported by the collective will of the world,” President George W. Bush said, addressing the nation just following the start of military operations in Afghanistan last week. If by “the world” Bush meant the “U.S. and Great Britain,” then his statement would have been correct. Of course, Bush has been known on occasion to be wrong—and the one-sided manner in which he has begun the battle against al Qaeda demonstrates yet another example of the Bush administration’s narrow-mindedness. This war will be decided, at the same time, in two very different battlegrounds, the physical and the mental, and at this moment, we have only been concentrating on the former.

Much has been said about the risks of negotiating with unreliable allies such as Pakistan or Egypt: their political volatility and the presence of small but significant fundamentalist groups inside their territories have led many to have misgivings about, or reluctantly accept, these last-minute alliances. Moreover, some have utterly denounced these covenants by predicting the potentially dangerous consequences they might bring in the short-run. Re-arming or collaborating with these “volatile” regimes is perceived as an unwise military strategy, for the ever-changing political fate of those states could suddenly turn them from being well-armed friends to potentially deadly foes.

However, it is vital for the U.S. to realize the strategic importance of these allies in a war not only determined by military might and guerilla tactics, but also by the most deeply-rooted religious beliefs configured in the epic conception of the world that fundamentalism has established in the area. For many Muslims influenced by fundamentalist claims, this war is the Holy War against the infidel Occidental World represented by America, and they are prepared to lose their own lives in order to defend their cause.

Osama bin Laden has understood this. His main weapon has been the spread of fundamentalist propaganda, and from the beginning, he has started to work on people’s minds-on those minds open to, but not yet convinced by his incendiary idealism. “Every Muslim shall support his religion,” he said on a taped message sent to Al-Jazeera television channel last week, after mentioning how his “brothers and sisters” in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq had symbolically retaliated in the recent attack on America. His denunciation of U.S. intervention in Israel will undoubtedly also bring others to his cause.

As a result, the contents of bin Laden’s message are perhaps as deadly as any bomb dropped in Afghanistan. By establishing his struggle as that of Islam and Islamic nations in general, he has sought to become an all-Islam martyr, fighting not only for al Qaeda and for the Taliban but also, and most importantly, for Islam and the Islamic people. Thus far, the American efforts in the mental war have been ineffective and have raised ethical dilemmas. The Bush administration has already taken some steps to avoid further propagation of bin Laden’s message at home: news programs and networks have been asked not to air the video of bin Laden’s preaching, and there have been rumors of heavy military surveillance (and eventually censorship) of coverage from the front. Although these strategies may ensure the success of the mental war at home by not further exposing the American public to the horrors of war, they seriously curtail the people’s right to freedom of information, something that we hold to be one of our society’s most treasured principles. The government must be very careful when handling ethical issues like this, especially now that enemies justify their attacks by condemning America’s scarcely ethical approach to foreign policy in areas such as the Middle East. Providing our foes with further evidence of moral double standards is especially risky now.

But in the mental war abroad, the U.S. has barely begun to engage the enemy on the same battlefield. If America is to seek the help of nations such as Pakistan or Jordan, it must convince their governments to publicly condemn bin Laden’s actions and align themselves with the recent attacks on Afghanistan. Most importantly, the U.S. must also make sure to convince the citizens and minorities in those countries of bin Laden’s wrongful message, clearly establishing that the war is against al Qaeda and the Taliban, not against Islam. For this purpose, the U.S. should encourage governments and leaders in those countries, who are clearly most apt than American leaders at influencing Islamic audiences, to address their people and convince them of the invalidity of bin Laden’s claims.

This, however, should be done with the utmost esteem for the right of people to unbiased information. The respect for civil rights and liberties (freedom of information among them) is a hallmark of our society as opposed to fundamentalist societies, intensely engaged in indoctrination and coercion of their people. We should not necessarily ask these governments to censor bin Laden’s messages, but instead, we should ask them to uphold free speech, so that truth can win out among the people in a fair way.

If the U.S. is to succeed in this war, the extent to which its allies in the Islamic world are prepared to contribute will be an essential factor. Bin Laden’s cause, like most fundamentalist ideals, greatly relies on its impact on people’s minds: defeating the religious raison d’etre of his cause will surely contribute to the fall of his terrorist empire. If the American administration is capable of convincing the Islamic governments and the general public of the validity of its cause, and succeeds in doing so, then this other war, this mental war, will be the first great victory against fundamentalism and a vital step towards the defeat of Islamic terrorist fundamentalism. The physical war will be already half won.

Bruno O. Alberti ’05 lives in Pennypacker Hall.