NATO's Strategy Problem

On April 5, we described the conflict in Kosovo as having "No End in Sight." Unfortunately, four weeks and 600,000 refugees later, the vision of the end has still failed to materialize. The costs of this conflict, both in terms of resources and human life, are too great for the NATO countries to be satisfied with the rate of progress so far. Either a qualitative change is required in NATO strategy--military or diplomatic--or Clinton and the other NATO leaders must provide a cogent explanation of how the current strategy will lead to success.

At the moment, there seems to be some diplomatic progress. The release on May 1 of the three detained U.S. servicemen following the mission of the Rev. Jesse Jackson to Belgrade is a welcome sign. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has shown that he would accept a U.N. force in Kosovo, albeit small and lightly armed. NATO has also rightly involved Russia in the diplomatic process, perhaps to make amends for excluding Russia at the start of the conflictnand should include in the diplomatic process the concerns of neighbors such as Montenegro and Macedonia and of nearby NATO members such as Hungary, Italy, and Greece.

But a diplomatic solution to the crisis will not be quick in coming. If past experience is any guide, Milosevic likely consented to the soldiers' release because of his own interests. The release was timed to prevent Clinton from taking any credit, as the White House had requested that Jackson not go, and the move could improve Milosevic's image and therefore his position in a negotiated peace. Such negotiations will not be easy: although there are some issues on which NATO can afford to be flexible, there are many on which the alliance must be adamant--including the removal of Serb troops from Kosovo and the creation of a well-armed international peacekeeping force--and on which Milosevic may be unwilling to budge. In these cases, the diplomatic resolution in the end will depend largely on how much damage NATO can inflict and how much Milosevic is able to sustain.

Milosevic has yet to show signs of weakness, however, and there is little consensus on how to proceed. On April 28, the House voted against sending ground troops without Congressional approval, rejected a proposed withdrawal of NATO forces and tied on whether to endorse the current strategy. Clearly, the House votes do not present the Clinton Administration with any useful guidance. But the House's indecision betrays a strong sense of frustration and impatience with the NATO effort, and that frustration could have been avoided had Clinton and other NATO leaders offered a coherent set of objectives when the air strikes began in March.

No one now expects the military strikes to end quickly; such an expectation may have always been a pipe dream. But there is a difference between a long, grinding campaign that makes visible progress toward some goal and a long, grinding campaign that is visibly stagnant. Even Gen. Wesley Clark, the military commander of NATO, has admitted that the weeks of bombing have not reduced either the size of the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo or the extent of their ethnic cleansing operations. No one knows how long air strikes might take to bring Milosevic to heel, but the results so far have given little reason to hope for their eventual success.

Furthermore, the high costs of the long-running military strikes are now becoming painfully apparent. President Clinton has asked Congress for a $6 billion appropriation to cover the costs of an operation through September, redirecting money that might otherwise have gone towards Social Security or the reduction of the national debt. And although the loss of innocent life is near-inevitable in any military operation, it cannot be blithely ignored. The consequences of war are made bearable only by the knowledge that some greater good will be achieved.

If Clinton cannot give strong reasons why the air campaign will suddenly become more effective, then a strategy that would merely continue the present air strikes in the hopes of eventual success would be unacceptable ¤ and the use of ground troops might be appropriate. Public impatience with the conflict is justified: The world deserves a more full accounting of NATO's strategy, not just appeals to the bad weather and Milosevic's unpredictable nature. If there is indeed no end in sight, the NATO leaders have at least the responsibility to show us how we will reach the beginning of the end.