UN-easiness

For those of you keeping score of the Clinton presidency, you can chalk up another broken promise, and this time it's a big one: the United Nations.

As he rode the campaign trail, Clinton sounded like an out-and-out internationalist. His proclamations on foreign policy were full of idealism and broad hopes for an improved world. He cited Woodrow Wilson, the epitomy of internationalism, as a role model. Then-Governor Clinton supported more robust U.S. cooperation with the U.N.; he called on the Bush administration to pay off its debt to the body, and he even supported the formation of a permanent U.N. military force, something the Bush administration firmly opposed.

Now it is becoming clear just how hollow that rhetoric was. Clinton the Brave Internationalist, if in fact he ever existed, has yielded to Clinton the Meek. Instead of taking a decisive turn toward creating a more just and fair international system, the Clinton administration has retreated into a corner, scarred by its rough treatment at the hands of Somali warlords, Serb soldiers and Haitian dockside gangs.

The clearest indication of this new, weak turn in American foreign policy is the just-released Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The 15-page document makes it very clear that rather than leading the U.N. in a more productive direction, the Clinton administration intends only to use it when it is safe and convenient. Gone are any hints at obligations to the international structure; the U.N. is just one of many tools at the U.S.'s disposal: "circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the U.N. can be an important instrument for collective action."

Gone as well is Clinton's support for a permanent U.N. armed force: "the U.S. does not support a standing U.N. army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation..." This position pushes U.S. policy behind even that of the bush administration--never a big supporter of the U.N.--which had pledged to designate certain U.S. military units for cooperation with the U.N.

What is most conspicuously absent from the document is any commitment on the part of the U.S. to live up to the ideals of the United Nations, which were, at root, to turn back aggression through concerted action. In its place are assurances that the U.S. will rigorously examine U.N. operations before voting for them. While there can be no doubt of the need for more planning and foresight in U.N. operations, the tone of the document would make Woodrow Wilson turn in his grave.

Some, no doubt, will be relieved to see a new hesitance on the part of the U.S. The credibility and competence of the world body has been found lacking in several ongoing operations. Serb forces have made a mockery of the U.N. in Bosnia, and General Aidid essentially forced the collapse of the U.N. mission in Somalia. For many, U.S. disattachment from the walking calamity that seems to be the U.N. can be nothing but good.

This is a short-sighted view. The U.N. is a classic example of an organization that reflects the commitment of its members. If member nations are cowardly, lazy or uninterested, the U.N. will be what it is now: an over gooder. On the other hand, if member states make serious commitments and sacrifices to the U.N., it can become what it was during the Gulf War--a competent organization that can turn back a major invasion.

The purpose of the U.N.'s founders was not to create a body that could be helpful at certain times. The U.N. was meant to be a binding commitment by major powers to reject force as a means of diplomacy. This commitment was to extend to small and large, weak and powerful.

The essence of a collective security system like this is commitments by member states to live up to these principles time and again, not just when it is convenient. The hope was that as the U.N. met its obligations and showed aggressors that they would meet with united resistance, the need for such operations would decline. Just like a domestic police force, the U.N., by fostering the expectation of a response, was designed to deter aggression.

This vision of the U.N.'s founders was quickly put on hold; the Cold war intervened and split the Security Council into hostile factions. Now that has ended. Putting the U.N. back on track will be the work of all nations, but primarily that of the world's sole super power.

Within the U.S., it will be the work of leaders, and President Clinton is showing himself to be far short of the task.