Clipper Will Help Fight Crime

I am writing to point out the amusing irony I discovered in Raymond Liu's editorial, "Info-Vasion" (March 21, 1994). Liu decries the "hype" that he believes characterizes the advent of new technologies, asserting that it "should not be...swallowed without thought." Yet lack of thought pervades his editorial. Liu wants us to wait until we have complete information about a plan before endorsing it; would that he had tried to gather more complete information before blindly flailing at systems like Clipper.

I must admit that in purely technical matters, Liu's research is adequate. His summary of how Clipper physically functions is correct. The government's encryption system will now individuals to send coded messages to one another, lending a substantial degree of protection from the intrusion of other private entities. Only a few law enforcement agencies would be able to break into these coded communications. The purpose of the project is to ensure that computer-literate criminals won't be able to conceal their data-trails with vast, "un-crackable" codes of their own.

Where Liu strays is his assertion that Clipper is out first step down the road to totalitarianism. He seems to believe that any of the government agencies with access to the "keys" to Clipper could arbitrarily "scan through any piece of data they deem necessary," perhaps "in the name of national security." His first error is in believing that this situation is new and unique to the Internet. Evidently, Mr. Liu is unfamiliar with the concept of a phone tap.

He also fails to realize that, like a tap on a telephone line, there are legal limits on how much access the government can have to electronic communications. I refer Mr. Liu to the Fourth Amendment, along with the past quarter century of Supreme Court decisions on search and seizure procedures. In short, in order for the FBI, for instance, to use any information they might acquire, they would have to supply probable cause, go to a judge, and get a warrant--all in advance of using the Clipper chip. Though I would admit that there are exceptions to this procedure, and that, especially with the current bent of our Court, no one's rights are entirely secure, I think it was a severe error of Mr. Liu not to realize that such protections exist.

Of course, there are other arguments against Clipper, most of them more compelling than the one that Mr. Liu is able to muster. But by merely beating the drum of social paranoia, he gives short shrift to not only these other potential arguments, but also the genuinely legitimate interest of the government to protect us all against electronic criminals. Brian d. Galle '94