Where Have We Gone on Bosnia?

Going, going... gone.

The independent nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is about to disappear. Her ravenous Serb and Croat neighbors are closing in for the kill. The future of Bosnia's mainly Muslim population--if it has any--remains to be seen.

Yet as Bosnia daily grows closer to disappearing from the map, her would-be defender, the United States, is slinking into the shadows, leaving her to die. As the U.S. fades from the scene it is throwing up a smoke-screen of excuses, admissions and rhetoric to mask its retreat. Without the U.S., there is little hope for Bosnia.

From the beginning, it was clear that it was America or bust. The "responsible" European nations, led by Britain and France, never gave the besieged Bosnian Muslims much reason to hope. But the Americans did. During the 1992 campaign, Governor Bill Clinton called for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnians and air strikes against the Serbs. For the Bosnians, a flicker of hope appeared.

And a month ago, it seemed as if the U.S. was finally on the move: Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher was in Europe, trying to push the Europeans into support for strong measures in Bosnia. Clinton was talking tough, publicly threatening air strikes and urging the end of the embargo.

Then something changed. Christopher's trip to Europe fell flat. He decided to follow the Europeans rather than to lead them. Clinton stopped talking about action, and started talking about "multilateral consultation." The direction of the Clinton administration as a whole changed, from that of an administration readying the country for action, to that of one explaining why the action was impossible.

This shift has manifested itself in several ways. First, the United States has stopped pressing its allies. Now rather than pushing its favored policy, the U.S. floats along, passively supporting whatever plan is in favor.

Several weeks ago, that was the "safe havens" proposal, which the U.S. enthusiastically supported. Now partition is the watch-word, and the U.S. has indicated its support for that as well.

Instead of using its massive influence to move its allies into line, the U.S. acts as if it has no more influence than a third world nation. Multilateralism has become a cover for a weak U.S. policy.

A second sign of the administration's shift is in its rhetoric.

Administration officials are preparing excuses for action by playing up the aspects of civil war in the Bosnian conflict and presenting it as an inevitable, intractable conflict between ethnic rivals who have always hated each other, rather than as the aggression and near-genocide that it is.

In a recent interview Christopher said all sides in the conflict "seem to be unwilling to take the steps necessary to create peace in their countries."

This kind of comment plays to the fears of Americans opposed to involvement. If no side wants peace, then why get involved? Yet as Christopher knows, the Serbs are the road-block to peace, and have been from the beginning.

The U.S. has also toned down its condemnations of atrocities, obscuring the main culprit in the conflict. In recent Congressional testimony, Christopher tried to spread the blame for atrocities around.

His testimony so distorted the situation in Bosnia that a senior State Department official had to remind the secretary of the facts--that the Serbs were responsible for the vast majority of the crimes.

Thirdly, Christopher has recently given hints that the administration is going to try to rewrite the history of the conflict in order to shift the blame to others.

In a recent interview, Christopher pointed to early German recognition of Croatia as a central catalyst for the war. This dubious assertion, which downplays the calculated nature of Serbian aggression, takes some of the burden from American shoulders and dumps it on an ally.

When the Germans protested, Christopher did what was necessary to avoid a major ruckus, but stuck to his claim.

If, as it appears now, the U.S. acquiesces in the takeover of Bosnia, it will go down as a sordid chapter in American foreign policy at a time when the prospects for a real "new world order" seemed so bright.

But it's not yet time to write off Bosnia as history. Much could still be done if the international community, led by the U.S., were to mobilize.

But that would take a measure of leadership and guts that are now nowhere to be seen.

David L. Bosco, who enjoys criticizing his bosses, is working this summer in the State Department press office.