The Errors of Isolationism

Walking across the Yard a few days ago, I heard the list of Holocaust victims recited from the steps of Widener. Name after name floated over the students walking to and from classes.

Remembering the Holocaust is a painful ordeal. But we choose to remember so that such a thing can never happen again.

So why are we letting it?

The slaughter and bloodshed in Bosnia has not yet reached the level of the Holocaust--hundreds of thousands have died, not millions. But should we wait until millions do perish before we act?

Apparently, leaders are starting to realize that this is the situation the world faces in Bosnia. Pressure for military action is mounting from various fronts, including the United States Congress. Senators Robert Dole (R-Kan.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.), two influential leaders, have called for air strikes to halt the Serbian onslaught.

But there remain prominent holdouts, including President Clinton. And without him action is impossible. Why are Clinton and several other world leaders resisting the growing pressure for action? Apparently they are still clinging to many of the myths, misperceptions and miscalculations that have combined with moral lethargy to paralyze the world for over a year.

The justifications for inaction have come in many flavors, but they can be boiled down to several assumptions:

The Ethnic Conflagration Argument: This states that the war in Bosnia is the result of spontaneous and violent ethnic hatreds. The corollary of this belief is that outside intervention can do nothing to stop the war, since it is a product of ancient hatreds.

This interpretation was a favorite of the Bush administration. Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger frequently said that no progress could be made in Bosnia "until those people decide to stop killing each other." Though the Clinton administration has mustered up the spine to blame the Serbs, this argument still appeals to many non-interventionists.

The flaw in the argument is that it makes ethnic hatreds a cause rather than a symptom. In reality, the war in Bosnia, just like the war in Croatia, is a calculated effort by the Serb government to capture as much land as possible as a means of creating a Greater Serbia. The overwhelmingly Serbian Yugoslav Federal Army has lent soldiers, weapons, training and support to the so-called Bosnian Serbs.

Ethnic rivalries, which certainly do exist, have been manipulated and fanned by Serb leaders for several reasons: first, to consolidate domestic support in Serbia for the war, and second, to keep the West from intervening by making the conflict look insoluble. The ploy has worked admirably.

The Quagmire Argument: This line of reasoning says that Western intervention will quickly bog down, and could trap thousands of NATO forces in a never-ending struggle, resulting in little gain and significant loss of life.

Much of the military leadership, including General Colin Powell, endorses this interpretation of the military situation. Often, proponents of the quagmire argument bring up the unsuccessful experiences of German troops in Yugoslavia during World War II in order to show the danger of military involvement.

This argument cannot be proven wrong. Military predictions are always speculative. But the argument remains insufficient in several ways. Western military intervention would not aim at conquering land, but instead at two other goals: putting real pressure on Serbia to halt the fighting, and leveling the playing field if they still refuse. Air power would be the primary method. These are realistic goals with good prospects of success.

Before the Yugoslav federal army (now in reality the Serb army) moved into Croatia or Bosnia, it attempted an attack on Slovenia. They were met with determined and organized opposition and quickly pulled out. This action indicates that once the costs become too high, the Serbs will cease offensive action. It's just that the West has allowed the cost of aggression in Bosnia and Croatia to be pitifully low.

Peace is not possible in the Balkans until someone shows the Serbs that aggression will be costly--that is the heart of the matter, and that is why numerous cease-fires and peace plans have failed.

The It's-Not-Our-Business Argument: This can be heard from neo-isolationists across the political spectrum. In essence their argument is that the war in Bosnia is not of direct national concern to the United States. They claim American foreign policy should be solely an extension of American interests. Both moral and realpolitik angles can rebut this argument.

As the world's only superpower, the United States is the leader of the United Nations and NATO, two organizations involved in trying to solve the Bosnian war.

The aggression in Bosnia, a U.N.-recognized country, directly contradicts the charters of both these organizations, both in terms of human rights and national sovereignty.

It is not necessary to catalogue the atrocities to see the moral imperative for action. The U.S. has an obligation to exert its greatest efforts through these two bodies to stop the bloodshed, using military means if necessary.

To many "realists," this argument will reek of sentimental hogwash. To these jealous guardians of the national interest, the only moral obligation the U.S. has is to stay out of trouble.

Yet the longer Serbian aggression remains unchecked, the more likely it is that the U.S. will become involved in a wider conflict.

Most analysts recognize the danger of Serbian action in Kosovo or Macedonia triggering a wider regional war. If that does occur, U.S. interests will be threatened, and involvement will be a must. Today's "realism" is nothing but curmudgeonly short-sightedness.

Realizing the fallacies of arguments against intervention will not, however, make the path clear for military intervention. Many problems remain. Most importantly, Russia appears unwilling to support any Security Council Resolution authorizing force against Serbia, its traditional ally. Britain also appears to have serious reservations because of worries over the safety of its peacekeeping troops.

But before our leaders can tackle the formidable task of convincing the world community, they must unhitch themselves from the many misconceptions about the war in Bosnia.

President Clinton, it appears, is still dragging them around.

Our attitude makes ethnic hatreds a cause rather than a symptom.

The West has allowed the cost of aggression in Bosnia and Croatia to be pitifully low