Mission: Unaccomplished

President Clinton is no doubt relieved that the furor over his administration's foreign policy has died down. Last month, after the debacle in Somalia, he came under fire from all directions for being an incompetent novice, incapable of running the country's foreign relations. Now, a few weeks later, the talking heads have simmered down.

With the clamor of opposition calming, Clinton should be able to hear something else: The sound of two important United Nations missions going down the drain. And though quieter, this sound is far more dangerous.

The two U.N. missions are those in Haiti and Somalia, and each has an important precedent attached to it. If these missions die, those precedents are in danger.

The international community is looking to Haiti to see whether the U.N. can force an illegitimate government to yield to the elected choice of the people. Several months ago, prospects looked good. The U.N. had brokered an agreement between the military leaders and the exiled President Aristide; the pact had called for Aristide's return. A force of lightly-armed U.N. peacekeepers, mainly from the U.S., was sent in September to monitor the peaceful transition of power.

Then something went wrong. Angry mobs met the peacekeepers--mobs encouraged by the military government. Without adequate arms to force their way ashore, the peacekeepers headed home, mission unaccomplished. Subsequent sanctions have made life miserable for Haiti's population, but the junta hasn't budged.

The story in Somalia is even sadder. Behind intervention there was the notion that the world community should not allow a society to self-destruct and a people to be decimated. Yet after conflicts with General Aidid, the U.N. operation that saved thousands from starvation and was restoring stability to the country seems about ready to collapse. With the imminent failure of the mission, the factional fighting that led to chaos is reappearing. Starvation isn't far behind.

As things now stand, Haiti will move deeper into the grip of a military dictatorship and Somalia will slide back into chaos. The U.N. will have shown itself incapable of restoring usurped democracy, and unable to manage large-scale humanitarian intervention. The failure of these operations will not neccasarily preclude the U.N. from trying again, but the memory of debacles past will cast serious doubt on future missions.

Yet missions such as these were intended to be a cornerstone of the post-cold war world. A revitalized U.N. was supposed to rectify wrongs that had long gone unchallenged in a world of superpower politics.

Obviously, this was an idealistic goal. Nobody thought the world would suddenly become a cradle of justice and peace. But Somalia and Haiti represented cases of blatant abuse where intervention seemed reasonable.

If the U.N. were truly incapable of these operations--as many believe--then these setbacks are a needed dose of realism. But the U.N. was--and still may be--capable of success in both cases, which makes failure all the more damaging.

The central problem is that the U.N. is still finding its footing, and in both Haiti and Somalia, it has leaned heavily on America. In both places, the U.S. has retreated, leaving the U.N. tottering.

Ideally, American support would not determine the success or failure of a U.N. mission. But the U.N.'s current position is such that without strong support from the world's only superpower, its missions will often fail. The Clinton administration needs to understand and accept this condition.

The U.S. retreat leaves some disturbing question marks about Clinton's leadership. Perhaps the president has decided that his domestic program and popularity are more important than these groundbreaking missions. If so, he has made a serious error in judgment. Worse, Clinton could be unaware of the ramifications of his actions. Neither alternative bodes well for U.S. foreign policy or for the future of the U.N.