Rape Definition Broadened

To the Editors of the Crimson:

In response to grave concerns voiced to me by constituents today, I would like to clarify some of the important issues debated in last Sunday's Undergraduate Council meeting. The issue under discussion was that of the council's report on date rape. The April 13 Crimson article covering the meeting was, I believe, misrepresentative of the UC's fundamental intent in the debate ("UC Defines Rape Narrowly"). The concerns voiced to me by several women center on the fear that rape victims will be less likely to step forward if they believe that the University's policy has become more stringent.

It has not, and I would like to allay any reservations victims might have about reporting such a felony to the police and to appropriate University officials.

First, the council's definition of rape is only part of a proposed and recommended report to the administration. It is not University policy, and those students who disagree with this definition are encouraged to contact Dean Jewett with their reservations. Second, and most importantly, The Crimson's reporting of the meeting is, I believe, somewhat askew of what actually transpired.

While Monday's headline runs in bold face "U.C. Defines Rape Narrowly," the entire point of the meeting was an attempt to broaden the definition of rape, as expressed in Massachusetts state law and in current Harvard policy. State law defines rape as "[s] exual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse by a person with another person who is compelled to submit by force and against his will or by threat of bodily injury, or sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a child under sixteen years of age," [Mass. Gen. Laws, 277, 639]. The two expanded definitions, put forward by Vice-Chair, Malcolm Heinicke '93, by the Academics Chair, Maya Prahbu '93 and by Effie Anagnostopoulos '93, are both vast expansions of the state's and Harvard's legal code.

While the imposing paragraph on the front page shows Heinicke, his definition of rape, deftly presented as it was, was nonetheless defeated in debate. What was accepted was Prahbu's and Anagnostopoulos's definition. And yet, no photo of them was shown, nor are their names mentioned on the front page.

While both definitions are expansions of the definition of rape, the distinction between the two is crucial. Heinicke's definition limits rape to those cases in which sexual intercourse occurs despite the woman's expressed objections. It does expand state law by counting as rape cases in which the victim is "physically unable" to express unwillingness.

Thus, if a woman were inebriated or in some other way physically incapacitated from expressing unwillingness, University policy would then consider sexual intercourse rape in such a situation. The final council recommendation is even more liberal, allowing for a victim who is merely "unable" to express unwillingness. Debate over the single word "physically" lasted nearly half an hour. It was decided that deletion of the word "physically" would allow for such situations as psychological trauma or shock which might prevent a woman from expressing unwillingness.

The quintessence of the council's new recommended definition lies in the definition of sexual negligence, or what The Crimson has termed "grey area." I believe this label to be a disservice not only to the UC, who see more importance in this than mere "grey area," but to the entire undergraduate community. The Crimson had a duty to inform the Harvard community properly of the significance and gravity of what has been termed "sexual negligence." This category opens up an entirely new outlook on the definition of rape.

What lies at the crux of the matter is not what happens when a woman says "no" and is ingored. All agree this constitutes rape. What is under consideration are situations in which a woman does not "say no," but nor does she say "yes." The new proposed definition is an attempt to take into account situations in which no clear "no" was spoken, but ones in which it was nevertheless signified.

Here, above all, is where the newly proposed definition is attempting to expand the current one. While the Date Rape Task Force did wish to have an even broader definition of rape, one in which any sexual encounter that did not have explicit consent of both parties would constitute rape, this definition was deemed too strict to be feasibly instituted. To be politically blunt, such a definition would never have passed the UC full council.

What was passed, a definition which integrates the concept of sexual negligence, is a compromise, but one which nonetheless takes into account very important considerations. It realizes that while a person's signals may be recondite, if they are there and they are ignored, that person is being violated.

It is difficult to prove rape in cases where a woman does not explicitly communicate "no." Yet, Prahbu and Anagnostopoulos have very astutely pointed out that while such cases may not always be considered rape, they are neither right, not, moral, nor should they occur with impunity. Such instances of "sexual negligence" have thus been the cynosure of the UC's attempt to broaden the definition of rape. If a woman does not say no, but nevertheless communicates unwillingness and feels violated, she may be able to prosecute under this new category.

By integrating sexual negligence into the definition of rape, the UC is allowing victims to have greater, legally recognized choices concerning courses of action.

In spite of The Crimson's account of this ongoing debate, I do hope this caveat will serve to assure rape victims that concrete steps are being taken to secure their rights, their decisions, and their peace of mind. David Lefer   Co-Chair   UC Security Committee.