Misjudging Maastricht

On September 20, the French people voted in favor of the Maastricht Treaty on European unity. Now all that remains is to give it a proper burial.

We should all heave a sigh of relief that, in the end, a majority of French left their pikes and Phrygian caps at home before going to the polls. If the French had voted to guillotine Maastricht, in the end many more heads would have rolled.

Even the basic concept of an integrated Europe, which had turned former foes into domestic partners, might have eventually been forced to the scaffold. In that case, Western Europe would have rejoined its Eastern neighbors in revisiting the ugly past.

The French vote has made such a turnaround less likely. But that being said, the Maastricht Treaty has no future. We can only hope that the damage the treaty has done to Europe already will pass, without permanently affecting the aims of security and economic well-being.

France did not have to hold a referendum on Maastricht. But French President Francois Mitterrand wanted more than parliamentary ratification; he hoped that a resounding French "oui" would make people forget that Denmark had already voted against the treaty--which needed unanimous ratification by all European Community (EC) member states.

Mitterrand, whose reputation as a political genius had already been tarnished by his appointment of Edith "Anglo Saxons are homosexuals and Japanese are ants" Cresson as Prime Minister last year, has seen his ploy--and his popularity--explode in his face.

Originally, the French leader said he fully expected that two thirds of his people would back Maastricht. In fact, barely 51 percent gave it their support.

This weakness in French support means Maastricht is as good as dead. Denmark's negative vote cannot be ignored, even though there will be a re-vote in mid-1993.

With a strong French "oui," the other EC members could have, perhaps, forced Denmark to change its mind. But with discontent appearing in a number of countries, no thinking person seriously believes the Danes will change their minds unless the treaty undergoes serious revision. Furthermore, Britain won't even consider the treaty until the Danes are satisfied.

Maastricht is a prime example of how easily leaders can lose touch with their societies, even under democratic rule. The signers of the Maastricht Treaty sorely ignored popular opinion. Now, understandably, popular opinion is taking them to task.

The leaders' two major misjudgements at Maastricht were, first, an overestimation of Europeans' will to (super)power, and second, an underestimation of Europeans' fear and loathing of each other.

European leaders thought everyone wanted what they wanted--a European superstate. And Maastricht would have done much to bring that about. The treaty was a big step toward the creation of a European superpower which Europhiles hoped would be equal to or greater than the United States.

Perhaps there is a geopolitical reason for a SuperEurope to stand shoulder-to-shoulder--or toe-to-toe--with the United States. But the dream of a European superpower is confined to a few realpolitikers in European governments. It is not shared by ordinary citizens, who wish for economic growth, not geopolitical posturing.

Secondly, the leaders failed to acknowledge how much fear Germany still inspires in Europeans. For instance, both sides in the French debate on Maastricht used anti-German arguments to bolster their cause. While the "non" side argued that France should not get in bed with a German dominatrix, the "oui" group argued that France should not get in bed with a German such "German demons" (as former Prime Minister Michel Rocard put it) could only be controlled by a tight embrace.

The extent to which fear and loathing still hold Europe in their grip is also demonstrated by the current crisis in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). This crisis, which in the past two weeks has seen the British pound and Italian lira suspended from the ERM, the Spanish peseta significantly devalued, and the French franc under serious attack, has brought out of the closet all of the chauvinist habits of the pre-war years.

The highest officials of the British government have accused Germany of a "whispering campaign" and conspiracy to push the pound sterling out of ERM. They have also charged that this campaign is part of a "secret pact" between the French and German governments to go ahead with Maastricht over the objections of their European partners, not to mention substantial sections of their own populations.

Germany accused the British of being bad Europeans for harboring suspicions about their Community comrade. Then it validated the British suspicions by planning a major celebration of the Nazi invention of the V-2 rocket, which caused so much destruction and psychological distress in Britain at the end of World War II (after howls of protest, Germany decided to cancel the "celebration").

In this situation of mistrust, no political or monetary union is possible. Europe is in turmoil. There is nothing to do now but sit and weather out the storm.

European leaders thought the 1930s were a thing of the past. They were. But now, thanks to the misjudgements of Maastricht, the 1930s might just turn out to be a thing of the future as well.