Who Was Right?

While the War Raged on, Scholars at Harvard Were Debating The Merits of a Ground Offensive. Now the war is Over, Leaving Scholars to Ask...By the middle of the week, international relations experts were left to reconcile their theories with actual events.

While the ground war was being fought on the sands of Kuwait this week, a quieter, more civilized disagreement was being played out on the pages of academic journals and newspaper editorial pages.

Before the ground offensive began, Harvard scholars debated the merit and necessity of such a military maneuver. But by the middle of this week, the success of the ground campaign left many international affairs experts who had argued against a ground war to reconcile their theories with actual events.

What surprised them was the ground war's quick success, they now say. Before the most recent attack, support for an offensive ground war was cautious and qualified, as scholars looked to diplomacy as an alternative to a military solution. A ground war would result in many lost lives, they said.

But with the apparent success of the campaign, several scholars now say they have been proven wrong. The easy victory was unexpected.

"I thought [engaging in a ground war] was imprudent," says Stanley H. Hoffmann, Dillon professor of the civilization of France. "It turns out I was wrong." Hoffmann wrote an opinion piece in the Monday's New York Times calling for the use of preventive diplomacy and not military might to end international conflicts.

"I was somewhat surprised at the ease of how things went," says Stephen M. Haggard, associate professor of government. "I believe we could have avoided the ground and air war. We should have attempted the sanctions for longer than we were willing. We were trapped by our deadlines."

Adds Haggard, "The reason why I'm not as dovish is because subsequent actions taken by Saddam Hussein meant sanctions might not have worked."

Meanwhile, scholars who recognized the necessity of the war are now pondering the future of a post-war Middle East.

"I thought the [ground] war was justified," says Joseph S. Nye. Dillon professor of international affairs. "The reason for it was if we left Saddam Hussein intact with his troops, there would not be stability in the region. Once more. Americans would be stuck with staying in the region."

Although many scholars agree that the allies' goal was not to remove Saddam Hussein from power but to humiliate him, they fear the future of the region remains problematic. U.S. involvement could expand to mean a permanent presence in the Gulf; an internationally-driven power struggle might ensue after the fall of a weakened Hussein, they say.

With an end to the military confrontation, diplomacy and statesmanship must again come to the fore, experts now say. U.S. military might cannot solve all the region's problems, they say.

"I am very worried of the implication of the use of American might to control world events," says Herbert C. Kelman, Cabot professor of social ethics. "Efforts must be multilateral and multinational."

"We must take into account the sensitivity of the region rather than trying to establish ourselves as the policemen of the world."

Says Nye, "It is easier to go in than to get out."

Before the ground war became a reality, several scholars said they were reluctant to support the push for military action. Some said they feared the liberation of Kuwait would mean high casualities. The media and the military depicted the Iraqi military machine as a formidable foe--something it was not, they now say.

"We were led to believe there would be high casualties," says Albert Carnesale, Littauer professor of public policy and administration.

"Everyone was afraid of troop casualties," says Kurt M. Campbell, associate professor of public policy at the Kennedy School. "It is now clear that there were very few casualties." Campbell recently returned to Harvard after a two year stint as special assistant to the National Security Council.

Campbell says that past experience in desert warfare supported the belief that a ground war must necessarily cost many American lives.

Other professors say, however, that diplomatic steps could still have been used to avoid the possibility of a ground war. While the Soviet peace plan was not acceptable, President Bush should have allowed more time for diplomatic manueverings, they say.

"They did not give adequate chance for the diplomatic process," says Herbert C. Kelman, Cabot professor of social ethics. "They did not take the Soviet effort seriously. They did not give it a chance to play itself out."

Two Objectives

Bush's decision to reject the Soviet peace plan had two objectives, scholars say. Not only did the U.S. want to reduce Hussein's arsenal, but the Administration wanted to leave the Iraqi leader little room to claim any sort of victory--military, moral or otherwise. Arabs would then have little reason to regard him as a hero, experts say.

Says Haggard, "They are allowing him no opportunity for claiming victory. There is no interest on the part of the Administration. Whether it is a smart move remains to be seen. They have as two possible models Versailles and Japan."

In Versailles, the Germans were humiliated and forced to pay reparations. The ultimate result, most scholars agree, was World War II. But Japan, after its defeat in World War II, has become a close ally of the United States.

But the acceptance of the Soviets' peace plan, many scholars now say, would have left a devious Saddam Hussein too much room to maneuver, both diplomatically and militarily.

"After all, Saddam Hussein has a reputation for deception. If we had gone along and given him three weeks, it is plausible he would change his mind and set other conditions," says Nye.

...By the middle of the week, international relations experts were left to reconcile their theories with actual events.