Scholars Consider A Post-War Era

Just over two weeks ago, U.S. planes began an air offensive that launched the country into its first major conflict in two decades. Inside and outside Harvard, the shock of war was immediate.

In the days that followed, the University's Middle East experts were bombarded by calls, requests and pleas from the media to answer initial questions and analyze the primary impact of the situation.

But since the first wave subsided, Harvard scholars from a wide range of area studies and disciplines have begun to reflect beyond the conflict and into the future of the region itself.

Second in a four-part series on the war in the Gulf.

Although professors disagree about the course of U.S. policy, most Middle East experts here are unanimous in their sense that the war will have serious consequences that may not have been fully considered. Most say they cannot even begin to predict what a post-war Middle East will look like.

"We are concerned about what kind of power balance will exist at the end of the war," says William A. Graham, director of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

Although most media attention has centered on the strategic and economic dimensions of the conflict, Graham and others in his field say policy makers must begin to examine the effect the war will have on the long-term balance of power within the Gulf. Once Hussein loses, they ask, who or what will replace him?

"It is most likely that Saddam Hussein will fall," says Laurie A. Mylroie, associate professor of government. "The question is what will happen next? We are talking about a country that was once apolitical. Now there is a lot of political activity. New people, new faces are ready to emerge."

U.S. Role

Looking beyond the region's political questions, Nur O. Yalman, professor of social anthropology and Middle Eastern studies, says the U.S. must define its own role within the post-war reconstruction. That is, he asks, will U.S. troops remain in the Gulf as they did in Korea?

Despite Bush's initial objectives in this conflict, many observers have speculated that the President may want to broaden these goals, as the war becomes more serious. Most scholars at Harvard, however, caution against this approach.

If Bush were to expand his game plan to include Hussein's downfall after the release of Kuwait, some experts say this would only aggravate tensions between the U.S. and Arab nations. It would further damage an American reputation among Arabs already suspicious of the war's motivations, they say.

"The U.S. would face serious problems within the larger Muslim world in terms of our credibility as an even-handed defender of just causes," says Graham, who is also professor of history of religion and Islamic studies. "This [talk of broadening the war] does not help the previous distrust any."

Amid the scholarly discourse at Harvard, debate over the ethics of the Gulf War brings a emotional charge to typically sedate academic commentary. Some professors say they feel all other options should have been exhausted before going to war, others say that the U.S. had no other alternative. But all say they agree that the war should end quickly.

"People would like to see this problem dealt with quickly," says Yalman. "If it goes on too long, people will question the ethicality of the war."

Scholarly Collaboration

Despite the specific political and social history that surrounds the Persian Gulf, scholars who study a variety of regions have added their thoughts to the fray. Given the increasing study of international conflict as a discipline in itself, this kind of collaboration is no surprise.

War analysts, military advisors and diplomatic historians have joined Middle East experts in their pursuits, often using their own past experience as a way to examine the present conflict.

"People from all walks of life have an informed opinion and they have a responsibility to share their opinion," says Graham. "It is a national issue and not just a foreign area issue."

Stanley H. Hoffmann, Dillon professor of the civilization of France, for example, has written editorials on the topic for publications like the The New York Review of Books and The Boston Globe. While he is no Middle East expert, he says he has chosen to write because it involves American foreign policy--a topic he teaches.

Although most faculty members have yet to assume a public stance on the conflict, David S. Landes, Coolidge professor of history and economics, says that is only a matter of time. "If it is a long war, there will be fairly little response," says Landes. "If it is a long war, there will be more faculty response."

Twenty Years Ago

Twenty years ago, many professors joined students on campus to protest the war in Vietnam. But now some scholars are quick to point out that reactions to Gulf War do not resemble those of the early 1970s. Vietnam divided the Faculty because for many professors, the reasons for intervention were unclear, says Landes.

"It had an aura of a progressive movement. This war does not," recalls Landes. "Even those opposed to war are ready to admit that Saddam Hussein is a villian--that Iraq was wrong to invade, occupy and annex Kuwait."

Should Bush Have Waited?

As events continue to unfold in the war with Iraq, some of Harvard's Middle East experts continue to question President Bush's decision to act so soon after the January 15 deadline.

"Most area specialists are concerned as I am over the long-term consequences of plunging rapidly into open warfare before exhausting all other options," says Graham. "The majority...are dismayed by the lack of a clear sense of objectives and how to deal with the aftermath."

Says Walburg Professor of Economics Emeritus John Kenneth Galbraith, who has written about military strategy in World War II, "The sanctions should have been given longer to work."

Bush committed himself to this line of action from the very beginning, some experts say. By sending such a massive force to Saudi Arabia last fall, Bush set the tone of the confrontation. Bush shifted U.S. purpose from the defense of Saudi Arabia to the retaking of Kuwait, they add.

"Bush attached himself to this policy by making two mistakes," says Stephen M. Haggard, associate professor of government. "First was the putting together of the coalition in the United Nations for the passage of the January 15 deadline. Second was the November deployment of troops which shifted [the conflict] from a defensive to offensive status. The decisions were against the sanction strategy."

At the start of the conflict and soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush ordered 125,000 troops to the Gulf. In the course of several weeks, more than 200,000 additional troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia to await orders.

But other Middle East experts say they support Bush's decision. Better to stop Saddam Hussein now then be faced with a larger threat later, they say, arguing that the world cannot make the same mistake as it did in World War II by conceding to Hitler.

"War is a terrible thing but what is more terrible is a bigger war down the road," Landes says.

And even as these personal and political debates continue, Harvard scholars say they can only begin to imagine where the war in the Persian Gulf will take us. Either way, they say, the Middle East and its place in Harvard scholarship will never be the same.

Tomorrow: Harvard's Scholars as Foreign Policy Makers