Don't Rush the Latin American Peace Plan

AFTER the presidents of five Latin American countries agreed this week to demobilize, relocate and repatriate the Contra revolutionaries in Nicaragua by December 5, the Bush Administration reacted with disappointment.

For once, the Bush Administration's position on the Contras makes sense.

The United States is upset that the accords set such an early date for the disbanding of the Nicaraguan rebels, as Secretary of State James A. Baker III told Costa Rican President Oscar Arias-Sanchez. Bush Administration officials prefer that the program take effect after the February 25 elections in Nicaragua.

Allowing the Contras to exist until the election would improve the chances of success for the democratic reforms in Nicaragua. But, if the Contras are dismantled ahead of time, there is no way for observers to guarantee that reforms will occur. Under the accords, the plan would be implemented by a group made up of representatives from the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

EXPERTS say the accords, signed in Tela, Honduras, by the leaders of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala, signal the end of the Contras. Most assuredly, the United States will not be able to wield as much influence in the region when the threat of the Contras no longer exists.

At the present time, the U.S. has some measure of influence over the rebels through its aid packages. By threatening to cut off that aid, which is already scheduled to expire in February and could be stopped after November 30, the United States can force the Contras to agree to the provisions of a Latin American peace plan.

And with its influence over the Contras, the Bush Administration could force Nicaragua to keep its promise of democratic reforms--starting with the February 25 elections.

The United States should insist that plans for the demobilization of the Contras be pushed back until after the results of the these elections are clear and show undeniable evidence of democratic change.

THE leaders of the five countries felt that the presence of the Contras during the election might spark a crack-down by the Nicaraguan government and military.

This outcome, however, does not seem likely given the now-imminent demise of the Contras and the apparent desire of the Nicaraguan government to appear fair. President Daniel Ortega has more to lose from the international outcry and the resumption of civil war following a military crackdown than he can gain.

The other reason advanced by the presidents for dismantling the Contras so quickly is the destabilizing effect of the rebels inside the Honduran borders. This may be true, but a plan to reintegrate 50,000 Contra refugees into the Nicaraguan social and political mainstream within four months doesn't seem viable.

The Tela accords also are impossible to implement because no consensus was achieved on whether demobilization could be forced on the Contras.

Ortega insists that the accords called for the disarming of the Contras, whether or not the rebels agree to it. But Arias and President Jose Azcona of Honduras say the disbanding will have to be voluntary, and Azcona refuses to use military force against the rebels and will not tolerate Nicaraguan military action along the Honduran border.

And unless the Contras disarm voluntarily, the United Nations reportedly would not be willing to play a role in the implementation of the accords, according to unnamed sources in the U.N.

THE Contras will have to disband soon. After eight years of fighting, they have played little role in the political outcomes in the region--a fact illustrated by the Tela accords that failed to include them.

"The Central American Presidents have taken the destiny of Central America in our hands," Arias said in Tela, and the rebels obviously have no place in any future decision-making in the region.

But a proposal to disband the Contras as a military force and re-integrate them into the Nicaraguan society by December 5 would be a shock to all parties involved. It hardly seems possible, especially without the presence of an international commission overseeing the process.

More time is needed to work out the proposal's logistics and determine further whether Nicaragua's promises of democratic reform are legitimate. It will certainly take more than four months to be successful.