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This article is the first in a three-part series examining the transition to the Bush presidency.
In 1962 in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union was poised for war with the United States, panelists revealed at a conference last week in Moscow. But today, President Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev are on the verge of a brave new world of global relations.
Bush and many analysts foresee a radical change in the world's power structure that will take the ideological spin off superpower relations. One day, the new president expects, the United States will view the Soviet Union as just another country, one among many.
But to achieve these heady dreams, Bush will have to overcome a bevy of obstacles--the possibility of domestic Soviet turmoil, the hesitancy of his cabinet and a 40-year-old tradition of anti-communism.
"In a sense it's more difficult policy-wise than the old time when we knew the Russians were up to no good," says Gurney Professor of History and Political Science Adam B. Ulam.
Bush's plans hinge on the domestic success of his Soviet counterpart, foreign policy experts at Harvard and in Washington say. They say there is a wide gap between what the Soviet people expect from Gorbachev's economic reforms and what he can deliver in the near future. The growing restlessness of the Soviet population, particularly its minorities, and the barely hidden bitterness of conservative forces could cripple Gorbachev and reverse the "softening" of Soviet foreign policy.
"If you knew for sure that Gorbachev was going to be there for four years, eight years, 20 years, you could draw up a policy that would respond to his flexibility and would probably mean a brand new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, something we really haven't seen for 90 years," says Marshall I. Goldman, the associate director of Harvard's Russian Research Center.
"But if Gorbachev is going to be thrown out--and I think there's every reason to believe that he probably will--then if you made all kinds of accommodations on the assumption that there is a brand new world order, you could find yourself embarrassed, having to backtrack, being called a dupe and also involving yourself in some things that would be much more costly if you have to try to gear up again after what did take place," Goldman says.
So Bush could find himself in a Catch-22 situation. Caution could hasten the general secretary's demise, but zeal could come back to haunt the president if Gorbachev loses power.
If repeated Soviet proposals fall on deaf ears in the U.S., Gorbachev's opponents may label his foreign policy reforms an embarrassing failure and demand hardline dealings, says Yuen Foong Khong, an assistant professor of government who researches the psychology of diplomatic decision-making.
"Inside the Soviet Union, I've been told by people in the Central Committee that they're worried that one of the reasons why Gorbachev is being attacked is that he is viewed as simply a pushover when it comes to dealing with Reagan," says Goldman, adding that they say whenever the general secretary meets with Reagan, he "comes home without his shirt."
Not only does the president have to worry about shifts in Soviet government, he must also combat criticism from Democrats in Congress, who want the president to make the most of Gorbachev's reign, no matter how soon it might it end.
"I think it's going to be tough for Gorbachev to meet the high expectations apparently developing among the Soviet people," says Senator Albert J. Gore, Jr. '69 (D-Tenn). "But he has consistently defied the pessimists and may continue to do so."
Gore and other Democrats say Bush should secure deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons and embark on an "unprecedented international effort to confront the global ecological crisis."
European Missiles
While some observers speculate that Bush could present his own bold proposals to Gorbachev, the president's handling of the missile situation in Europe may hint at things to come.
Last week, Bush sent Secretary of Defense-designate John G. Tower to Europe to urge the NATO allies to permit the U.S. to upgrade missiles stationed there. The allies, especially West Germany, are resisting the change. They say the upgrade is unnecessary in the light of Gorbachev's decision to unilaterally withdraw 500,000 troops from Eastern Europe and cut the U.S.S.R.'s defense budget by 14 percent.
"It's the same song, second chorus, a little bit louder and a little bit worse," says Retired Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll of the missile program. The deputy director of the Committee on Defense Information in Washington says Bush is violating pledges he made since his election to reassess Soviet relations, adding that the president is wedded to the outdated "peace through strength" philosophy.
But experts say Bush must balance the desire to encourage allies to take up the burden of their own defense with the need to hold together the Western alliance against a purportedly diminishing threat, experts say.
The Soviet Union's impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, set for February 15, will afford Bush another opportunity to demonstrate his foreign policy objectives. When the Red Army tanks roll out of the Afghan capital after a nearly 10-year-long occupation, rebel factions are expected to overthrow the government and fight among themselves for leadership of the country.
In a press conference last week, Bush said the United States should play a "catalytic role" in bringing about democratic rule in Afghanistan. But advisers stressed later that the U.S. would continue a calculated policy of strict non-intervention in Afghanistan.
In fact, moderation and practicality may be the hallmarks of Bush's foreign policy team, according to experts.
Secretary of State James A. Baker III, deputy Lawrence S. Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft are Washington insiders who place pragmatism before ideology.
"I have a feeling that Baker is just too much of a politician to kind of put his neck out the way that [former Secretary of State George] Schultz did and fight on principle in this way," Goldman says.
Baker, chief of staff and later secretary of the treasury under Reagan, has little foreign policy experience and will probably rely on career bureacrats for guidance, Khong says. He adds that these experts at the "second tier" of the state department are moderate.
Administration critics charge that another Bush appointee, Tower, will resist military cutbacks essential for an arms control agreement. Some have charged that Tower, who served as a consultant to defense contractors after retiring as chair of the Senate's armed services committee, has ties to the weapons industry that might impair his judgment.
The Defense Department "requires a very strong disciplinarian, a strong manager, and if there's anything that's true it's that John Tower is not a disciplined man or a manager," Carroll says.
If American foreign policy continues to embrace a hostile relationship with the Soviets, "it will distract us from what is our real problem right now--not the Soviet Union, but technology and the American economy," Goldman says.
Instead of a cold war, securing markets and halting an economic slide relative to Japan and rising economies like South Korea and Taiwan could become the focus of American foreign policy, experts say.
Khong says the U.S. should be aware of Japan, and Ulam says, "I think to some extent the Reagan administration kept pushing problems under the rug, and those problems--Japan, Western Europe--they all come."
And it is fairly certain that Bush will continue dealing with the Palestinian Liberation Organization in its search for a solution to the Middle East crisis, experts say. And one Harvard professor says he would not expect Bush to discontinue Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" with the apartheid regime of South Africa.
"Two years ago, you could say that constructive engagement was an excuse for a stand-pat policy, a do-nothing policy," says Thompson Professor of Government Martin L. Kilson. But he says the plan has allowed the U.S. to mediate the recent Southern African peace settlement, which ties the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola with Namibian independence from South Africa.
Despite potential pitfalls, experts say, more peace pacts could continue to defuse tensions between the two superpowers, setting the stage for a new age of cooperation.
"If the present trend in the Soviet Union lasts, let's say, five or seven years or more, then the whole concept of NATO should be reworked," says Ulam, an expert in Soviet foreign policy.
"If indeed Gorbachev succeeds, we could really be on the brink of a whole new era," Goldman says. "It's not a question of holding down the military budget. It may be just chopping it up."
Jonathan S. Cohn contributed to the reporting of this story.
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