A Reunification Primer

MUCH ink has been spilled recently, on these pages and elsewhere, on the question of German reunification. And for good reason--it is potentially the most important thing that's happened to the Eastern bloc since Yalta, in which international democracy accepted the fait accompli of a Soviet military blanket over Eastern Europe and thereby condemned millions of its newest members to at least 44 years of political suppression and economic stagnation.

Only the most fringe conservative elements on this side of the Atlantic retain a traditional Cold War perspective on Eastern Europe. The rest have moved to reevaluation--of superpower relations, economic opportunities and German unity.

DISCUSSIONS of reunification, however, can expose several misconceptions about German attitudes, politics and the international context of the reunification. The following are five rather curious views of the German situation, all read or overheard on campus in the past weeks.

The Wall was the primary division between East and West Germany, and its opening removes the main obstacle to reunification. Some well-stacked bricks with electrified wire (and a few well-placed sharpshooters) doesn't constitute a wide enough chasm to keep apart the two halves of a once-mighty European nation. The gulf which separated the Germanies--and still separates them--is membership in their respective economic and military alliances, treaties more permanent than a stack of bricks.

This gulf isn't the physical distance across the no-man's land behind the Wall, but the political distance between Comecon and the EEC, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. For now, East Germany remains a vital part of the frontline forces of the Warsaw Pact, and West Germany provides the crux of NATO forces in Western Europe.

There's quite a temptation to elevate symbols over reality, especially when you call yourself Peter Jennings or Dan Rather and you're standing in a trenchcoat next to the Wall, reporting on live network television. But the primary obstacle to reunification was never the Wall itself, but the yawning political chasm between two 40-year-old international alliances. When and if it comes, reunification will be preceded by a gradual German abrogation of the opposing supranational commitments which keep them at arm's length.

Germans have served their penance; now we should reward them for their contrition. We shouldn't flatter ourselves. If reunification ever comes, it won't be a "gift" from the West as much as a concession from the East. After years of presidential rhetoric decrying the artificial German division (from Kennedy through Reagan), U.S. officials have almost no choice but to support reunification. The people agree--a recent New York Times poll showed that over two-thirds of Americans think favorably of reunification. If it were only a matter of U.S. agreement, one Germany would be a done deal.

The real obstacle to German reunification lies with the Soviet Union, where a prolonged discussion of Germany is likely to stir up latent anti-German sentiment and a fear of neo-Nazism. Officially, the Soviets are civil, but determinedly dead-set against reunification. Nikolai Portugalov, a Soviet expert on Germany, explained the Soviet stance to the Boston Globe last week. "The present geopolitical conditions in Europe," he said with Kruschev-like bluntness, "cannot tolerate a German confederation."

As of now, the Soviets will not even consider a confederation, a halfway step to full unification. A change in this policy is infinitely more important than American goodwill.

We needn't worry about anti-Semitism and greater-German nationalism, because they're dead. To many people, this statement is dogma. To others, it's pure untruth. Certainly the Germans have shown virtually no manifestations of a dormant Nazism in the past forty years; in fact, they have gone far to dispel Western suspicions.

In a letter to The Crimson last week, Stefan Klasen '91 proposed that "After World War II, those who supported Hitler kept their mouths shut, for obvious reasons, and were hardly able to pass on their horrific heritage." But many people don't share Klasen's rosy diagnosis, and they can't be blamed.

Germany's culturally ingrained attitudes and modes of thought didn't just disappear as Allied troops rolled through the Rhineland; they have been gradually submerged as new generations and ways of thought replaced the old.

Very few people expect today's Germans to beg in perpetuity for forgiveness for the aggressions of a previous generation. But it's rather arbitrary to decide that 40 is the number of years necessary to erase all lingering wartime sentiments. Germans can't expect that the passage of two generations with "good behavior" will convince everyone of the desirability of investing the German people with a European economic and military dominance. There are still plenty of people who aren't likely ever to forgive.

Judging by how eagerly East Germans flocked across the Wall when it was opened, they must be eager for a reunification. Yes, there are some things about life in West Berlin--and the West in general--that East Germans desire, like high-quality meat and vegetables, shelves full of wares, VCR's and watches. Forty years ago, East Germans might have leaped at the chance to give democracy another try.

But it's wrong to assume that East Germans are as disenchanted with their political system as are many of their bloc neighbors. GDR citizens aren't clamoring to trade their government subsidies, guaranteed health care and the highest standard of living in the Eastern bloc for higher prices, unemployment, a declining birth rate and the impersonal chaos of capitalism in their western counterpart.

The reunification debate is not a matter of discussion in the Germanies. The debate is largely held abroad. This sentence was taken verbatim from Mr. Klasen's letter, and it is a rather perplexing opinion, coming from a German citizen who might know better.

Ironically, on the day of this letter's publication, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented in Bonn a 10-point program that would lead to the ultimate goal of reunification. Kohl addressed his proposal to the West German Parliament, which interrupted his address to clap their wholehearted approval. "Nobody knows how a reunified Germany will look," Kohl said. "But I am sure that unity will come, if wanted by the German nation."

It sounds like the debate is indeed up for discussion inside Germany. Kohl's Bismarckian reference to a "German nation" shows that at least one West German is already convinced.

KOHL is no Bismarck, and his movement will never gather the same force or militancy as that of his 19th century counterpart. Keep a close eye on central Europe, though, and you're bound to see continued politicking and constituency-building towards one Germany. If it comes, the 20th-century reunification will be built not with blood and iron, but with consensus and politics.