Freeing Our Arms in Honduras

As the Sandinistas and the contras sat down this week for their first face-to-face meeting at Sapoa, Nicaragua, they added another chapter to the book of American failures in Central America. Even if "neither side seeks a military victory over the other," as rebel negotiator Alfredo Cesar said after Monday's talk, the truth of the matter is that a diplomatic peace is also far from the minds of both sides.

With the cutoff of American aid to the contras in February, Managua believes it can win on the battlefield what it can't on the negotiating table. Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega displayed these noble intentions last week when more than 4000 Sandinista troops poured over the Honduran border in search of the main rebel supply depot. Was it just last August that Ortega signed the Arias Peace plan?

Trouble continued this week across Central America. In El Salvador, Communist rebels disrupted national elections by destroying power lines, kidnapping local officials, and threatening terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. And notwithstanding his offer to step down as armed forces chief, Gen. Manuel Noriega still maintains his grip on the reins of power in Panama--a country where the once-familiar "Yanqui go home" has now become "Noriega go home."

Why all the unrest and rebellion? Democrats in Congress like Speaker Jim Wright and Sen. John Kerry who lay all the blame on the White House shouldn't throw War-Powers-Act stones in glass rotundas. They are equally--if not more--to blame as the Reagan Administration for our failure to pursue a coherent foreign policy in an area which was once so secure as to be called "America's backyard". Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Panama show the indecision and weakness that can erupt when the executive and legislative branches refuse to cooperate on foreign relations.

The recent decision to deploy 5000 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne in Honduras in response to the Nicaraguan invasion highlights these problems. At hearings before the Senate last week, Secretary of State George Shultz said, "It's important that people know the United States will fight." The Administration properly used military force in Honduras to bolster Tegucigalpa's morale and to deter further Nicaraguan incursions across the border. In essence, we stuck out the American chin and dared the Sandinistas to hit us--and it worked, as they withdrew this week without destroying the main contra supply cache.

Political sciencists couldn't have come up with a more perfect exercise in the use of military coercion. The territory of our treaty ally was invaded by her expansionist Soviet-bloc neighbor; the United States sent in troops as a warning that a deeper invasion would provoke the retaliation of our forces; the enemy withdrew without reaching its objective that threatened American national interest. It would all have been perfect, except for meddling by the Democratic congressmen who invited Managua to enjoy its Spring Break in Honduras.

"I know of nothing that justifies sending troops to Honduras," Jim Wright said the day of the deployment. Sen. Kerry even went so far as to question the logic of the White House's decision to attack the cause for the response. "I think the notion that there's a real invasion is just ridiculous," he said. Under pressure from the Democrats during the Senate hearings, Shultz had to say that the U.S. troops "are not there in a shooting capacity. We haven't been asked for that."

THE Democrats' attack on the deployment put American servicemen in greater danger by calling into question the likelihood that military force would ever be used--even to defend themselves. Indeed, the administration itself had to equivocate on the 82nd Airborne's mission because of pressure from a Congress duped by Daniel Ortega's promise to adhere to the Arias peace plan. Capitol Hill statements reduced the deterrent effect of the troops and displayed a wide dissension in American policy for all to see--especially Managua, Havana, and Moscow.

Up to now, the administration has favored covert and overt military action to solve problems in the hemisphere, most notably in Grenada. Sadly, Congress has given itself a reactive, subsidiary role as a glorified back-seat driver, constantly watching over the shoulder of the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As in Honduras, this relationship prevents the United States from taking a strong military stand against communism and limits our ability to use force when and where we ought to. Divisions also makes our allies doubt our determination and gives our adversaries renewed confidence.

Oppressive poverty, political repression, lack of medical care, and the excessive concentration of power and wealth in a few hands are conditions which have given rise to rebellion throughout the region. Yes, Republicans have deferred attention from these pressing problems by favoring military aid and quick troop interventions. Yet by limiting its actions to countering the administration, Congress also fails to solve the true problems. The Congress should develop programs which would attack the underlying economic and social ills in Central America--something the United States has not even tried to do since the early 1960s.

Relieved from congressional back-biting, the executive branch could use military power in accordance with the demands of the situation, rather than with the demands of certain senators and representatives. And Congress could fill a gap in our foreign policy-making that over the long run would prevent crises in Panama and El Salvador from arising in the first place. When America moves in the international arena, unity must prevail so that our determination and purpose will not be questioned by our adversaries or by those we try to help.