Contra-versy on Aid

THE decision by the House of Representatives Wednesday to cut off all U.S. military aid to the the contras further indicates the perilous, perhaps insurmountable, road to peace and democracy in Nicaragua.

Despite the lofty goals that form the widely-heralded Arias Peace Plan, it's been obvious all along that the plan would fall victim to political bickering among the parties involved. All parties to the raging debate--Sandinista officials, contra leaders, the Reagan administration, or Congressional opponents of aid--tailored the Arias plan to fit their long-held views on contra aid, rather than taking the politically untenable position of opposing the peace plan.

It was inevitable that opponents of contra aid would argue that further support for the rebels would give the Sandinistas an easy excuse to withdraw from the peace process and to continue suppression of all internal political opposition.

Likewise, it was inevitable that the White House would seek further military aid on the assumption that only continued contra pressure would force the Nicaraguan government to comply with the provisions of the Arias plan.

It was also hardly surprising that Sandinista officials would argue that they could not be expected to comply with the Arias Plan and take the required steps towards democratization until the contras were disbanded.

AFTER the vote, a jubilant House Speaker Jim Wright, who has become another Secretary of State on this issue, was forced to acknowledge the tremendous risks involved.

"Obviously, if the government of Nicaragua were to misbehave in extreme ways, to renege outright on its commitments or to invade its neighbors, that would radically change the situation," he admitted. But he hastily added, "We don't anticipate that."

But by leading the fight against contra aid, Wright has made such a scenario all the more likely. With the contra threat eliminated, the Sandinistas are certainly no more likely to comply with the principles of the Arias plan and take serious steps towards democratization.

Indeed, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega suggested this last month when he said that the Sandinistas would never cede their political hegemony. As Robert Leiken, currently a visiting scholar at the Center for International Affairs has written, Ortega's "strategy is clear... he will delay lifting the state of emergency and granting broad amnesty and the other democratic reforms stipulated in the Guatemalan accords until the contras have been disbanded and defunded." Others have echoed Leiken's fears that the Sandinistas are cynically using the peace process to squash internal resistance to their regime.

Are Wright and the other 218 congressmen who voted against military aid really willing to trust the Sandinistas' good will? What can they do if the Sandinistas, politically secure at home, renege on their promises to take steps towards democratization and begin to undermine the fragile and fledgling republics that surround them?

HOWEVER, equally troubling issues would have emerged had a mere four congressmen switched their nay votes against Reagan's $43 million contra request. The Sandinistas, upon learning of the vote to extend contra aid, surely would have denounced it as sabotaging the peace process. More aid would have allowed them to continue hiding behind the screen that the contra war, and not their own pathetic fiscal mismanagement, is to blame for the searing poverty and economic woes that afflict the Nicaraguan people. The delicate peace accord would have collapsed, and the United States would have been accused by the international community as the "saboteur of the peace."

The compromise solution proposed by the Democratic leadership-- a $10-million package providing humanitarian assistance to the contras--is probably the best way for the United States to walk a delicate tightrope. Because the aid would be administered by an international agency such as the Red Cross, the U.S. would not violate the provisions of the Arias Plan prohibiting aid to anti-government rebels. And the Administration would preserve the contras as a lever, pressuring Managua into compliance with its part of the bargain.

Yet even this moderate, judicious plan is already in jeopardy. Republican leaders in the House, miffed at losing the vote for military aid, have already sworn to sink the package. Meanwhile, Ortega pledged in a speech the day after the vote that Nicaragua would oppose any form of nonmilitary aid to the contras and made the outrageous claim that "we now have full democracy and full freedom of expression in this country." Tell that to the 9 000 political prisoners in Nicaragua and the still heavily-censored editors of La Prensa, the Nicaraguan opposition newspaper.

All of which underscores the incredibly ambitious task facing the Arias Peace Plan. Despite all the lofty rhetoric that prevailed in the House chamber this week, the chances of bringing peace and democracy to Nicaragua, a country that has never known either, remain slim. Forty years of Somoza rule and another eight of a communist regime have left the country with precious little democratic institutions and heritage.

The only way the United States can possibly hope to achieve peace in Central America and to bring about the stirrings of democracy in Nicaragua is through military, diplomatic, and economic pressure on the Sandinista regime--while still honoring the Arias Plan. This does not demand a continuation of the contra war, but a recognition that some military pressure exist to prod the Sandinistas into opening up their political system. While it is naive to expect the Sandinistas to agree to a coalition government including the rebels, it is certainly not unjustified to let the Nicaraguan people decide on its government in regular and free elections.