America's Decline?

This week, two more setbacks struck President Reagan's policy in the Persian Gulf. A mine destroyed an Arab supply vessel in what were supposedly safe waters off the United Arab Emirates, and a possible act of terrorism destroyed a major Saudi Arabian-American oil installation in the Gulf itself.

Critics of the Administration's course in the region are already using these incidents as further examples that the United States does not belong in the Gulf. Perhaps they have good reason to cry wolf.

Our warships are not suited to the warfare of the narrow Gulf, where small speedboats, mines, and Exocet missiles seem to be the weapons of the day. The navy has concentrated the largest American armada of warships, those designed for escorting convoys across the Atlantic and attacking the Soviet navy in its bases off the cold Kola Penninsula, in a region filled with terrorists, Revolutionary Guards, and trigger-happy Iraqui pilots.

Critics also point out that the Administration has been foolish not only militarily, but diplomatically. Kuwait, a country the size of New Jersey, has used the spectre of increased Soviet influence in the Middle East to trick us into guarding their supertankers. In fact, the country we most hate in the region stands to gain the most from our decision to defend open navigation of the sea; Iran sends most of its exports out of the Gulf by sea, while Iraq transports its oil through overland pipelines. By keeping the waters open, we inadvertently prevent Iraqi attacks on Iranian ships.

All these criticisms are valid. Unfortunately some have chosen to view our difficulties in that region as evidence to bolster predictions of the decline of American power in the world. If we cannot even prevent Iranians armed with World War I vintage weapons from sinking ships, then what makes us think we can protect the entire free world virtually alone?

Two articles in this month's Atlantic argued these points. Yale political scientist Paul Kennedy wrote an article suggesting that America's strategy and overseas commitments had overreached her resources. Then followed a piece by foreign affairs expert James Chase, entitled "Ike Was Right," arguing that we should withdraw our troops from West Germany and allow the Europeans to take care of themselves.

Such writers are frightened--and rightfully so--by our sluggish economy, our losses in international trade, and our rapid transformation from the world's largest creditor to the world's largest debtor in the space of a few years. They have watched the United States' share of the world economy drop from nearly half to close to a quarter. They observe the growing power of the Japanese and Germans, and they say the decline is unstoppable. They chart the failures of our military power in Vietnam and now the Gulf, and they cry "Uncle."

With this evidence, Kennedy maintains that the United States is in the midst of a decline from its position as the world's premier power which parallels Great Britain's demise in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Curious historical circumstances after World War II allowed us to rise to world dominance, economically and militarily, and now history is righting itself. A country should only have as much power as her population and natural resources allow, Kennedy believes. Because we have only 16 percent or so of these commodities, when history has fixed itself, we will possess only that much economic and military power.

Hail the return of isolationism, a creature not seen since the 1930s, but one that has not lost any of its power over the American mind.

While such arguments are attractive, the conclusion they lead to is not in this country's best interests. They are based on a number of wrongheaded assumptions. First, in a world of nuclear weapons, a country's economy and natural resources are not commensurate with her military power. A country, such as Great Britain, can possess greater military power than Italy, even though the latter may have a larger share of population and world economy.

Second, a country's resources do not determine her place in the world economy. That lesson is proved every time protections is resort to yelling at the Japanese and the South Koreans: "Stop that! You're not allowed!" Both countries carry much more than their weight in the arena of international trade. Factors such as culture, leadership, and the education of a country's workforce are far more important than the number of workers or barrels of oil.

The decline of the United States that has been witnessed is a positive one, not a negative one. Other countries, notably Japan and Western Europe, are regaining the positions they lost after World War II and thus are transforming the world into one with multiple centers of power instead of just the two. As Henry Kissinger foresaw, the development of a multipolar world will provide substantial strategic stability by blunting the bitter superpower rivalry with new powers that have to be reckoned with.

True, currently we are subsidizing the defense of Japan and Western Europe at the expense of our economy and international competitiveness. But the democratic societies we protect cannot be left unguarded for the Soviets to pressure and coerce. Our allies have not yet reached the stage where they can stand up to the Soviets alone, and it is the United States' job as it has been for the last 40 years, to see that they do. The American nuclear guarantee has kept the peace in Europe and Asia since World War II, and the relative sluggishness of the American economy in comparison to the growth of our competitors provides no compelling reason why that assurance should be withdrawn.

Indeed, our military obligations overseas have not increased since the 1950s, while our economy has grown absolutely. Where is the "growing imbalance between commitment and power?"