On a Recent Non-Election to the NAS

The National Academy of Sciences advises the government on scientific matters, and at the same time it is viewed as an honorific organization. The Academy is divided into five classes: (I) Physical and Mathematical Sciences (II) Biological Sciences (III) Engineering and Applied Sciences (IV) Medical Sciences and (V) Behavioral and Social Sciences. The inclusion of the social sciences in the NAS is a relatively recent event, dating back only to 1971. Many people do not realize that the social sciences in the NAS is a relatively recent event, dating back only to 1971. Many people do not realize that the social sciences, and in particular sociology and political science, are part of the NAS.

I myself was recently elected to the NAS under recommendation of Class I, in 1985. I had not been in for one year when I received the ballots for election to the Academy in March 1986. These ballots, as usual, present members with choices grouped by Classes. A member must vote for a minimum number of candidates in each class to fulfill certain quotas, otherwise the entire ballot is invalid. Thus each member is forced to take responsibility for candidates in entirely different fields, about whom one has no information except for a list of publication and honors contained in a booklet accompanying the ballot. However, I recognized one name under Class V, that of Samuel P. Huntington.

Huntington is currently director of the Center International Affairs and is also president of the American Political Science Association. He was formerly chairman of the Government Department at Harvard. According to the Social Sciences Citation Index 1981-1985, he is the most quoted political scientist in the field of International Relations. Some of his books are required reading in some political science courses in several universities (for instance Yale). Beyond the academic world, he has also consulted for the State Department and the CIA. From 1966 to 1969, he chaired the Vietnamese subcommittee of the U.S. government's Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group. He is one of three authors of a Report for the Trilateral Commission.

I have a long-standing interest in the area where the academic world meets the world of politics and the world of journalism. I have especially raised questions previously about what is produced in the social sciences, by some people and how this production affects "politics." This political motivation does not mean that I support some wing over another wing, say the left wing over the right wing, or that I support some "ism" ideology like socialism, communism or capitalism. I understand "politics" to mean in the broad sense how one deals with social organizations, how we arrive at decisions concerning society, the role of government, the role of education, the role of the press in informing the public, how information is processed (by the press, by individuals, by the educational system, by the government, etc.) In particular, I now have a direct responsibility for the political role of the NAS, which issues reports on scientific matters affecting political decisions. But the problems I deal with are invariant under"ism"transformations: they are in part problems of standards and accuracy, and the way political opinions are passed off as social "science." I developed the analysis on one concrete case in my book The File, triggered by Ladd-Lipset's "The 1977 Survey of the American Professiorate," and a review in the New York Review of Books of Education and Politics at Harvard by Lipset and David Riesman. As it happens, Seymour Martin Lipset is a member of the National Academy of Sciences.

I also raise questions about the certification process available in our society concerning the quality of what is produced the social "sciences" ("studies" would be a better word), journalism, education, and political discourse. The NAS plays some role in this certification process. I object to the NAS certifying as "science" what are merely political opinions and their implementations.

I claim, and I shall give documentation, that much of Huntington's works makes it appear, falsely, as if certain political opinions, or his opinions, are rooted in scholarship and science.

II

My methodology is to start from a concrete case, nail it, and document it thoroughly. I shall now document some of the things to which I object in Huntington's works.

1. In one of his most famous books, Political Order in Changing Societies, we find the following passages in which Huntington discusses developing countries.

"The political backwardness of the country in terms of political institutionalization, moreover, makes it difficult if not impossible for the demands upon the government to be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within the political system. Hence the sharp increase in political participation gives rise to political instability. The impact of modernization this involves the following relationships:(1)Social mobilization / Economic development=Social frustration (2)Social frustration / Mobility opportunities=Political participation (3)Political participation / Political institutionalization=Political instability

The absence of mobility opportunities and the low level of political institutionalization in most modernizing countries produce a correlation between social frustration and political instability. One analysis identified 26 countries with a low ratio of want formation to want satisfaction and hence low "systemic frustration" and 36 countries with a high ratio and hence high "systemic frustration." Of the 26 satisfied societies, only six (Argentina, Belgium, France, Lebanon, Morocco, and the Union of South Africa) hid high degrees of political instability. Of the 36 dissatisfied countries, only two (Philippines, Tunisia) had high levels of political stability. The overall correlation between frustration and instability was .50."

When Huntington summarizes his own book elsewhere, he himself refers to the "relationships" as "equations," when the writes:

"The impact of modernization on political stability is mediated through the interaction between social mobilization and economic development, social frustration and nonpolitical mobility opportunities, and political participatiion and political institutionalization. Huntington expresses the relationships in a series of equations."

Thus Huntington writes of himself in the third person, and the "equations" are those listed as (1), (2), (3) above.

(a) As Koblitz has observed, "Huntington never bothers to inform the reader in what sense these are equations." How does Huntington measure "instability," "social frustration," "social mobilization?" Does he have a social frustration meter? Abbreviating the equations in the form A/B=C, C/D=E, E/F=G, are we allowed seventh grade algebra to conclude that A=BC=BDE=BDFG, i.e., that "social mobilization is equal to economic development times mobility opportunities times political institutionalization times political instability"? And Koblitz remarks: "Huntington's use of equations produces effects--mystification, intimidation, an impression of precision and profundity..." Huntington fails to define just what these terms mean, or how he dealt with them quantitatively. In particular, how is one to take the sentence: "The overall correlation between frustration and instability was .50." What is the meaning of the two significant figures?

There is no discussion of how numbers were assigned to vague notions like frustration and instability, or any margin of error (as in the sciences) for such a decimal figure. As far as I am concerned, that sentence is nonsense. Huntington gives similar "correlations" to two or three significant figures, pages 39 through 53, so the one I have mentioned is not an isolated example.

(b) Is it meaningful to measure "social frustration" or "economic development" or "political instability" according to some absolute scale, applicable at all times, to all countries, or to such diverse countries as are listed in the paragraph following the equations? Huntington lists France, Belgium, and the Union of South Africa as "satisfied" societies with "high degrees of political instability," while the Philippines are only one of two "dissatisfied" countries with a "high level of political stability." Huntington's book was written in 1968. Can the "political (in)stability" of Belgium, say, be compared with that of Argentina, or that of the Philippines? Do you really think Belgium was (is) politically unstable, let alone to a high degree? Is political instability to be measured in the short run, in the long run (the past year, the next five years, the next 10 years, the next 20 years)? Do France and Belgium exhibit "high degrees of political instability" in the same context as do Morocco and the Union of South Africa?

Or for that matter, the Philippines. Marcos's dictatorship in 1968 planted the seeds of rising rebellions a decade later, and his replacement by Aquino two decades later. Why is the Union of South Africa listed as having a "high level of political instability" in 1968, while the Philippines have a "high level of political stability"? The situation in South Africa appears to me parallel in one respect to that of the Philippines, with a government able to impose itself for a relatively long period while the tension builds up and the period may end up in a bloody revolution. After all, it took 146 years for the French ancien regime (say, from 1643--Louis XIV's coming as a King--to 1789) to evolve into the French revolution. I would not call the ancien regime "highly politically stable". Different people have perceived differently during those 146 years, and since.

(c)What is much more insidious, however, and illustrates how a political opinion is passed off as political "science" is the classification of the Union of South Africa as a "satisfied society". In what sense were (are) 20 million Blacks "satisfied"? In 1968? Today? Note how Huntington's political opinion about the Union of South Africa being a "satisfied society" is embedded in a tissue of pseudo-science consisting of "equations," "correlations," decimal figure, "ratios," and a type of language which gives the illusion of science without any of its substance.

Questions about Huntington's classification of the Union of South Africa as a "satisfied" society were originally raised in an unpublished letter to Science by the Yale sophomore Joshua Katz, to whom Huntington's competence and standards are particularly relevant since Huntington's book is required reading in the course Political Science 111 b, which Katz was taking. How critically is Huntington's book examined in such a course? Katz asked the professor teaching the course whether he could pass out his analysis in class, but the professor asked him not to do so. What happens at other universities where Huntington's department at Harvard has written that the book "merits its reputation as one of the true classics of modern political science?" On the other hand, the Yale anthropologist Leopold Pospisil (who is a member of the NAS), wrote to Katz that he "very much like [Katz's] letter as a critique of the social sciences," and he asked Katz's permission to reproduce his letter "for the benefit of students and colleagues."

2. A propos of the Philippines: they are mentioned as a "Case of Highest Concern" in the article "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs," published by Huntington and Richard K. Betts in Winter 1985-1986, before Marcos was out. In this article, the authors include numerous tables, entitled for instance: "Calorie Consumption as Percentage of Daily Requirement and Instability First Year After Death [of Dictator]"; "Urban Population and Instability First Year After Death"; "Literacy and Instability First Year After Death"; "Annual Growth GPD Per Capita and Instability First Year After Death"; with percentages, numbers, and items like "Extensive," "Moderate," "Limited," "None," "Total." I already question the meaning of these tables per se. But in addition, the authors follow these tales by predictions:

"Conceivably, Marcos could retire from office voluntarily, but on the basis of his past performance, this seems very unlikely. Conceivably, he could be forced out of office, but this also seems unlikely...Hence it is highly probable that he will die in office...

"These two factors--previous instability and social organization--virtually insure substantial instability following Marcos's death...

"Hence the greater the probability that Marcos's departure from office will be followed by major revolutionary or quasi revolutionary upheaval. Ghoulish as it may appear, Marcos's ill health is now one of the few factors favoring less instability in the Philippines." The authors write:

"With respect to the other two variables, the U.S. presumably could attempt to induce the authoritarian leader: (a) to coopt and compromise with opposition groups, thereby presumably reducing the instability before his death; and (b) to effect an early retirement from power. Given the ways in which most authoritarian leaders view their interests and the limited leverage the U.S. has in most Third World countries, neither of these courses of action is likely to be very productive." In each item, the statement is either incorrect or very unclear, even incomprehensible to me. The authors' pronouncements, with language like "virtually insure" or "the greater the probability," in the context of tables, numbers, probability and variables, give the illusion of science without its content. Of course, there was political instability in the Philippines before Marcos departed, and there continues to be. I do not question that. I question the pseudo-scientific context of Huntington's article.

Huntington and Betts published another version of their "Dead Dictators" article in the Wall Street Journal (13 August 1986) after Marcos was out. The whole discussion about the Philippines and the false conclusions are omitted, in light of Marcos's replacement by Aquino, which occurred in the meantime. Once more, both articles make it appear as if certain political opinions are rooted in scholarship or science.

Be it said in passing that the original article resulted from a study funded by the CIA, but the source of funding was not given. As a result of a flap at Harvard about this instance, and some others more or less at the same time, the CIA somewhat changed its policy about keeping the source of funding secret, and the CIA is clearly identified as this source in the Wall Street Journal article.

3. In Foreign Affairs, July 1968, Huntington published an article: "The Bases of Accommodation" concerning the Vietnam War. Among other things he writes:

"The principal reason for this massive influx of population into the urban areas is, of course, the intensification of the war following the commitment of American combat troops in 1965...

"In this sense, history--drastically and brutally speeded up by the American impact--may pass the Vietcong by. Societies are susceptible to revolution only at particular stages in their development. At the moment, the rates of urbanization and of modernization in the secure rural areas exceed the rate of increase of Vietcong strength...

"In an absent-minded way the United States in Vietnam may well have stumbled upon the answer to wars of national liberation.' The effective response lies neither in the quest for conventional military victory nor in the esoteric doctrines and gimmicks of counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country in question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power."

The invocation of history and "forced-draft urbanization and modernization" reminds me of the invocation of history by the Stalinists who destroyed a large part of the peasant class in the Soviet Union in the thirties, and the "forced-draft" ruralization by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (a mirror image of "forced-draft urbanization"), after the U.S. invasion of that country. Such people can have whatever political opinion they want: I do not regard these opinions as science, merely political opinions and their implementations. Note how the word "modernization" occurs in a paragraph like the above, as well as on the page with the famous "equations" and the "correlation of .50." Thus Huntington gives the illusion of setting a scientific stage for his statements, but only the illusion. He is in fact deeply involved in justifying and implementing the reality which he purports to describe.

4. In that same Foreign Affairs article, Huntington wrote, "The realities of the situation in Vietman will not please the extremists on either side. If properly perceived and accepted, however, they may provide some basis for accommodation and an eventual compromise settlement." The presumption of what "will not please the extremists" belongs to pop psychology and is a rhetorical thrust which scholars can evaluate in light of the above false evaluation of Vietcong strength, for instance. Who are the "extremists," by the way? Huntington does not specify. He also states:

"Spokesmen for the Administration, on the other hand, have in the past underrated the strength of the Vietcong and have ascribed to the Saigon Government a popularity which has as little basis in fact as that which the critics attributed to the NLF... The misplaced moralism of the critics has thus confronted the unwarranted optimism of the advocates."

Leaving aside the rhetorical thrust concerning "moralism of the critics," I note that Huntington's criticism of the Administration and his dig at the "unwarranted optimism of the advocates" is all the more absurd since some of his own opinions were no more than "misplaced optimism," as we see from the passage quoted in section 3. Indeed, Robert D. Putnam in his PS article states that Huntington was guilty of "misplaced optimism about the effects of American-sponsored forced draft urbanization' on the prospects for South Vietnamese resistance to the Communist insurgency."

5. There is evidence that the Foreign Affairs article is partly based on a report written by Huntington for the State Department in 1967. This possibility is mentioned by Putnam, and Huntington himself has written in a "response" to Marion Levy in Science (20 March 1987): "I have never made any secret of my work there [in Vietnam] as a consultant in the Policy Planning Council of the State Department. I subsequently published an article in Foreign Affairs based in large part on that study." But in fact, Huntington did make a secret of the connection between his published article and a "study" or "report" to the State Department, because the article makes no mention of being based on the study, or on work sponsored by the State Department, or any other Government agency.

In addition, despite the fact that Putnam wrote that the report is declassified, and Huntington also wrote that he "secured its declassification under the Freedom of Information Act," Huntington has failed to answer my request for a copy of this report (and related material), and I have also been unable to obtain the report under the Freedom of Information Act. Indeed, the State Department wrote me that release of "one of the documents" I asked for (the Huntington Report) "requires coordination with another government agency." (This agency may be the CIA, for whom Huntington has consulted in the past.) Thus Huntington is also misrepresenting in this instance.

Insiders like Putnam have been able to see that report. The availability of the work should be automatic, no questions asked. When a scientist reports on an experiment, or empirical conclusions, or a proof of a theorem, it is a standard of science that one is entitled to have the data on which the conclusions have been based, and a complete version of the paper. I wrote to the chairman of Class V to ask if he, or Class V, condones the failure to provide me with the material I requested from Huntington about his State Department Report in 1967, and I asked him to make that material available to me and to members of the NAS. The non-availability of Huntington's "report" or "study" has now become an independent issue, since scientists and the public are entitled to have first hand knowledge of a document which influenced public policy.

A State Department memorandum at the time showed that the State Department reacted partly in a favorable way to Huntington's "study" as when the memorandum states: "We agree with much of his analysis of the present situation..." But the State Department also expressed a serious reservation, namely, "There is a major point in the study about which Huntington is not clear: nowhere does he suggest how or when' elimination of the Vietcong forces and the retreat of the North Vietnamese regulars can be brought about to establish the preconditions which he describes for ac-

Serge Lang is a professor of mathematics at Yale. commodation with isolated Vietcong Hamlets."Thus in this instance, the State Department sawthrough Huntington's verbiage, and that memorandumgives further evidence that Huntington's politicalopinions have "no basis in fact."

III

David Singer, professor of political science atthe University of Michigan, has written to me andother colleagues that Huntington "should not be amember of the NAS, even if it is Class V," on thegrounds "that he has neither the knowledge nor theinterest necessary to conduct [scientificresearch]," that he has an "ideological outlooksufficiently parochial to question hisidentification with the world-wide scientificcommunity," and that Huntington lacks competencein "matters epistemological." As Singer suggests,one can leave aside the claim made by Putnam inhis PS article, that Huntington is"avowedly patriotic." The quality of scientificdoings does not depend on their being "patriotic" buton the factual documentation and accuracy.Huntington gives evidence that he confuses thetwo. For instance, when writing about TheSoldier and the State (one of the books uponwhich his reputation as a political scientist isbased), and its reception in the 1970s, he states:"Some indications of this trend in the directionof a more conservative realism compatible with theprofessional military outlook were brieflysketched in the final chapter of The Soldierand the State. Indeed, the publication ofThe Soldier and the State, with itsunabashed defense of the professional militaryethic and rejection of traditional liberalism, wasitself evidence of the changing intellectualclimate." A scientist does not give an "unabasheddefense" of the object of his study.

To what extent can the criticisms that I andsome others have leveled against Huntington'sworks be equally well applied to others inpolitical science, whether in or out of the NAS?

Some social scientists of the Academy, inanswer to the critics, have tried to make a casethat "ambiguity" is inherent in the socialsciences. For example, an anonymous member ofClass V told the Harvard Crimson reporter(13 March) that the critiques of Huntington's workas pseudo-science by hard scientists in theAcademy reflect their psychological inability toaccept ambiguity. "I don't know that any socialscientist would meet their standards. They arepsychologically angered by it. They are people whowant certainty," the member is quoted as saying."They have no tolerance for ambiguity." Whoeverthe member was, his statement is very similar tothe statement by Seymour Martin Lipset, that "tobe a social scientist, one must have a hightolerance for ambiguity" (The File.)Readers can evaluate the pop psychology about"ambiguity" in light of my previous analyses.

As for Lipset, readers can also refer to hisunambiguous statement in Political Man,containing the sentence, "This change in Westernpolitical life reflects the fact that thefundamental problems of the industrial revolutionhave been solved." Lipset was writing in 1960. Wasit a fact? Was it perceived as fact? By whom?When? Does Lipset or Huntington know thedifference between a fact, the perception of afact, an opinion, and what is neither? The abovesentence occurs on a page speckled with footnotes,which make it appear as if this particular opinionis rooted in scholarship. But all the footnotesdocument is the statement: "In 1960, a prevalentopinion in Western society was that thefundamental political problems of the industrialrevolution have been solved." Lipset is a pastpresident of the APSA, and is a member of the NAS.Is Lipset a "scientist?" If not, what is he doingin the National Academy of Sciences? And whatwould S.P. Huntington be doing in the NAS ifelected?

I generalize only with caution. I have noquantitative measurement as to how many people insociology or political science are purveyors ofpseudo-science, like Huntington and Lipset. Awidespread uncritical acceptance of Huntington'sworks, his eminence in his field, and hisnomination by Class V indicate that he is not anisolated phenomenon. As Edward Anders, a member ofthe geophysics section of the Academy has written:"Though there are many excellent people in [ClassV], I have repeatedly had misgivings about some ofthe candidates in in social and political science,and less frequently about those in psychology andeconomic science. My suspicions have been amplyconfirmed by the Huntington debacle. Any sectionthat nominates poorly qualified candidates lackseither good candidates or good judgment. Theproper punishment is to reduce their quotas."

Like Anders, I do not wish to condemn allmembers of the disciplines of Social or PoliticalScience. But if many people in those fields putout defective works like those of Huntington, thisdoes not make those works any better