Use It Or Lose It

LIKE AN unwary tourist in a Middle Eastern bazaar, the Reagan Administration wandered into the Persian Gulf unsure of what it wants and how much it needs to pay.

The White House said the purpose of bombing an Iranian oil rig last week was to punish the Iranians--in "proportion"--for their attacks on Gulf shipping. It didn't work. Instead, the Teheran government responded in kind, attacking Kuwait's major oil facility and mocking American attempts to end the shooting war in the Gulf.

Rather than end the shooting, the U.S.'s large military presence in the Gulf has intensified it. Before the administration decided to send a carrier battle group and assorted escort ships to the region, the tanker war between Iran and Iraq subsided. But our presence in the Persian Gulf put the spotlight on our allies--the Kuwaitis and the Saudis--and the U.S. as new targets in the war. The unnecessary intervention into the area didn't silence the guns so much as give them something to aim at.

The goals of protecting our moderate Arab allies and insuring the free flow of oil are entirely legitimate. Unfortunately, the result of America's military presence in the Gulf has been increased warfare there and greater restlessness in Kuwait about her security. The only nation which seems to be gaining from American's protection of shipping is, ironically, Iran, which sends almost all of her oil out of the Gulf by supertanker.

AMERICA'S GULF strategy bears a frightening resemblance to its tragic attempt to bring peace to Beirut in 1982. Both then and now the White House committed America's prestige and credibility without defining its goals, let alone the best means to achieve them. There is little indication from the White House of an end to be achieved in the Gulf, or of a recalulcation of our reason for being there in light of the evidence that our presence seems to be helping the Iranians. And our forces in the area are sadly ill-suited for their job: multibillion dollar supercarriers and their escorts are not quite what you want chasing down Revolutionary Guards in glorified Boston Whalers.

The military must be used wisely if it is to be used effectively. Armed force should be exercised only for a few specific purposes. Such purposes include removing an enemy's capacity to wage war and making a show of strength designed to persuade an adversary to stop its belligerent ways. Neither rationale lay behind the order to four Navy destroyers to shell an Iranian oil platform.

As we learned in Vietnam, proportional response brings failure. Destroying oil platforms will not convince Iran to end its war with Iraq, to cease its attacks on shipping, or to stop its support of international terrorism. A radical, revolutionary regime that is indeed "stupid enough" to risk war with the United States, Iran only will respond by doing what it does best--escalation. And our undefined commitment in the Gulf will give us only one choice. That will be to follow, thereby passing on the initiative to Teheran.

OUR INTERESTS in the Gulf best would be served by forestalling an Iraqui defeat. This would prevent the spread of Iran's Islamic fundamentalistism to the moderate Arab countries who supply much of the West's oil.

We have sent to the Gulf the largest concentration of American military force since the Vietnam War. Let's use it. Air strikes against Silkworm missile sites and Iranian weapons factories would cripple Teheran's ability to attack shipping in the Gulf. And if Iran causes more trouble, the American task force could wipe out Iran's entire air force--all 26 planes--and then go to work on Teheran's precious Revolutionary Guards at the front. Even the TOW missiles we sold them wouldn't do them any good.