China and No First Use

How many people realize that China, which started the world on the path to the nuclear arms race by inventing gunpowder, has also come up with a possible antidote--the doctrine of "no first use"? As President Reagan commences his state visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC), it can be instructive to look at how China has viewed the bomb and reacted to the growing strength of the two nuclear superpowers and, in particular, the Soviet military buildup along its borders.

Although Mao Zedong (Mao Tsetung) publicly disdained atomic weapons as paper tigers. China was determined to develop a nuclear capability whatever the cost and sacrifice--if necessary, "going without trousers," in the words of a former foreign minister.

To its everlasting regret, the USSR initially provided assistance to its fledgling ally in this endeavor. However, Khrushchev reneged on a promise to provide China a "sample" A-bomb, according to Beijing which made this charge when presenting its account of the Sino-Soviet schism. Nevertheless, in April 1964, within 15 years of its establishment, the PRC successfully detonated an atomic device.

Beijing was more conscious of the political fall-out than the radioactive one--a situation which to a considerable degree pertains today. In announcing the test, the PRC proclaimed that it was developing atomic weapons for defensive purposes only and that it would never be the first to use such weapons nor would it ever use, or even threaten to use, them against nations which did not possess them.

In the two decades since, China has persistently reiterated this theme, which forms the centerpiece of its sweeping arms control proposals and peace plans. With equal persistence, it has quietly pursued the development of nuclear weapons, despite the political turmoil of the Cultural revolution, under Mao and under his successors.

China has not played a constructive role in arms control. It has opposed agreements on test bans and non-proliferation, has placed strict conditions on its participation in arms control parleys and agreements, and has sought to avoid any controls on its own nuclear weapons program or its transactions with other countries involving nuclear technology or materials.

Beijing has shaped its nuclear weapons program and its broader deterrence strategy in the context of the "strategic triangle" of the USSR, US, and PRC. Although publicly Beijing has decried the hegemonistic behavior and unbridled arms race of the two nuclear superpowers and has emphasized its independent foreign policy stance, strategically and tactically, of course, it tilts toward the US.

But the Soviet Union is unquestionably regarded as the principal external threat to Chinese security. The Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 and an abortive Soviet plan to take out China's nuclear facilities in a swift preemptive strike undoubtedly contributed to China's interest in repairing relations with the US and creating Sino-US ties that would give the Soviets pause in contemplating any military action against the PRC.

China has developed a comprehensive policy framework for its strategic weapons program, one that includes a broad-gauged, nuanced deterrence strategy and a declaratory policy on nuclear weapons use, both of which conform to China's perceived national interests, circumstances and resources.

Part of this deterrence strategy is periodically to demonstrate the Washington-Beijing entente by high-level visits between the two countries. The reported existence of a joint intelligence facility in Northwest China to monitor. Soviet advanced weapons tests also sends a message to Moscow.

Equally a part of this strategy has been a cooling of tensions between the PRC and USSR over the past three years. Beijing has lowered its rhetoric if not its guard. It has engaged in a series of vice-ministerial talks with Moscow that have led to increases in trade and some improvements in government-to-government relations and contacts.

The bottom line for top Chinese leaders has been to enhance China's security and well-being at minimum risk and cost. For them, the modernization of a Socialist China is the top priority. This places constraints on the resources available for strategic weapons and other military requirements. Under a strict austerity program adopted five years ago, China reduced its military spending in 1980 and again in 1981. More recently, in order "to cope with international developments" (in the words of Premier Zhao in June 1983). Beijing has indicated that defense modernization would be given higher priority with special attention paid to strategic weapons programs. However, it has declined to give budget data and has implied that increased spending on modern and advanced weapons will be made possible by economizing elsewhere within the military establishment.

Which brings us back, circuitously, to China's declaratory policy on nuclear weapons and its invention of the "no first use" and "non use" doctrine. This has cost China nothing and has not hampered its strategic weapons programs. Conversely, it has made propaganda points for China throughout the world, improved its international image, and established an approach, which, if accepted by the other nuclear powers, could enhance China's security and ultimately reduce the enormous cost for China of membership in the exclusive nuclear club.

There has been widespread endorsement of "no-first-use", "non-use" and the analogous concept of nuclear free zones, most particularly by the non-nuclear nations. India's Indira Gandhi and Canada's Pierre Trudcau have made impassioned pleas for declarations of restraint by the nuclear powers. Pope John Paul II has echoed these sentiments.

Without giving China any credit, the Soviet Union in 1982 in a pronouncement by Leonid Brezhney formally adopted a "no first use" policy. As recently as March 1984 Moscow has reiterated this pledge and hinted broadly that a similar declaration by the US would bring it back to the negotiating table. To date, both the US and us fellow Western nuclear powers, the UK and France have declined to endorse the concept even in principle or as a declared objective.

Needless to say it would give China great "face" were its doctrine accepted by all five nuclear powers. Such a development would also offer the best prospect for getting China to abandon its present standoffish attitude towards negotiations among the nuclear powers.

Although there are problems with US adoption of "no first use"--our commitment to NATO for example--the principle, which has been advocated by a series of distinguished Americans, is deserving of greater attention by Washington. As a first step, it would make eminent sense for the US to confer with the PRC on ways in which its "no first use" concept to the security of ourselves or other nations.

Richard D. Nethercut, a former Foreign Service Officer and consular on Chinese affairs, currently is a Fellow at the Institute of Politics.