A Pillar of Stability

WHEN INDIAN CITIES began to burn a couple of weeks ago, a bloodbath appeared inevitable. National reaction to Indira Gandhi's murder seemed to ignite a textbook Third World crisis, complete with factional strife, religious fanaticism, and widespread, crushing poverty.

But, somehow, India avoided both a descent into chaos and an authoritarian military backlash, fates so tragically familiar to observers of underdeveloped nations. In managing to stick to a moderate middle path, India remains the "miracle" of the Third World and the largest democracy in history. The Indian Army deserves the largest share of credit for this unique situation.

India's modern military tradition begins, somewhat ironically, after the mid-nineteenth century British conquest of the subcontinent. Before the Imperial era the various Indian nations maintained essentially feudal, personal armies. Each prince, oligarch king, or head of state led armed forces with personal allegiance to, and often clan relationships with, the leader. The "officers" were almost always members of the ruling family or clan.

Along the road to conquest the victorious British forces disbanded or destroyed many of these personal armies. However, the British took the highly unusual step of cementing loyalties to certain "elite" forces which fought with particular bravery against them, the famed Gurkhas being the best example. These Indian units, often led by British officers, fought around the world for the British Empire throughout the century before 1947. The importance of this experience, under British command and training, for the future armed forces of free India cannot be overestimated. Many of the officers and traditions of these elite units were transferred en masse to the vastly expanded native Indian forces created during the British mobilization for both World Wars.

The professionalism and skill of India's military was put to the test immediately upon independence in 1947. In accordance with the partition agreement creating the new predominantly Muslim entity of Pakistan, bordering India to both the northwest and east, the army was divided between the two nations roughly in proportion to their respective populations. Throughout the horrible violence and bloodshed following the separation, especially in the crucial northwest Indian state of Punjab, both forces exercised restraint toward one another and constant obedience to their respective governments, a rare occurrence indeed in war-torn underdeveloped countries.

Since that tumultuous time the professionalism and subjugation of civilian authority of India's army has held fast. Conflicts with Pakistan, border disputes with China, and internal unrest have prompted almost constant utilization by the Indian government of its military force. Despite this, the Indian military has not grown proportionately more powerful in Indian society, nor has it undermined the civilian authority, both of which events have occurred in Pakistan. Indian defense expenditures have averaged between three and five percent of GNP since 1947--nearly the lowest level in the Third World--with a slight downward trend. Also, the military is all-volunteer, and at slightly over one million men it is near or at the bottom of the Third World in percentage of population.

India's senior military officers have never aspired to political control, and even under the recent state of martial law the supremacy of civilian leaders was never in doubt. In part this is a result of Western-style training: officers are educated in academics modeled on British institutions. In part it is caused by the military's heterogeneous nature; the armed forces perform the same role for India as they do for nations like Israel and the United States, providing a "melting pot" of different regions, religions, socioeconomic strata, even languages. No group or social class has been systematically excluded from military service in India. Such a cohesive, non-exclusive force in Indian society is not likely to engage in sectarian squabbles or to generate potential tyrants, and such has indeed been the case for India.

RECENT EVENTS, at first glance, would seem to cloud this hopeful prognosis. In particular, the role of the Sikhs in the past few months of turmoil throws new variables into the role of the army in India's volatile democracy. This minority (see accompanying story) forms a disproportionately large block of military leadership; with only two percent of India's population, Sikhs fill almost 15 percent of the military's officer billets. A Sikh general led the attack (which Indira Gandhi ordered) on the Golden Temple, the Sikhs' holiest shrine, and now rumors abound that this catalyzed a high-level conspiracy in the army to assassinate Gandhi with the help of two of her Sikh bodyguards. Finally, the bulk of the unrest has occurred in Punjab, the Sikh homeland.

But as yet no evidence exists indicating the decay of India's apolitical, non-sectarian military; throughout the recent crisis mixed Sikh-Hindu battalions have struggled to prevent violence both in Hindu and in Sikh communities. Even if investigations into the alleged military conspiracy come up with substantive charges there is still little likelihood that the disease will spread throughout the bulk of the army. Institutional soundness, a dedication to peace and duty, and above all a sense of subordination to civilian authority have every chance of survival in Indian democracy's most valuable pillar--the military.