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IF A CRAZED "Chicken Little" mentality caused the furor over the MiG episode, then we have much to fear as a nation, because American political leaders from across the spectrum shared in the concern (as duly noted in the majority opinion). In fact, though, no such irrational fear of the unknown is indicated by this bipartisan condemnation of any outside attempt to arm Nicaragua beyond its legitimate needs. If MiGs are delivered to Nicaragua, then it will merely highlight and confirm the long-standing desire of the Sandinistas to possess far more military power than they could possibly need for their own regional security.
Nicaragua's army of approximately 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers, supplemented by as many as 200,000 reservists, is proportional to an eight to nine million-member U.S. army and a 25 million-strong reserve. The argument that U.S. government policy prompted this buildup is absurd; it began long before Jimmy Carter abandoned his accommodating stance toward the Nicaraguan Revolution.
After the Sandinistas solidified their hold on the original, broad-based junta and purged it of non-Marxist elements, they perceived the need to maintain a powerful standing army for three reasons: first, to provide an internally repressive force to control the populace; second, to serve as a vehicle for indoctrination of most young Nicaraguan men and women, and for indirect indoctrination of older Nicaraguans through frequent drills, rallies, and "defense alerts" against potential U.S. invasion and finally, to be used as a tool of aggression against Nicaraguan's non-Marklet neighbors.
The Sandinista are smart enough to know that no conceivable they might amass could possibly defeat a U.S. invasion. And the majority opinion is correct in saying that the Reagan Administration knows that direct invasion will not achieve Central American freedom and stability along the lines desired by the original leaders of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Such as invasion would actually play into the hands of the Sandinistas by galvanizing support. The Sandinistas are fully aware of the constraints-from Congress, public opinion, and other nations-placed on Reagan, and they can safely dismiss the possibility of a general landing of U.S. troops.
Why, then, are the Sandinistas enlarging what is already by far the largest military force in Central America? Why do they want a handful of MiG-21$, which could be destroyed in minutes bx U.S. carrier based fighters? The answer is quite straightforward: through a combination of internal military oppression and cultivation of a bogus external threat, the Sandinistas are trying to strengthen their domination over the people, to deny the pluralistic spirit of their revolution, and to destabilize and tyrannize their neighbors.
All of this goes over and beyond the simple American desire to prevent Soviet encroachment in the Western Hemisphere. Introduction of high-performance aircraft could be a prelude to tension-heightening Soviet actions. But these are merely additional reasons for our leaders, from both parties, to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to oppose, with force if necessary, the unwarranted and dangerous Central American arms buildup initiated b8 Nicaragua's Soviet-backed dictators.
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