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Send in the Prof

Newsmakers at the Kennedy School: Robert J. Murray

By Rachel H. Inker

All his life. Robert J. Murray has had first-hand experience with national security, from the Marine Corps through a string of positions in the Department of Defense. But only three months after entering the relative calm of academia by taking a job at the Kennedy School of Government, Murray was called back out to the front lines, this time to Beirut.

Appointed Director of National Security Programs at the K-School in August. Murray joined a five-man committee confronted with the grim task of assessing official blame for the October 23 terrorist attack on the Marines headquarters in Beirut which took 241 lives.

The committee, appointed by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger '38, strongly criticized the Marine Corps commanders for failing to provide adequate security and for stationing all the forces in one building.

During his two visits to Lebanon, and additional trips through Europe. Murray says he interviewed "everyone from the man on the ground up to generals in Europe."

Even though the compound was devastated by the suicide truck bomb, which Murray says is "the largest conventional explosion the FBI has ever investigated," he says, the Marine installation managed to pull together and continue their job.

"The Marines were hurt and shocked by the nature of the catastrophe and the deaths of their comrades, but they were still functioning," he says.

Murray is the only civilian member of the commission, which included officers from all of the branches of the U.S. Armed forces. He says he initially felt ambivalent about serving on it, because of the huge time commitment it would take--he was just beginning to settle in at the K-School--and also because he thought it would be a depressing assignment.

"I was not enthused about it," Murray said. But he was won over in part by the substantial leeway he believed the commission would have in exploring the catastrophe. "It wasn't a commission whose job it was to say that everything was O.K., but rather a commission that looked at the circumstances and said what it honestly found to be the case."

"Putting in more American forces on a fairly large scale strikes me as the least useful of the solutions. I don't think that the country will support it..."

The process of investigating the bombing required a heavy schedule of interviews and members of the commission spent their time speaking with eyewitnesses, sentries, Lebanese soldiers, and anyone who had any connection to the bombing. As they gathered information, the committee members would meet and debate passionately the latest findings.

At the end of the investigation, Murray, his four counterparts and 15 aides "spent two weeks, day and night, in a room in the Pentagon. There was a terrific lot of arguing, but in the end there was agreement on what we wrote," Murray recalled.

"Basically the argument was: what really happened and how to explain it both accurately and fairly to the people involved," Murray said.

Another central issue was whether to recommend punishment in principal for the commanders at fault. While the commission held the ultimate responsibility for such a catastrophe lay with those in charge, they did not recommend that Reagan levy any punishment. "There is not evidence to prosecute successfully," said Murray, adding. "There should not be court martialing of some people while other people escape." Reagan eventually accepted this recommendation.

Murray's own responsibility was to interview Israeli government officials to determine why the U.S. declined to use Israeli medical help when it was offered. The injured Marines were flown to West Germany instead of taking the 20-minute flight into Israel, a decision which Murray says was practically, not politically, motivated.

Murray said that the general in command knew the West German facilities, and that it would be inappropriate during a time of crisis to use unfamiliar facilities.

The head of the committee, retired admiral Robert L.J. Long, strongly praised Murray. "He brought a fine human quality to the commission. I am most appreciative of the service he provided."

Long added that Murray has a "broad back-ground in political military affairs, with a good understanding of the military." Murray has held a variety of positions in the federal government, including undersecretary of the navy and deputy assistant secretary of defense. Before coming to Harvard he served as dean of the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

Although he declined to make any recommendations on future administration policy in Lebanon, Murray said he feels the worst course would be to increase the number of troops in the war-horn country.

"Putting in more American forces on a fairly large scale strikes me as the least useful of the solutions." Murray said. "I don't think than the country will support it and I don't think our interests are, that deeply at stake."

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