Still the Wrong Prescription

THE FINDINGS of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America published this week have, not surprisingly, reaffirmed the United States' vital stake in Central America. For both humanitarian and security reasons the situation in the troubled region concerns us more than ever, the report states. With that said, the 12 member panel headed by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger '50 goes on to propose a set of conflicting solutions that if adopted as policy would inevitably fail to place Central America on the path to peace and prosperity.

By emphasizing the social and economic dimensions of the Central. American problem and suggesting the need for longterm answers, the Commission moves away from a total reliance on the hasty military measures for problems south of the border that have too often plagued U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless the ratio of military measures to social and economic ones endorsed by the report remains too high.

As the report correctly notes, before any serious reforms and development can take place in Central America the path towards peace must be cleared of violence from both the right and the left. Unfortunately, the contradictory measures prescribed to end the bloodshed promise only to prolong it.

Kissinger and company urge a stepped up campaign by the Salvadoran Army in order to defeat the leftist insurgents and end the country's three-year civil war. Although the group wisely rules out the use of any U.S. troops in El Salvador, it does call for a quadrupling of U.S. military aid in the next year to the order of $250 million, adding the important condition that aid be contingent on the Salvadoran Government's success on curbing the rightist death squads and securing basic human rights. Such a condition, unlike in the past, must be strictly adhered to by both the President and Congress.

But at the same time, the report asks the Salvadoran government to invite the rebel organizations to participate in the upcoming March elections and details plan to guarantee the fairness of the elections and the safety of all the participants. The preparation of the Salvadoran Army for the knock-down blow of the guerrillas is sure to keep the rebels away from the voting booths and the negotiating table. A far wiser course would be to delay increased military aid for El-Salvador and hope for signs of willingness to negotiate on the part of the insurgents. This would give the rebels time and incentive to come to the bargaining table knowing that a potentially mightier opponent awaits it if it doesn't.

For nearby Nicaragua, the Commission upholds President Reagan's view that the presence of a Soviet and Cuban backed government imperils regional security. It demands the return of the Nicaraguan Revolution to its democratic course and the end to Communist meddling in the area. Towards that goal the panel supports continued covert aid to the Contras as an incentive for the Sandinistas to grant greater freedom at home and negotiate a regional security settlement.

Such a policy is misguided on two counts. As the situation in El Salvador reveals, governments under siege have trouble maintaining open societies and often sacrifice civil liberties in turn for survival. In addition, it would be foolish to think that even if Nicaraguan policies did finally meet with U.S. approval the Contras would stop fighting. Most of these groups, peopled by members of Somoza's National Guards, do not seek the improvement of Nicaraguan society according to U.S. standards but control of that society itself. They will neither give their U.S. arms back to their donors or stop using them. The United States would be well advised to negotiate with the Nicaraguans and offer to withdraw support for the Contras provided the Sandinistas stop aiding Salvadoran guerrillas and reduce ties with the Cubans and Soviets. Recent moves by the Sandinistas such as scheduling elections, expelling 2000 Cuban advisers and granting greater freedom to the opposition signal a willingness on the part of the Nicaraguans to come to terms with the U.S. Washington must seize this opportunity and pursue peaceful negotiations.

It is the social and economic proposals of the report that Congress and the President must use as a foundation for consensus. The report faces up to the realization that it will take many years and billions of dollars to reverse the decline in living standards from which Central America now suffers. Although as the panel points out, much of Central America's future depends on the policies it adopts U.S. assistance is vital in providing the region with a head start. Washington should continue its support for agrarian reform which will lessen the power of local oligarchies and offer the peasant some hope of livelihood. In addition, the U.S. should be generous in supplying technical and monetary aid in helping the Central American nations diversity their agricultural sector so as to make countries more self-sufficient for food and less dependent on one crop economies.

In a time of concern over increased deficits, the $8 billion in aid proposed by the commission over the next five years for Central America seems like an exorbitant sum. Surely Congress and the President will work to pare that figure down in the future. For now, Americans must discard the notion that shooting will bring peace to the region and sober up to the reality that there is no flight from commitment from Central America. The cost in humanitarian and strategic terms is too great.