Tremor in Timor

When Indonesian troops launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor--a small island north of Australia--in 1975, the Indonesians knew they could count on tacit United States support. They felt confident that not only would the U.S. play a role in suppressing discussion at the United Nations for this bistant breach of international law, but also continue its military aid to Indonesia. At the time, the stated purpose of the Indonesian invasion of this Portuguese colony was to "stabilize" it and prevent the allegedly leftist liberation front FRETILIN (a Portuguese acronym) from taking over power after the Portuguese had started the decolonization process in 1974. This "stabilization" process has since involved 100,000 to 200,000 civilian deaths caused by the actual fighting and even more by the large famines which came as a result of indiscriminate bombings of the countryside. In about three years, roughly one-third of the entire East Timorese population was wiped out.

United States blessing was already evident from the beginning of the operation. The main invasion "coincidentally" began one day after then-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger '50 and former President Gerald R. Ford visited the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta. Since then the U.S. has openly backed the Indonesian position. Every year, the U.S. has voted against U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning Indonesia. (The reolutions were passed anyway.) Since mid-1976, the U.S. State Department has recognized East Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia contrary to international law and to the U.N. resolutions asserting the island's right to self-determination. Furthermore, at the time of the attack, the U.S. not only continued but actually increased substantially its military aid to Indonesia. Even during an official six months suspension of military aid in 1976, the U.S. continued to sell military hardware to Indonesia.

Does this tacit support imply that the U.S. bears responsibility for the invasion which was carried out entirely by Indonesian troops? Could the U.S. government have stopped Indonesia? The position of the State Department and of the major American media is unambiguous: they deplore the admitted atrocities but claim that the U.S. could have done little to prevent the invasion. At best it would have alienated an importantally. To give only one example, James Fallow of The Atlantic Monthly argued:

"Having spoken to Indonesians on this 'sensitive' subject. I now believe that the Indonesian army would have invaded Timor no matter what we or anyone else said about it, even if each Indonesian soldier had at his disposal no weapon other than his sacred dagger, the 'kris.'" (Atlantic Monthly, June 1982)

Recently leaked top-secret American documents seem to prove the opposite. They show that the U.S. foreign policy makers were aware that Indonesian President Suharto was concerned about world opinion and resisted the demands of his generals to annex East Timor for over a year. These leaked documents were passages from the "National Intelligence Daily," a briefing document published by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for a small, specially cleared audience in Washington--which included, the President of the United States. These leaked intelligence briefs, published in the Australian newspaper National Times in May and June 1982, have never been made public in the United States. They suggest that the U.S. State Department and President Ford gave their blessing of the invasion of East Timor with the full knowledge that international law as well as American laws were broken. Following are excerpts from the briefs:

August 12, 1975: "Last fall, Suharto's top military advisors advocated a military move against Timor, but the President preferred to rely on a clandestine political and propaganda campaign. He was concerned about Indonesia's International reputation and particularly about the reaction in the U.S. and Australia."

August 18, 1975: "Suharto continues to worry about adverse reaction from the U.S.... top military commanders, however, still favor swift action."

August 20, 1975: "President Suharto evidently is still delaying on a decision to authorize military action. Apparently, a major consideration on his part is that an invasion of Timor, if it comes, must be justified as an act in defense of Indonesian security. He is acutely aware that conditions of U.S. military assistance to Indonesia specifically limit the use of this equipment to defensive purposes."

September 26, 1975: "Vastly increased Indonesian involvement is now proposed: special forces troops, armed with weapons that cannot be traced to Jakarta will be used. Malaysia has reportedly agreed in principle to supply such weapons...recent press reports from Jakarta that claim FRETILIN forces crossed the border and attacked Indonesian Timor may have been released by military officers in an effort to build up the pressure on Suharto."

October 31, 1975: "Despite increasingly visible military activities, Jakarta continues to deny its involvement and attributes all fighting to anti-FRETILIN Timorese. President Suharto remains concerned about international reaction and continues to make an effort to deny any territorial ambitions."

December 5, 1975: "President Suharto has reportedly approved a plan to begin overt Indonesian intervention in Portuguese Timor soon after President Ford leaves Jakarta...Suharto is undoubtedly still concerned about the effects of an Indonesian invasion on his relations with the U.S., particularly the continuation of U.S. military aid, and he will try hard to present a plausible justification...Suharto is certain to try to elicit a sympathetic attitude from President Ford during their meetings."

December 8, 1975: "Indonesian troops have captured Dili, the capital of Portuguese Timor. Yesterday marine and airborne troops equipped with U.S. weapons mounted a full-scale attack against the city."

December 10, 1975: "Indonesia is having trouble convincing the world that military intervention in Timor is justified in part because of the unexpectedly strong reaction from Portugal itself...Lisbon has broken relations with Indonesia and the Portuguese Foreign Minister has branded Jakarta's actions an 'unqualified act of armed aggression.'"

These excerpts from top-secret CIA documents leave no doubt that the U.S. did have the leverage to prevent Indonesia from invading East Timor without greatly upsetting President Suharto.

Yet, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor is not a matter of the past. FRETILIN is still fighting and has actually gained strength. A large surprise attack on the capital Dili took place in 1981 killing many Indonesian soldiers and destroying the local TV station. And documents smuggled out of East Timor late last year indicate that FRETILIN troops have reorganized and number about 6,500. According to The Washington Post (January 16, 1983), this renewed strength of FRETILIN could be corroborated by independent reports of recent refugees and letters from East Timor. All of these reports indicate that guerrilla activity was much higher in 1982 than in 1981 or 1980. In other words, the people of East Timor--who are ethnically different from the Indonesians and do not share the same history--have by no means accepted their fate of being the 27th province of Indonesia.

Also here in the United States, the issue of East Timor has gained attention. Last October, President Suharto visited this country. Just prior to his arrival 100 legislators from both houses sent letters expressing concern about East Timor to President Reagan and to Secretary of State George P. Schultz. The national media also raised the issue prominently for the first time. Criticism in Congress has been mounting. Sen. Paul Taongas (D-Mass.) and Rep. Tony Hall (D-Ohio) introduced a concurrent resolution last fall demanding negotiations for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and the right of the East Timorese to exercise self-determination. Hearings are expected to take place later on this year.

The question of East Timor can no longer be simply ignored. The human suffering has been too great. International law needs to be restored. The U.S. should finally face up to its duty and correct for its past mistakes. It is an illusion to believe that the issue will fade if we only let time pass by. The principle which has upheld during the Malvinas Falklands war should be applied un-equivocally in the case of East Timor: no nation has the right to armed aggression. And as Tsongas has pointed out: the issue of East Timor is separate from our relations with Indonesia. It is perfectly possible to maintain friendly relations with an importantally in Southeast Asia, and still pressure it to respect the international law.

Gregor Binkert '83 is in the Economics Department and is associated with Dadley House.