Debunking Deterrence

To the Editors of The Crimson:

This letter is a reply to that by Eric Stockel (4/14/83).

Mr. Stockel attacks Errol T. Louis, who has written against President Reagan's nuclear policy. Mr. Stockel argues that Reagan's policy best serves the interests of deterrence, by seeking nuclear parity with the Soviets. Regardless of what one might think of Reagan's nuclear policy. I think it is a mistake to believe it is based upon strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence operates on the belief that war can be avoided if each side (the U.S. and the USSR) is able to deter the other from starting a nuclear war with the threat of retaliation. If the United States has sufficient arsenals to respond to an attack from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union will be reluctant to start a war which would lead to its own devastation.

Yet, it is difficult to explain Reagan's policy on a basis of this logic. Take for example the issue of parity. 'It is wholly unnecessary for the United States to match the Soviet Union "missile for missile." The U.S. need only be capable of launching a counterattack to answer any Soviet attack; despite recent Soviet missile build-ups, it is entirely likely that we have that capability.

Even if one could explain Reagan's goal of parity on a basis of deterrence, other aspects of his nuclear policy remain unexplained. Why, for example, would Reagan be concerned with highly accurate missile systems? A policy of deterrence calls for nothing more than the firepower necessary to respond to an attack, and no more accuracy than is necessary to hit population centers. Yet, Reagan, seems to want the accuracy capable of hitting missile silos Why?

The answer is that Reagan's policy does not rely upon the logic of deterrence (though he may still pay lip-service to it). The argument could be called "thinking the unthinkable." In the event of nuclear attack, so the argument goes, to respond by attacking population centers would only leave both countries devastated. Therefore, the United States should be prepared to respond to Soviet attack by knocking out the Soviet's missiles, and thereby halting the assault in its tracks.

Of course, as each side develops more accurate weapons systems, deterrence falls by the wayside. This is because each side gains the capability of launching a surprise nuclear assault (destroying the other side's arsenal), to which the other side could not respond.

There is, then, a crucial difference between a policy of deterrence and Reagan's nuclear policy. A policy of deterrence is designed to avoid nuclear war. Reagan's policy rests on the belief that nuclear war is a distinct possibility, even a likely occurrence; it is a policy for surviving nuclear war.

I believe that "thinking the unthinkable," and not deterrence, will make much more sense of Reagan's nuclear policy. (It would also explain, by the way. Reagan's concern with such issues as a post-nuclear postal service.) If Mr. Stockel truly accepts Reagan's nuclear strategy, then I believe he must reject any policy of deterrence. If that is the case, then the next step for Mr. Stockel is to find a shovel, and start digging. Andy Dwyer '84