Questioning Israel's Morality

Serious moral questions are raised by the Israeli Commission of Inquiry's report on the Sabra and Shatila massacres, and more particularly by public reactions to it. Paradoxically, while the factual findings of the Commission establish unequivocally the grave moral turpitude of a number of Israeli leaders, the very fact of the Commission's creation and the carrying out of its duties are hailed as evidence of Israel's observance of the rule of law and respect for democratic institutions. There are some very troubling aspects to this latter view, to say the least.

First, one may challenge the conclusions of the Commission that the acts documented in the report represent no more than "carelessness," "incompetence," "indifference," "negligence," and "passivity." On the contrary, the factual record substantiates very active complicity in the massacres by the Israeli military. The direct logistical support given by the Israeli forces to the Phalangists during the massacres was hardly "passive." Moreover, considering the arms aid and years of training given by Israel to the Phalangists and other right-wing Lebanese militias--and the claim of Israel's Defense Minister Sharon that Israeli military officers had witnessed prior massacres of Palestinian civilians by Phalangists--it is impossible to conclude other than that the consequences of the Phalangists' entry into the camps were utterly predictable to the Israelis. The situation was analogous to that of a person unleashing a trained, vicious attack dog on a defenseless other--the injuries from which would be attributable to the "indirect responsibility" of the dog-owner only at the expense of credible notions of intentionality and responsibility. It is immaterial that the Israeli may have had a "legitimate" aim in "mopping up" (to use that morbid and dehumanizing expression) Palestinian resistance--even though the train of events demonstrated that there was in fact none--and that the Israelis did not intend specifically that the massacres be perpetrated. The use of means with foreseeably inhuman "incidental" effects cannot be justified by reference to some alleged 'legitimate" end.

Second, it is more than disturbing to witness the rapidity with which Israel's defenders would forget the numerous and severe offenses committed by Israel against international law both before and after the Sabra and Shatila massacres. The most important of these offenses was the invasion of Lebanon itself, which violated articles of the U.N. charter prohibiting the use of force international relations, as well as U.N. General Assembly resolutions defining aggression and declaring the inadmissibility of intervention in another state. The massive scale of death and destruction caused by the Israeli forces in Lebanon far outweighed any actual or potential harm inflicted upon Israel by Palestinian forces based in Lebanon, thus violating a basic principle of customer international law requiring proportionality in the use of force, applicable even to a legitimate exercise of the right to self-defense.

Israel's use of phosphorous bombs, other incendiary weaponry, and anti-personnel cluster bombs in indiscriminate bombings of civilian areas of Beirut and other Lebanese cities violated numerous provisions of international conventions relative to the protection of civilians in times of war. Extensive looting and vandalism of residences and public institutions by Israeli troops also violated these general conventions. The theft of the 25,000 volume library of the Palestine Research Center violated a specific convention relative to the protection of cultural property in times of war of which both Israel and Lebanon are signatories. The destruction of Palestinian camps and other property in the aftermath of active hostilities to "relocate" (disperse) the Palestinian population violated principles of the laws of warfare which strictly bar the destruction of property except for reasons of immediate military necessity.

The arbitrary arrest and detention of all Palestinian men between the ages of 14 and 60 found within the Israeli sphere of occupation, aside from its chillingly racist overtones, also violated international law protecting the rights of civilians in occupied areas. The thousands of Palestinians who remain in detention camps in Southern Lebanon have not been accorded prisoner of war status, an on-going violation of international law regarding treatment of prisoners in times of war.

Israel can be upheld as an exemplar of the rule of law only when this list of extensive abuses of law (which could be lengthened still further were Israel's actions in the territories occupied in 1967 to be included) has been obscured and forgotten. It is not so much a criticism of the content of the Israeli Commission's report as it is of the exclusivity of its scope to note that the subject of the broader violations of international law committed by Israel in the invasion of Lebanon has now been dropped from public discussion.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the public response to the Commission's report is the apparent readiness of Israel's defenders to accept the appearance of legal procedure as being the equivalent of the substance of democratic government. There is something myopic in the proposition that a "democracy" is no more than a government which follows acts of genocide with rituals of retribution. Somehow, one would hope and expect of a democracy that it not commit such atrocities as those committed in Lebanon to begin with. This hints at the inconsistency between Israel's simultaneous claim to status within the community of democratic nations and the determination of its leaders to crush, with violence if necessary, any institutional expressions of Palestinian nationalism. For invasions of Lebanon, or some equivalent, will probably be necessary as long as Palestinians aspire to nationhood, and as long as Israel refuses to come to grips with the reality and legitimacy of Palestinian national claims.

A sense of moral unease with the reaction to the Commission report can only be heightened when the gravity of the crimes committed is measured against the mild recommendations of the Commission. Is the loss of a position within the government truly an adequate sanction for crimes against humanity?

Legal procedures in a democratic society are not ends in themselves, but are legitimated only by the justice of the substantive results they render. Legal procedures are seldom if ever truly sufficient to rectify past wrongs, especially when blood has been shed. But when the sanctions associated with these legal procedures offer no meaningful promise of deterring individuals from future wrongs, they become a mockery of the ideal of justice rather than the best that justice can provide under less than ideal circumstances. The probability that Sharon will remain in the Israeli Cabinet, and that the furor over the Commission report will obscure the collective capability of the Israeli leadership for the broader violations of law and morality in the invasion of Lebanon, suggest that justice here has been mocked rather than vindicated.

George E. Bisharat is in his third year at Harvard Law School and the president of the Harvard Arab Student's Society.