Spreading the Wealth

EVERYONE HAS HEARD the sayings. "You shouldn't put all your eggs in one basket" and "Cover all the bases just to be sure." The logic is sell-evident. Yet, for the sale of convenience, individuals often accumulate valuable items in one place, or fail to spread their options as widely as possible. National governments often go this easy route as well, and the Reagan Administration is no exception.

Political convenience lies at the root of America's newest arms control initiative "build-down." This concept, under which the superpowers nuclear forces would be simultaneously reduced and modernized, has gained favor in Congress over the past year. It is attractive to just about all parties concerned. Both Democratic and Republican congressmen can claim support for nuclear reduction of freeze proponents, while simultaneously maintaining an image of backing for strong national defense, through modernization of weapons. The President, by accepting the congressmen's proposal, will also be able to call on favors when the final vote for MX missile is cast.

Upon superficial examination, the proposal seems good for everyone. Reducing the horribly destructive arsenals of the Soviet Union and the US possesses a strong emotional appeal for all Americans. And continuing introduction of new weapons presumably avoids all of the dangers claimed by opponents of arms control.

On closer analysis, however, "build-down", rather than reducing the chances for a nuclear war, actually increases the likelihood. The core of the proposal simply flies in the face of established deterrence theory. The main problem lies in the projected trend for land-based missiles. "Build down" would decrease the current force by almost half, from 1.050 missiles to a total of 100 MX's plus 500 yet-to-be-designed Midgetmen. The number of warheads on these missiles would decrease less from 2.145 to 1500 Reducing the number of missiles (i.e. potential targets) more than the number of warheads compounds an already existent problem--the fewer separate targets each side has, with more warheads, the greater the temptation in a crisis for each to knock out the other. This is analogous to the "too many eggs in one basket" idea. Thus, while "build-down" would achieve a desirable reduction of destructive capability, it would do it in exactly the wrong way.

The authors of "build-down" also want a reduction in the number of Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles. However, the Poscidum and Trident submarines are America's best deterrent, and the greatest guarantee for peace in the nuclear age. They are mobile, hard to detect, and hard to destroy. The Soviet Union knows that they offer a retaliatory potential which Russia cannot ignore. Therefore, what peaceful purpose is served by putting a cap on the number of submarines with missile that the US can deploy at any given time?

The nebulous nature of the initiative should also cause Americans grave concern. Five-sixths of the projected land-based mix depends on Midgetman, a small missile proposed by the special Scowcroft Commission essentially to mitigate problems with the MX. However, the Midgetman has yet to be designed, and Congress and President Reagan have yet to move on it. It would seem unwise to summarily dismantle existing deterrent systems before equally effective replacements are assured. Also, verification of Soviet compliance with any "build-down" scheme would be extremely difficult. Finally, "build-down" has become an instant symbol of so-called bipartisan cooperation in support of arms control, when in fact it is merely an artificial contrivance to allow congressmen to sleep well after they approve MX. But the MX is the root of the problem. It sticks out like a sore thumb and is obviously the reason for the President's eagerness to accomodate the authors of "build-down". Just as painfully obvious is Congress duplicity in cooking up "build-down"--it will serve as a shield when they approve the giant missile.

The folly of MX should be apparent by now. It is only the inherent inertia of any large weapons system with a complex sum of industrial, defense, and governmental special interests that keeps the missile alive at all. America should cut its losses now, stop work on the giant missile, and move toward-those systems that enhance deterrence--small, mobile missiles and submarines. Of course, reduction of nuclear weapons is a desirable goal, but it can be done in much better, safer ways. "Build-down" should be recognized as a confused smokescreen for all the parties in Washington, and should be discarded before it distorts the real issues of deterrence and peace.