Harvard Experts on Nuclear Politics:

One by product of the nuclear arms race has been a proliferation of scholarship and analysis devoted to complexities and dilemmas. The Crimson recently talked to four Harvard experts about the issues surrounding the arms race, both how it is now and where it is likely to go from here. Participating in the two hour discussion were: Michael I. Mandelbaum '69, associate professor of Government and author of The Nuclear Question and The Nuclear Revolution. Michael I. Nacht, associate professor of Government and author of The Nuclear Question and The Nuclear Revolution: Michael L. Nacht associate professor of Public Policy at the Kennedy School, currently finishing a book on strategic nuclear questions for the Brookings Institute in Washington. Joseph S. Nye Jr., professor of Government who had dealt with proliferation issues as a State Department officials in the Carter Administration and Martin J. Sherwin, a visiting scholar at the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History and author of A World Destroyed. The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance now writing a biography of physicist J. Robert Oppeheimer '25, following is an edited transcript of the interview, which was conducted by Crimson editors Paul M. Barrett and James G. Hershberg.

Crimson: It's been 37 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why are we now seeing such an outpouring of public concern over the dangers of nuclear war? Do you see this movement as some thing which has been building for a long time of as a transitory reaction to Reagan Administration rhetoric?

Sherwin: I think it has been building for a long time, in the same way that the nuclear arms race quantitatively has been building for a long time. In 1948, we had 50 atomic bombs. Today there are something like 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear weapons in Soviet and American missiles, and that doesn't even count the French and British, so the sheer quantity is beginning to get frightening.

But I think that precipitated the present concern for nuclear weapons is the Reagan Administration's rhetoric the foundation for which was laid by the Center Administration discussion of limited nuclear war, that it's winnable discussion by the Reagan Administration, the Carter Administration put forth [an] Presidential Directive 59, the limited nuclear war doctrine. The introduction of a new series of weapons systems into the public arena the neutron bomb again, components for that were manufactured under the Carter Administration's auspices. And then Haig's discussion before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December of the warning-shot idea...Following the European protests, then followed by Reagan's limited war discussions, it just coalesced.

Mandelbaum: I agree in part with that I think there is a kind of underlying reservoir of anxiety, if you will, or the collective pvsche of the American public, about nuclear weapons....This anxiety stays beneath the surface because most people would prefer not to confront the reality of our nuclear situation. But every so often something happens that compels people to recognize the peril in which we all live....

I agree with Marty that what has prompted it in this instance is the Reagan Administration and its policies. I would say that it is a combination of three things: first, the accumulation of the various policies that [Sherwin] has noted--the discussion of a nuclear warning shot, nuclear war fighting strategies. Second, the failure of the President to do what every president since Eisenhower has done, and that is to speak about nuclear weapons in a reassuring way, to make it clear to the world and to the American people that he recognizes the dangers of nuclear weapons and is determined to do everything he can to minimize them. I'm not suggesting that Mr. Reagan does not recognize these dangers, but I don't think that he has made a public display of his concern or he didn't in the first 15 months of his administration in the way that other presidents have. Third, I think there was an underlying sense of unease about Mr. Reagan in American public opinion based on his previous political career, his political rhetoric, and I would say especially the 1976 campaign.

Nye: I tend to agree; I think it's worth remembering just two things. One is that it's not the first time we've seen an upsurge of public concern about nuclear weapons. I was a student at Oxford in the late fifties, and at that time there was a very strong anti-nuclear movement, which then receded during the sixties to be born again.

I think that the basic dilemma that one has to keep in mind--that was my second point--is that if you want nuclear weapons for deterrence, which we do, since there are Russians out there, there has to be some possibility of their use....If on the other hand, they [turn out to] be too usable, there's always the possibility of their leading to a holocaust, which nobody wants to see either. So you're caught in a very tight space....I think what Reagan has done by his declarative policy is err in the direction of usability and thereby stimulate great public concern. I think that gives him the title of father of the nuclear freeze movement.

Nacht: There's no denying that the Reagan Administration has contributed to this anti-nuclear sentiment in the United States and in Europe, and perhaps it is the primary contributor. But I don't think they are, the Administration, is the only contributor. I would say that there are two other important considerations. One is with a lot of attention in the media to SALT and now START, and to its difficulties, more Americans are at least crudely aware of the fact that the arms competition between the Soviet Union and the United States is not abating in any fashion.

The other is that I think there is quite a deep feeling that Soviet American relations have turned quite cold, and if you've got a seemingly unabated competition and a very cool relationship between the two adversaries and a president who speaks somewhat cavalierly about these nuclear weapons. I think if you put all those things together, then you have a lot of fear and concern.

Crimson: The Reagan Administration's statements, [especially] the Eureka speech, seem to mark something of a change in their policies, especially their admission that the Soviet leaders had learned the necessity of preventing nuclear war. Do you believe that Reagan has significantly altered his [nuclear arms reduction] strategy, and what chance of success do you think the START program has?

Nacht: I would say that the [Reagan] arms control initiative is as much a political initiative for domestic purposes as it is anything else. I think that perhaps the President now shares Professor Nye's view that it is the Reagan Administration that is the father of the nuclear freeze movement, and they don't wish to continue to nurture that child. They would like to dismiss it, and one way to do that is to move, as many students of the presidency have often argued, to a somewhat more centrist position to appear more accommodating, to tone down the rhetoric, to come forth with more substantive proposals....I do think also, it took quite a while for this administration to get its act together and hammer out a start negotiating position. In fact, it wasn't really hammered out, because there are virtually incompatible views within this administration on the START proposal and what the President did.

Nye: What's interesting, to go back to the original question, is the extent to which the Administration has changed from its initial position. After all, this Administration came in saying that we shouldn't have arms control until we've rebuilt our military strength. And any arms control would be tightly linked to Soviet behavior elsewhere in places such as Afghanistan and Poland. And, lo and behold, both of these things seems to have dropped by the wayside.

Crimson: What would be the tip-off for people to start thinking that the Reagan Administration wasn't serious, that the proposal that it was offering wasn't negotiable?

Nye: If they had gone forward with the massive cuts in throw-weight, which essentially required Soviet cuts rather than American cuts....I think that would have been clearly not negotiable.

Nacht: I remember some of the Reagan Administration officials said that the European proposal for the intermediate nuclear force talks was not an opening negotiating position, it was the only negotiating position....Now there was none of that rhetoric in public associated with the START proposal, and even when Mr. Brezhnev came back with quite a lot of criticism about the proposal and some different ideas, the Administration interpreted it very positively and said, well, this shows Mr. Brezhnev wants to speak....There are many problems with the opening position, but, I mean, it does clearly seem to be an opening position, and that's a positive step forward on this kind of relative basis.

Sherwin: I think it's a positive step that the Administration has taken reluctantly as a result of external pressure. I think that point has been made in terms of political strategy, and the critical question becomes has it really changed its strategy? And the answer to that in my view is, yes. Has it changed its objective? The answer to that at this point. I think, is maybe. It may have to change its objective.

Crimson: Dealing with the change in the Reagan Administration's policy, do you view it as the Administration becoming educated to the realities of arms control or actually changing its view of the Soviet Union?

Mandelbaum: Once in office, a variety of pressures come to bear on any president that incline him to favor arms control, and these pressures have come to bear on Mr. Reagan. They have been enumerated here: domestic political pressure, international pressure, the feelings of our allies. Costs are important. Mr. Reagan has budget problems. A large nuclear buildup promises to be extremely expensive. And also...presidents have really felt the personal weight of the nuclear responsibility that each of them bears. And I think Mr. Reagan can hardly avoid feeling that way as well.

Sherwin: Let me go back to a point that was brought up a little bit earlier by Professor Nye about deterrence because this is really at the heart of things...That is the alleged reason we have nuclear weapons and we continue the build-up. We live in a system that believes that deterrence is what prevents war, and war will be nuclear, so deterrence prevents nuclear war. And I think one of the problems that has emerged...that, with respect to our nuclear weapons, we really go beyond deterrence. I think that it is true that we have to deter the Soviets from striking the the United States with nuclear weapons or giving them an opportunity to think that they're in a position to do so....The problem is that we try to sort of expand the usability of nuclear weapons, and it's a recognition of that that has also been a contributor to precipitating this concern about nuclear weapons. Taking it from deterrence, specifically, into the general area of diplomacy, with limited nuclear war, for example, creates opportunities for slip-ups. And those slip-ups or potential slip-ups are very frightening.

Crimson: What is your evaluation of Reagan's whole nuclear build-up plan in terms of arms themselves, and along with that, does the term "nuclear superiority" in your mind have any meaning anymore?

Sherwin: Yes, it has a meaning, and the meaning is tied to the point that I was making--it's called nuclear diplomacy, atomic diplomacy, or nuclear blackmail, that sort of thing. The fear is that the side with more, with a superiority, will be willing to threaten more. It's a vague, general perception that has specificity, that is in a sense contrary to theory and in a sense beyond the bounds of history....It's a problem in cultural anthropology, and we don't want the Soviets to be superior.

Mandelbaum: I think it's true that no one is clearly sure what nuclear weapons beyond those clearly necessary for deterrence are useful for. And since it's not clear, since as we search the historical record of the last 37 years we don't come up with any clear answers as to just how nuclear weapons can be used diplomatically....

It seems always better to err on the side of caution....Nuclear weaponry constitutes a fairly small portion of the defense budget, and so running the nuclear arms race does not tax the capacity of the American public. Second, I would agree, and this is very much a debatable point, that continuing to run the nuclear arms race, erring on the side of caution, caution defined in precisely this way, hasn't really been all that dangerous. It's simply been a moderate expense.

Nye: Well, on the point of superiority, I think the quest for superiority is futile, because I don't think either side is going to allow the other to achieve it. And the reason is that if one side believes the other has superiority, it may be more cowed in the possibility of a diplomatic confrontation....In that sense I think there is a concern that you don't have a sense of superiority on which there is a danger of miscalculation....So I think both sides are going to, in fact prevent that from becoming as imbalanced as it has been in the past....

On the question of the Regan force build-up. I think you have to approach that by asking what is it that you want from your nuclear weapons. And clearly you want them to provide deterrence, but you want more from them than that. You want them to be able to support the umbrella which you extend over allies such as Europe and Japan, and this is called extended deterrence. And you do want them occasionally to bolster your diplomacy. And I think that's becoming more and more difficult in a world of party....I'd want to see nuclear forces which are relatively invulnerable in their bases so that there's no prospect that they would be used in time of crisis for fear of their being lost. And in that sense I would tend to support the broad outline of the Reagan modernization of nuclear forces.

Crimson: Would you say there would be any long-term alternatives to a deterrence [policy] along the lines of what's already been said?

Nacht: There are several issues on the table here that I would like to respond to. The first on the question of nuclear superiority. It may be the case that the quest for nuclear superiority by either the Soviet Union or the United States is futile. But I think it will be pursued with all due vigor by both sides.

The reason I feel that is because I don't think that the nuclear arms competition between the two superpowers is some kind of irrational or non-rational behavior pattern. I think it's very much a central element of what I see as the major competitive relationship in international politics....So it may be that now that the Soviet Union has eliminated many of the numerical interiorities it faced previously and we're in a situation of ambiguity....There are still some areas in which the United States is superior, but I think in most measures of nuclear strength, I would argue that it is quite clear that the trends are adverse to the United States....

The two sources of glimmer of hope when they [the Administration] look at the Soviet Union and when I look at the Soviet Union are, one, that perhaps there is quite serious concern in the Soviet leadership about what the Reagan program might really look like in the late 1980s and perhaps this is a good reason to negotiate agreements now....The other is, and I know that very few people in the West and in the Soviet Union have a good handle on this, but there is some sense that perhaps the Soviet Union is entering a period of such extraordinary economic difficulty that they're really beginning to feel the pinch....It may be the case that there is not an infinite capacity for expansion in the Soviet system and that in a period of transition in leadership they they may find arms control, legitimate constraints, limitations, even reductions of nuclear weapons, to their economic and political advantage.

Crimson: Do you think that's part of the reason for Brezhnev's proposal for a freeze, which he promptly rejected two years ago when Carter offered it?

Nacht: The whole Brezhnev posture is probably playing toward concerns of Americans and Europeans that there is a threat of nuclear war. He wants very much to posture his government on the correct side, the peaceful side, and Reagan as the war monger. I think he's done a quite effective job at that.

Sherwin: Reagan's been a big help.

Nacht: Reagan's been a big help. I think in some areas they have superiority, such as in the European theater and therefore....If I were in the Soviet leadership I would want a freeze in Europe also....But anyway, that's all on the superiority front, and digressions or changes of path from de-

'What Reagan has done by his declarative policy is err in the direction of usability and thereby stimulate great public concern. I think that gives him the title of father of the nuclear freeze movement.'

'I don't think that the nuclear arms competition between the two superpowers is some kind of irrational or non-rational behavior pattern. I think it's very much a central element of what I see as the major competitive relationship in international politics.'