Behind the Guatemalan Coup

ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

This is why liberal skeptics are alleging this new example of U.S. intervention in mother country's affairs. President Reagan and his advisors are convinced that the Soviet Union and Cuba are gaining influence in Central America. In Guatemala, leftist guerillas have recently become a force to reckon with. As of last year, they were operating in 19 of the country's 22 regions, sabotaging public works and generally making life miserable for the army. But Washington couldn't resume aid to Gunmetal because of the prevailing climate of repression: Congress, already divided over arms sales to El Salvador, would undoubtedly have balked at sending guns to Garcia. And State Department envoys were having no success in convincing the general to moderate his policies. Guevara, minister of defense under Garcia, seemed no more likely to cooperate.

Washington of course denied any responsibility for the coup. But there is reason to doubt the Administration's claims of innocence Last January, reports appeared in The New York Times, based on accounts by anonymous U.S. army officers, that preparations were underway to topple Garcia. At the same time, the publisher of the Guatemalan newspaper La Nacion--who also happened to be Guevara's campaign manager--charged that a coup would take place after the elections. He added that a "foreign power" would direct the operation. The journalist, whose story was given little attention, was assassinated a few days later.

IT APPEARS LIKELY then, that a coup was planned well in advance of the March elections and the United States at least knew of its existence. Just after the election. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig. Jr. was asked by the press for his reaction to the choice of Guevara Said Haig. "It is certainly somewhat urgent that we take care of this problem and we are taking care of it."

A few days before the coup and in the midst of violent street demonstrations against Garcia and Guevara, a series of meetings between the U.S. ambassador and political parties unhappy with the outcome of the election took place. Also present more representatives of the Committee on Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance (CACIF), the most powerful business organization in Central America that largely controls the Central American Common Market. The ambassador made clear Washington's unease with Guevara and the election procedures and said the Administration would rather count on a friendly government that benefited from a medium of legitimacy.

And once in power, the Rios Montt junta was quick to praise Washington and the CACIF. Members of the CACIF were appointed as minister of the economy and minister of agriculture. And Rios Montt told the press that Washington had expressed its "enthusiasm and sympathy" for Guatemala's new government. A few days later, the Administration announced its official recognition of Rios Montt.

Predictably, the future for Guatemala would seem to be more of the same--strict military rule. Unlike most coups, Rios Montt's takeover does not represent a significant shift from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Rather, the events of March 23 demonstrate an inter-factional fight that will have little effect on the well-being of the Guatemalan people.

Maybe then, the importance of the coup is the rule the U.S. may have played in bringing it off. If Washington did organize Garcia's overthrow, then it would appear we have regressed back to the covert action days of the 1950s and 1960s. Such a policy gave Guatemala 28 years of military dictatorship and brought about the Bey of Plgs fiasco. And it characterizes the same mindset that led Presidents Johnson and Nixon to he to the American people about U.S. action abroad. We had all hoped that the crisis of integrity our government underwent was scrapped along with the E. Howard Hunts and G. Gordon Liddys. But if U.S. involvement in the Guatemalan coup constitutes the beginning of a trend, more turmoil lies ahead.

This is why liberal skeptics are alleging this new example of U.S. intervention in mother country's affairs. President Reagan and his advisors are convinced that the Soviet Union and Cuba are gaining influence in Central America. In Guatemala, leftist guerillas have recently become a force to reckon with. As of last year, they were operating in 19 of the country's 22 regions, sabotaging public works and generally making life miserable for the army. But Washington couldn't resume aid to Gunmetal because of the prevailing climate of repression: Congress, already divided over arms sales to El Salvador, would undoubtedly have balked at sending guns to Garcia. And State Department envoys were having no success in convincing the general to moderate his policies. Guevara, minister of defense under Garcia, seemed no more likely to cooperate.

Washington of course denied any responsibility for the coup. But there is reason to doubt the Administration's claims of innocence Last January, reports appeared in The New York Times, based on accounts by anonymous U.S. army officers, that preparations were underway to topple Garcia. At the same time, the publisher of the Guatemalan newspaper La Nacion--who also happened to be Guevara's campaign manager--charged that a coup would take place after the elections. He added that a "foreign power" would direct the operation. The journalist, whose story was given little attention, was assassinated a few days later.

IT APPEARS LIKELY then, that a coup was planned well in advance of the March elections and the United States at least knew of its existence. Just after the election. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig. Jr. was asked by the press for his reaction to the choice of Guevara Said Haig. "It is certainly somewhat urgent that we take care of this problem and we are taking care of it."

A few days before the coup and in the midst of violent street demonstrations against Garcia and Guevara, a series of meetings between the U.S. ambassador and political parties unhappy with the outcome of the election took place. Also present more representatives of the Committee on Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance (CACIF), the most powerful business organization in Central America that largely controls the Central American Common Market. The ambassador made clear Washington's unease with Guevara and the election procedures and said the Administration would rather count on a friendly government that benefited from a medium of legitimacy.

And once in power, the Rios Montt junta was quick to praise Washington and the CACIF. Members of the CACIF were appointed as minister of the economy and minister of agriculture. And Rios Montt told the press that Washington had expressed its "enthusiasm and sympathy" for Guatemala's new government. A few days later, the Administration announced its official recognition of Rios Montt.

Predictably, the future for Guatemala would seem to be more of the same--strict military rule. Unlike most coups, Rios Montt's takeover does not represent a significant shift from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Rather, the events of March 23 demonstrate an inter-factional fight that will have little effect on the well-being of the Guatemalan people.

Maybe then, the importance of the coup is the rule the U.S. may have played in bringing it off. If Washington did organize Garcia's overthrow, then it would appear we have regressed back to the covert action days of the 1950s and 1960s. Such a policy gave Guatemala 28 years of military dictatorship and brought about the Bey of Plgs fiasco. And it characterizes the same mindset that led Presidents Johnson and Nixon to he to the American people about U.S. action abroad. We had all hoped that the crisis of integrity our government underwent was scrapped along with the E. Howard Hunts and G. Gordon Liddys. But if U.S. involvement in the Guatemalan coup constitutes the beginning of a trend, more turmoil lies ahead.

This is why liberal skeptics are alleging this new example of U.S. intervention in mother country's affairs. President Reagan and his advisors are convinced that the Soviet Union and Cuba are gaining influence in Central America. In Guatemala, leftist guerillas have recently become a force to reckon with. As of last year, they were operating in 19 of the country's 22 regions, sabotaging public works and generally making life miserable for the army. But Washington couldn't resume aid to Gunmetal because of the prevailing climate of repression: Congress, already divided over arms sales to El Salvador, would undoubtedly have balked at sending guns to Garcia. And State Department envoys were having no success in convincing the general to moderate his policies. Guevara, minister of defense under Garcia, seemed no more likely to cooperate.

Washington of course denied any responsibility for the coup. But there is reason to doubt the Administration's claims of innocence Last January, reports appeared in The New York Times, based on accounts by anonymous U.S. army officers, that preparations were underway to topple Garcia. At the same time, the publisher of the Guatemalan newspaper La Nacion--who also happened to be Guevara's campaign manager--charged that a coup would take place after the elections. He added that a "foreign power" would direct the operation. The journalist, whose story was given little attention, was assassinated a few days later.

IT APPEARS LIKELY then, that a coup was planned well in advance of the March elections and the United States at least knew of its existence. Just after the election. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig. Jr. was asked by the press for his reaction to the choice of Guevara Said Haig. "It is certainly somewhat urgent that we take care of this problem and we are taking care of it."

A few days before the coup and in the midst of violent street demonstrations against Garcia and Guevara, a series of meetings between the U.S. ambassador and political parties unhappy with the outcome of the election took place. Also present more representatives of the Committee on Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance (CACIF), the most powerful business organization in Central America that largely controls the Central American Common Market. The ambassador made clear Washington's unease with Guevara and the election procedures and said the Administration would rather count on a friendly government that benefited from a medium of legitimacy.

And once in power, the Rios Montt junta was quick to praise Washington and the CACIF. Members of the CACIF were appointed as minister of the economy and minister of agriculture. And Rios Montt told the press that Washington had expressed its "enthusiasm and sympathy" for Guatemala's new government. A few days later, the Administration announced its official recognition of Rios Montt.

Predictably, the future for Guatemala would seem to be more of the same--strict military rule. Unlike most coups, Rios Montt's takeover does not represent a significant shift from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Rather, the events of March 23 demonstrate an inter-factional fight that will have little effect on the well-being of the Guatemalan people.

Maybe then, the importance of the coup is the rule the U.S. may have played in bringing it off. If Washington did organize Garcia's overthrow, then it would appear we have regressed back to the covert action days of the 1950s and 1960s. Such a policy gave Guatemala 28 years of military dictatorship and brought about the Bey of Plgs fiasco. And it characterizes the same mindset that led Presidents Johnson and Nixon to he to the American people about U.S. action abroad. We had all hoped that the crisis of integrity our government underwent was scrapped along with the E. Howard Hunts and G. Gordon Liddys. But if U.S. involvement in the Guatemalan coup constitutes the beginning of a trend, more turmoil lies ahead.

This is why liberal skeptics are alleging this new example of U.S. intervention in mother country's affairs. President Reagan and his advisors are convinced that the Soviet Union and Cuba are gaining influence in Central America. In Guatemala, leftist guerillas have recently become a force to reckon with. As of last year, they were operating in 19 of the country's 22 regions, sabotaging public works and generally making life miserable for the army. But Washington couldn't resume aid to Gunmetal because of the prevailing climate of repression: Congress, already divided over arms sales to El Salvador, would undoubtedly have balked at sending guns to Garcia. And State Department envoys were having no success in convincing the general to moderate his policies. Guevara, minister of defense under Garcia, seemed no more likely to cooperate.

Washington of course denied any responsibility for the coup. But there is reason to doubt the Administration's claims of innocence Last January, reports appeared in The New York Times, based on accounts by anonymous U.S. army officers, that preparations were underway to topple Garcia. At the same time, the publisher of the Guatemalan newspaper La Nacion--who also happened to be Guevara's campaign manager--charged that a coup would take place after the elections. He added that a "foreign power" would direct the operation. The journalist, whose story was given little attention, was assassinated a few days later.

IT APPEARS LIKELY then, that a coup was planned well in advance of the March elections and the United States at least knew of its existence. Just after the election. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig. Jr. was asked by the press for his reaction to the choice of Guevara Said Haig. "It is certainly somewhat urgent that we take care of this problem and we are taking care of it."

A few days before the coup and in the midst of violent street demonstrations against Garcia and Guevara, a series of meetings between the U.S. ambassador and political parties unhappy with the outcome of the election took place. Also present more representatives of the Committee on Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Finance (CACIF), the most powerful business organization in Central America that largely controls the Central American Common Market. The ambassador made clear Washington's unease with Guevara and the election procedures and said the Administration would rather count on a friendly government that benefited from a medium of legitimacy.

And once in power, the Rios Montt junta was quick to praise Washington and the CACIF. Members of the CACIF were appointed as minister of the economy and minister of agriculture. And Rios Montt told the press that Washington had expressed its "enthusiasm and sympathy" for Guatemala's new government. A few days later, the Administration announced its official recognition of Rios Montt.

Predictably, the future for Guatemala would seem to be more of the same--strict military rule. Unlike most coups, Rios Montt's takeover does not represent a significant shift from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Rather, the events of March 23 demonstrate an inter-factional fight that will have little effect on the well-being of the Guatemalan people.

Maybe then, the importance of the coup is the rule the U.S. may have played in bringing it off. If Washington did organize Garcia's overthrow, then it would appear we have regressed back to the covert action days of the 1950s and 1960s. Such a policy gave Guatemala 28 years of military dictatorship and brought about the Bey of Plgs fiasco. And it characterizes the same mindset that led Presidents Johnson and Nixon to he to the American people about U.S. action abroad. We had all hoped that the crisis of integrity our government underwent was scrapped along with the E. Howard Hunts and G. Gordon Liddys. But if U.S. involvement in the Guatemalan coup constitutes the beginning of a trend, more turmoil lies ahead.