Looking at the Post-Brezhnev Era

Prior to the death of Leonid Brezhnev, a fairly strong consensus had emerged among Kremlinologists that Yuri Andropov would be the next Soviet Premier. Now Soviet experts are speculating on what Andropov's assumption of power means for Russia and for the rest of the world. The Crimson this week interviewed three Soviet specialists from Harvard's Russian Research Center on their views of this post-Brezhnev era. The participants were Assistant Professor of Government Mark R. Beissinger, David E. Powell, a Russian Research Center associate who recently wrote a book entitled Anti-Religious Propaganda in the Soviet Union, and Russian emigre Mikhael Tsypkin, a doctoral candidate in the Government Department. Following is an edited transcript of the interview conducted by Crimson editor Lavea Brachman.

Crimson: In light of the Soviet Union's continuing economic difficulties, do you see Andropov making any significant changes in the allocation of money away from the military toward the agricultural sector?

Beissinger: If one were to do a Kremlinological study on the positions Andropov has taken in the past, he comes down favoring the Soviet military build-up. There really isn't any indication, at least from his statements in the past, that he favors such a change. I think also in this immediate transitional period, his authority is still tentative among others. The most powerful organization is the Soviet military, and he would be very unwise to challenge that power.

Powell: It is most unlikely that there will be a reallocation of resources of any substantial size, but not so much because the leader has to rely on the military--although neither of us would argue that the military has a veto authority. More important, there is nothing in the political make-up of Mr. Andropov which distinguishes him from other members of the Soviet political-military elite. After all, the military industrial complex is at the apex of Soviet power, an approach which has worked very well from their point of view, and there is no reason to change.

Beissinger: Mr. Andropov is not someone who deviates tremendously in his background and his attitudes from what we've seen in the past. [But] I think Mr. Andropov is someone who would challenge the military, given the opportunity. Andropov's statements immediately upon assuming the post of General Secretary were very pro-military, basically saying he would maintain a high war preparedness.

Tsypkin: There is really no reason for Andropov to embark on a policy of cutting defense spending. The risks inherent are considerable for him personally because he would undermine the successes in foreign policy that Brezhnev enjoyed. Those successes were based on the buildup of Soviet military might. At the same time he would undermine foreign policy, he would undermine his support in the military...Also, it would take a very long time to turn the Soviet economy around. Meanwhile, what would you do with the millions of people engaged in military production? Moreover, it is my impression that the problems with agriculture come not only from the Soviet investment policy, their investment in defense, but from mismanagement and lack of incentive which is inherent in the Soviet system--particularly in the Soviet agricultural system.

Powell: The last decade, the decade in which the food problem--the shortage, the long lines, the stress and fear of food availability--had occurred at precisely the time when authorities have enormously increased outlays for agriculture. In the last Five Year Plan, the amount of money allocated to agricultural investment was greater than all the amount of money allocated to agricultural investment since the beginning of Central planning. In the most recent Five Year Plan, the same statement holds true. Twenty-seven percent of all capital investment now goes to agriculture. They grow more than they used to, but they've also acquired more waste than they used to. They have inadequate communications, storage facilities, network of roads. Somewhere between 20 and 25 percent of all agricultural output rots in the field.

Crimson: In the past several years, we saw evidence of Brezhnev's waning power and movement by the massive Soviet bureaucracy to take over that power. Do you see Andropov coming in and usurping any of that power back from the bureaucracy?

Powell: In every system, there is a contest between the bureaucracy and the top leader...I think Andropov is better informed [than Mr. Brezhnev]. According to our intelligence people, in his final years. Mr. Brezhnev apparently was only able to function four hours a day. That didn't give him much control over himself, much less over the bureaucracy.

Beissinger: Some of the steps Mr. Andropov has taken so far also would indicate that he is trying to assert more control over the bureaucracy. One of those steps is the promotion of Mr. Aliyev--who was head of the Party in Ascrbaijan (a Union Republic located in Trunscaueasia) and before that chief of the KGB in Aserbaijan--to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He achieved a better record of economic performance in Aserbaijan largely through greater control he asserted over the bureaucracy. That particular promotion [of Mr. Aliyev] may indicate the path Mr. Andropov will follow. In his speeches as well. Andropov emphasizes the need to crack down on corruption and the need for discipline.

Crimson: Will we see Andropov persecuting Russian dissidents more or less fervently than Brezhnev did during his time as leader of the Soviet Union?

Beissinger: It's hard to say more or less right now because the dissident movement is in a very bad state. Mr. Andropov basically presided over the temporary demoralization of the movement. There's no doubt in my mind that if the dissident movement were to raise its head again, he wouldn't hesitate to crack down. The promotion of Mr. Fedorchuk, a professional KGB man, to chairman of the KGB, is an indication that you won't find any changes in that area--especially since Mr. Fedorchuk's track record has been purging dissidents.

Powell: There is a tendency on the part of the press here to see a campaign of repression, but basically the overriding truth is that our conception of human rights is incompatible with the Soviet system. It's a system based on deprivation of, what would commonly be called in the West, human rights. People are not free to write what they want, to say what they want, to meet with whom they want, that is considered invaluable to the norms of Soviet life. It's the job of the KGB to prevent this sort of thing from happening. There's no reason why a professional KGB man ... would want to alter his attitudes.

Crimson: A number of Jewish dissidents still remain in the Soviet Union. Can world public opinion be effective in aiding their fight under Andropov?

Beissinger: I think world public opinion still can be effective It has been in the past and will continue to be ... in specific cases.

Powell: If I could take a guess. I would say Andropov will in fact allow more emigration. It's a cheap and attractive way of demonstrating bonafides. For the Soviets to do this will allow them to relieve themselves of "disagreeable" types, maybe some of the lower level Jewish dissidents or refusniks. They will be given front headline treatment in the Washington Post or The New York Times attesting to the relatively benevolent character of this regime.

Crimson: Is there any chance Andropov might pursue an arms reduction agreement, or can we expect to see Andropov continuing along the same path as Brezhnev, deploying such Soviet missiles as the SS-4's, 5's, and 20's?

Powell: I very definitely see Andropov continuing along Brezhnev's path. They are just beginning to reap the rewards of having gained numerical superiority. This is hardly a time to change course. From the Soviet point of view, the purpose of these weapons is to promote the likelihood of using them for intimidation purposes. I see, from the point of view of the Politburo, no reason to expect change, rather a lot of patting themselves and each other on the back for the successes they have achieved.

Tsypkin: I would say they will continue a surreptitious deployment of SS-20. One of its characteristics is it is very difficult to monitor, making it a destabilizing force.

Beissinger: I think that he will try to pursue an arms agreement. He will be a tougher negotiator than Brezhnev was. He has laid blame on the Reagan Administration for not pursuing arms negotiations seriously. That's not a new change at all.

Powell: To amplify something both of you said, it seems to me that there are two weapons of particular interest to the Andropov regime and particular concern to the United States. I would say on the strategic level, they will give more attention to faster MIR Ving of submarine launch missiles. It is the SS-20 that they care most about as an intermediate range system, it can reach anywhere in Western Europe. They are also mobile....highly accurate and can be used as counter-force weapons ... For exactly the same reason why the Russians say they are so distressed at the Americans about the MX. Western Europeans are rightly concerned about the SS-20. The SS-20 is definitely something Andropov will continue on with in Europe.

Crimson: Do you think Andropov will take greater advantage of the disgruntlement illustrated by the Peace Movement in Western Europe with the United States and turn it around to act in Russia's favor?

Powell: Yes I do We are in for a period in which the Soviets are going to use even more skillfully than they have in the past a combination of approaches. One is the peace offensive, another is a much more covert use of terror, and a third is the willingness to rely on intimidation by weapons preponderance in the European theater.

Tsypkin: Andropov has been in the middle of assessing Western weaknesses and strengths for many years. His instrumental knowledge of how to deal with the West is much stronger than with any Soviet leader before him.

Beissinger: However, we have this image of this urbane, Western intellectual who knows an awful lot about our society. I'm not sure he knows all that much about our society. He is a shrewd man. It is said he has modern art on his walls and likes to listen to records and that those are the major signs that he is indeed Westernized. But, he is a man who has never traveled outside of the Soviet bloc...I want to show that he is not as fascinated with Western culture as we may think.

Crimson: There are over 100 different nationalities which exist in the Soviet Union today. Despite efforts by Russia's leader to squelch this ethnicity, these national groups continue to be viable forces and are increasingly becoming the cause of intro-Soviet instability. Do you see Andropov adopting any significantly new plan to deal with these various nationalities?

Beissinger: Well, I think the major problem they are going to come up against is connected with the fact that the economic pie is growing at a slower rate, so they're going to have real problems with resource allocation. I think the next period is going to be one of increasing regional and ethnic conflict. It will be an issue that will overhang almost everything else. Generally, what seems to have been happening in the last 15 years, there has been a growing sense of nationalism among everyone, not just among the minorities, but among the Russians as well. For instance there have been riots in Estonia, and Georgia in the past five years.

Powell: Central Asians have manifested their ethnic distinction by refusing to become acculturated ... Only a small minority want to move from their villages into the cities and take urban jobs. The real problem is going to come from the labor side. There is a serious labor shortage in the Soviet Union. Most of the increment to the labor force is going to have to be from central Asians...I see Andropov using more traditional methods to deal with this new work force, methods associated with Stalin's era. There will be more of an effort to combat drinking and absenteeism. There will be an effort to fire workers who are not doing their jobs. The end result will still be ethnic friction because the top jobs will always be held by the Russians. The party leadership overwhelmingly represents the Russians.

Crimson: Andropov is already 68 years old. Do you see the changes that he will make as interim changes lasting only until a younger leader takes over who is destined to be in office for a longer time?

Beissinger: To a certain extent, his age precludes him being able to put a great stamp on the Soviet system. He will probably be known more in Soviet history for having set the stage for what is going to happen next--having created the atmosphere, having initiated the policies, having moved the people into place for what is going to happen five or six years from now.

Powell: In a phrase made famous by Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels: "No ruling class ever voluntarily gives up state power." I would be astonished if the ruling class in the USSR, especially under new leadership, volunteers to do so.