A Change In Course

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S decision last week to lift sanctions against American and foreign companies helping construct the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe ended an embarrassing and potentially dangerous chapter in United States relations with its key allies. The President's move, which came after months of intensive negotiations with the Europeans, had been expected for some time: it was only a question of how the Administration could drop the sanctions and still manage to save face. By simultaneously announcing an end to the trade restrictions and an agreement with the allies on overall economic strategy toward the Soviet bloc. Reagan successfully fulfilled both requirements.

The accord with the allies is more rhetoric than anything else. It calls for the United States and Western European countries not to engage in trade agreements "that contribute to the military or strategic advantage of the U.S.S.R." Since deciding what constitutes such an advantage is purely a judgment call, the accord leaves plenty of room for future bickering between the U.S. and the allies. But Reagan made it look as if he was getting something in return for his concessions on the pipeline.

The Europeans had been planning the pipeline deal since the heyday of detonate in the early 1970's When they finally signed the contracts with the Soviets last Spring after years of negotiations, it seemed obvious the allies would not reverse their decision. At the Versailles summit conference of Western leaders in June, Reagan himself assured the Europeans he would not block the pipeline--only to shock them a week later by announcing the sanctions.

The penalties proved totally counterproductive. The President succeeded only in hurting a few Western companies and in losing the trust of the European allies. Had the sanctions been maintained, the allies might have sought retaliation against the U.S. via trade barriers. Then the Soviets, laughing in Moscow, would have been the only beneficiaries.

At the heart of the matter, of course, was the pipeline itself. The administration was worried that the Soviets could blackmail the Europeans by denying them gas, and that cash obtained form the sale of gas would end up in Afghanistan and Poland in the form of guns. These concerns were not unwarranted.

But the Europeans had a more compelling case. They rightly claimed the U.S. should not dictate to its allies in such cases and pointed out the hypocrisy of maintaining American grain sales to the U. S. S. R. They also argued they had negotiated a sound business deal, which seems apparent.

Western Europe, hurting from the recession, sorely needs the jobs the pipeline will provide. And the U.S.S.R. gas will, in fact, represent only a fraction of the allies' energy requirements.

Just as important, the Soviets stand as much to gain from the pipeline as the West does. They are likely to pour much of the currency revenues from the pipeline right back into Western economies for the purchase of grain and high technology. The pipeline technology itself will help the Soviets produce for themselves Siberian gas they otherwise could not get at for a few years, hence making energy hunting in the Persian gulf less of a necessity.

The philosophy of the pipeline is perhaps just as important as its tangible effects. If the Soviets depend on us and we on them, the prospect of war becomes more remote. So the pipeline, by enhancing mutual dependence, makes the possibility of mutual annihilation a little less likely and the prospect of mutual economic benefit much more realistic.