An Opportunity To Ease Tensions

THE WEST HAD LONG BRACED itself for the death of Leonid I. Brezhnev, but the quick succession of the 75-year-old Soviet leader last week caught even the most seasoned Kremlin watchers off guard United States analysts differed considerably in interpreting the effects on Soviet behavior of the unexpectedly rapid ascension to power of Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB.

Some observers, like former President Jimmy Carter, suggested that Andropov may feel impelled to flex his country's military muscles in his first months as general secretary of the Communist Party. Such a gesture would presumably cement the tentative legitimacy of the former Brezhnev aide. Others depicted the new leader as being more pragmatic in foreign affairs than his predecessor. In this view, Andropov might focus his energies on firming up the tottering Soviet economy, seeking success in the area where Brezhnev failed most.

Either way, the change in Soviet leadership would seem to afford both opportunities and perils for the U.S. On the one hand. President Reagan must be careful to retrain from belligerent anti-Soviet rhetoric. A nation like the U.S.S.R.--manned by new leaders anxious to gain a firmer foothold in power is unlikely to treat the President's words as mere bluster, and a precipitous response could have grave repercussions.

On the other hand. Andropov's ascension may give the U.S. an opening through which to move towards arms reduction and detente.

Positive signals from the West conceivably could induce him to consolidate his power through cooperation abroad. Instead of through firmness and hard-line posturing.

Sketchy accounts of the new leader indicate that, to a greater degree than Brezhnev. Andropov is familiar with Western culture, a fact which could make him more receptive to detente Should the U.S. fail to encourage reasoned negotiation, the former KGB head's apparent hostility towards human rights at home could well become a fixture of his regime. Initial U.S. gestures towards the U.S.S.R. may prove critical in helping Andropov's diplomatic posture take shape.

It is hence important that the Reagan Administration give the new Soviet leadership clear signals in coming days--indications that the U.S. is eager to case tensions with the U.S.S.R., that America is flexible and willing to negotiate seriously on the subject of arms reductions. The move toward serious arms talks has long foundered because of mutual suspicions and misperceptions. The U.S., for its part, must be careful not to cloak its goal of arms reductions in cold war rhetoric in the coming weeks. At the very least, it should take the lead in calling for meaningful arms talks. Presidential endorsement and Senate approval of the currently shelved SALT II arms treaty would be a very welcome such signal.

To date, the President's rhetoric in response to the Soviet turnover has been surprisingly moderate. But Reagan has suggested that he has no intention of taking the first step towards reduced tensions, telling a press conference the day Brezhnev's death was announced that "It takes two to tango." Such cooperation is plainly imperative, but given the importance of scaling back superpower tensions and arms build-ups, it doesn't seem unreasonable for the U.S. to invite the Soviets to the dance.