Transcript of Weinberger Interview

The following is an edited transcript of an interview with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger '38. The interview was conducted on Thursday, March 26, in Weinberger's Pentagon office by Crimson reporter James G. Hershberg. Weinberger, 63, is a former secretary of Health. Education and Welfare who joined the Reagan administration after working as an attorney and executive for the Bechtel Corporation.

Crimson: During the campaign, Ronald Reagan indicated his opposition to a peacetime draft and peacetime registration. Since the Inauguration there have been mixed signals on this, and one of your advisory panels recently recommended reinstituting the draft...

Weinberger: There's a lot of support for the draft in Congress, and within some of the services. The president remains opposed to the draft. He is opposed to the compulsive aspect of it. He would like very much to see if by increasing salaries and educational and other benefits we cannot attract enough people to the services. We will need more people, and we're ordering more planes and ships and one thing or another so we'll need more people in the armed services. We hope to get them on an entirely voluntary basis, and that's what the increased benefits are designed to accomplish.

Crimson: Under what circumstances would you foresee a return to the draft?

Weinberger: Only if it became very apparent that we could not possibly get enough people to fulfill the national security needs of the country. At this point. I think we're doing pretty well. The salary increases last November helped some: we have another salary increase in June, and one in October. I've made proposals to exempt the first $20,000 of income for men in the military services from federal income taxation--a lot of states do that now--and we are considering some educational benefits. All of these things I hope would be enough so that we wouldn't have to go to a draft.

Crimson: In addition to the manpower element, some advisers have said reinstituting the draft might serve as a deterrent.

Weinberger: Well, this is said to be one thing. I think the Soviets are aware of the fact that if need be we could mobilize reasonably quickly. But a lot of people think we can't mobilize rapidly enough because we won't have as much time as we've had in previous wars. And a lot of our European friends and allies, when we push them to support defense efforts more, continually tell us that they have conscription and we don't and we should do it. But the president remains very strongly opposed to the compulsive element in the draft and for that reason we hope to avoid it just as long as we can. If we see that we aren't getting enough people then we would have to think about some other means of doing it. But at the moment, we think...the number of volunteers seems to be coming in at a little better pace.

Crimson: There seems to be no move towards rescinding registration.

Weinberger: I don't think, sir, there will be. Registration seems to be, first of all, not particularly onerous. It doesn't seem to be particularly...well, it's not as effective as...I think if we're going to do registration we should get more information as part of the registration process. But there doesn't seem to be any particular opposition to it, and it would save time on mobilization, if need be, and to that extent provides a good additional argument why we don't need the draft.

Crimson: You mentioned that you would favor getting additional information from the registration process. Does that mean that, without going back to the draft, you might be reopening some of the induction centers?

Weinberger: No, it just means that on the slip of paper that people fill out when they register they might give us some more useful information, like 'Where do we reach you in time of an emergency?' or 'What are some of your skills?' or 'What are some of your interests?' or a few more facts like that. Since you're going to all the trouble of getting people to sign up, it doesn't do very much good just to have the name and address. I think we need something a little more than is there now. But that's just an administrative matter, that doesn't have anything to do with the basic principle of whether we would draft or not.

Crimson: Secretary of State Haig said recently that the Soviet Union had a 'hit list' in Central America, starting with Nicaragua and moving on to EI Salvador. Would you agree with that assessment?

Weinberger: Well, I don't know quite what he had in mind by that. But I think it's apparent that there is a great deal of support within the Soviet government for aggressive invasion-type moves or infiltration-type moves. I think that they also do a lot of probing and testing, and if they don't meet any resistance--and they didn't in Angola, and they didn't in Ethiopia, and they didn't in Yemen, and they didn't meet much in Afghanistan except within Afghanistan--then they go ahead and do more. Each time they meet no resistance on one of these infilitrations or actual invasions, they're encouraged to do more. And I think they've had plans to do more, and I think it's essential that we provide the clear evidence of the fact that we are resolved not to let 'emproceed along these lines and we are resolved and have the capability of resisting activities of this kind which just further limit peace and freedom in the world. And I think that to the extent that they know and understand this, these additional probes and thrusts will stop. In Secretary Haig's language, maybe the hit list will get smaller.

Crimson: Richard Pipes was recently quoted as saying that "at a very low cost, without a big investment on our part, we can make it very hard" for the Soviets in places like Angola and Afghanistan. President Reagan has said he might favor supplying arms to Afghanistan rebels, and there have been reports that this has been done covertly. Should we be sending arms?

Weinberger: Well, I think that it is very much to the interests of the West and people who are for freedom and for peace to insure that aggression of the type that's practiced in Afghanistan--and I hope will not be practiced in Poland but is at least being threatened there--the people who are resisting that [aggression] need support from people who love freedom and peace all over the world. I would not argue with the president's statements on the subject, that these are freedom fighters and some support should be considered if they request it.

Crimson: Have we been providing support to them?

Weinberger: I don't know of any, no.

Crimson: On Poland, what would be the appropriate U.S. response should the Soviets move in?

Weinberger: Well, first of all, I think if the Soviets went into Poland, either directly or indirectly, it would be a perfectly clear statement by the Soviets that they didn't want any further peace or disarmament or arms limitation talks. These would become completely futile. I've raised this point with a number of the foreign ministers and defense ministers from the NATO countries, and they all seem to be in full agreement. Their demands and their desires for discussions of this kind would pretty well evaporate if the Soviets went into Poland, and I think maybe that in itself would be a fairly strong deterrent because the Soviets seem to be extremely anxious to have talks of almost any kind, do anything they can to get people around the table. There are other things that could be done, and obviously we didn't want to discuss very specific measures that might be taken because there's a substantial capability to do some things but we want to achieve the result of not having the Soviets go into Poland.

Crimson: What if the crackdown came from Polish internal security forces?

Weinberger: Well, I used the words "directly or indirectly" before when talking about an invasion. There might be a fine line which might be difficult to determine, whether the Soviets had actually invaded or not but I think we'd be able to tell pretty well one way or another.

Crimson: Why is this administration confident that, unlike in Vietnam, the U.S. will not be slowly drawn, step-by-step, into a situation in EI Salvador where it will either have to withdraw or escalate?

Weinberger: I guess one reason is that we have the lesson of Vietnam before us. The other is that the instructions that have been given to the 50 trainers who are down there, technicians and so on, are very explicit. They are not to engage in any combat; they're not to go in areas where there has been combat; they're not to go out on combat patrol; they're not to fly helicopters in the combat areas or where there has been combat. They are to engage strictly in training, and in assistance of that kind, and not to yield any requests or indeed to go in any areas where there might be combat. The guerilla situation means there isn't any front line and the whole country's dangerous, but it's dangerous to cross the street in New York City and there's no place that's risk-free. But I think we've done everything that we can to insure that the EI Salvadorean government, which has embarked on a course of liberalization and land reform and all, is supported in the way in which they think is effective, and what they've asked for is military and economic aid and 50 advisers, trainers. And that's what they're going to get.

Crimson: There have been reports that some of those advisers may be withdrawn-over the summer. What are your plans?

Weinberger: Obviously it's a temporary assignment, I don't think anybody's got any fixed date on it one way or the other, but there'll be some rotations. Some people will complete particular assignments, and perhaps there will be some training done outside the country, and reasonably informal kind of shifts But I don't know when the actual training mission will be formally completed. They'll be withdrawn when that time comes. There isn't any particular timetable. There is a need to do a job, and that's a job which the EI Salvadorean government wants, and that's what they're down doing. I don't really know how long it will take.

Crimson: In a worst-case scenario, would you favor sending U.S. military troops if necessary to keep the EI Salvadorean government from falling?

Weinberger: Well, I'd have to see what that worst-case scenario really was. I'm very hopeful and reasonably confident that the EI Salvadorean government will be able to dispose of the guerillas, but if they keep pouring in more weapons and arms and PLO-types from various other parts of the world why then [the government] might have more trouble in handling the situation. But I hope this doesn't happen.

Crimson: In previous positions you've gained a reputation as "Cap the Knife" and keeping a tight budget. How do you justify a $25 billion increase in the defense budget at a time when federal spending in human areas, including programs for Vietnam veterans, are being sharply curtailed?

Weinberger: I justify it because it's necessary. I think we've fallen far behind in our defense expenditures--not expenditures per se, but in our defensive strength. Any briefing on a comparative basis of our strength and Soviet strength, either in conventional or strategic forces, brings us out, I think, in a very inferior position, and it's very dangerous to stay in an inferior position without trying to do something to redress that balance. We have to do quite a lot and do it quickly, because there is along lead time before you can improve your situation. That's why it's so dangerous to let it get out of balance. Government spending should be reduced on an overall basis. The president is doing it and making some very courageous decisions because frequently these are politically-supported programs, supported by very vigorous and effective special lobbys. They aren't all that good programs, many of them. There is a lot of support, for example, among the lobbys for school lunch and school milk programs. These sound like the height of compassion and anyone who opposes them is bound to be anti-humanitarian. But when you look at them, what are they? Well mostly they're programs that are sponsored by the milk lobbys and the agricultural lobbys, and they're programs that frequently are not need-oriented. My children, when they were in school, qualified for the free milk program, which is absurd. So I think it's time to reexamine a lot of these programs and point them where the need is, and reduce their inefficiencies and their costs, and I think that's what the president is trying to do. Frequently, he's only reducing the rate of increase. This budget, even besides for defense, is very much higher than last year's budget; it's not all that austere. It's the reductions that have been needed for a very long time, and reexaminations of programs and regulations that have been needed for a very long time.

Crimson: But in a bureaucracy as large as the Pentagon's, surely there must be some waste...

Weinberger: Oh yes, there is, and we've already found $3.2 billion in the short time we're here in sayings, and we'll hope for a lot more. Now, this isn't to say that we shouldn't have our knives out for all the savings we can, and we hope to do that. But what we've done, really, is make a thorough revision in two budgets, a job that ordinarily takes about eight months, in about four weeks. We've done that because we felt we had to to get started early and present these approvals to the Congress. In that time, as I say, we've been able to make about $3.2 billion in savings, but we could do a lot more. Any organization that spends $222 billion dollars has got to have some waste in it, and that's what we're after. So the knife's just as sharp as ever.

Weinberger on:

Withdrawal of Advisers in El Salvador There isn't any particular timetable. There is a need to do a job, and that's a job which the EI Salvadorean government wants, and that's what they're down there doing. I don't really know how long it will take.

Defense Budget

I think we've fallen far behind in our defense expenditures--not expenditures per se, but in our defensive strength.