Negotiating Theory

To the Editors of The Crimson:

Paul Engelmayer's December 3 review of "Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In" by Roger Fisher '43 and William Ury, M.A. '77 is a disappointingly shallow and confused critique.

Engelmayer's chief accusation is that the book fails to deal with the "hard cases" such as Munich in 1938 or the West Bank today, and never says when a negotiator should "get tough." Since the book focuses repeatedly and explicitly on just such issues and the most effective decision-making analysis to use in confronting them, one can only conclude that Engelmayer's real objection is that the book refuses to give the simplistic and easy, but demonstrably ineffective answers he seems to want.

Second, Engelmayer fails to distinguish between acting as if the world were rational, and planning rationally how best to deal with an irrational world. The method of principled negotiation outlined in "Getting to YES" is an attempt at the latter. Far from assuming or pleading for rationality, Fisher and Ury start from the premise that in most negotiations "people problems" are at least as determinative of the outcome as the merits, and deserving of equal attention. The point is simply not to confuse the two in deciding what to do. Don't try to treat Hitler's megalomania by making a concession on the merits of Sudetenland.

As to Engelmayer's blithe assertion that this book could be of interest only to "the least animate members of the human race," the empirical evidence is to the contrary. At the Law School principled negotiation has been a resounding success both among law students during the year and among practicing lawyers in the School's summer program of advanced study--where Fisher's is the most popular course offered. And principled negotiation is taught at both the Business School and the Kennedy School.

Whatever the extent of Engelmayer's negotiating expertise, Cyrus Vance found in "Getting to YES" "simple but powerful ideas that have already made a contribution at the international level." Elliot Richardson '41, LL.B. '47 said it was "perhaps the most useful book you will ever read." John Gardner found it "a splendid contribution to our understanding of conflict resolution." And John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics emeritus, concluded. "This is by far the best thing I've ever read about negotiation. It is equally relevant for the individual who would like to keep his friends, property and income and the statesman who would like to keep the peace."

Yet Engelmayer's argument is that these ideas will not "put a strike-out king on base." Indeed not, nor is any such thing ever claimed. Knowing the best process to aim for in a negotiation will improve your chance of achieving a satisfactory outcome, but it certainly cannot guarantee results. Neither can understanding the theory of calisthenics make you physically fit.

The clarity and accessibility of Fisher and Ury's presentation is one of their most appealing virtues, if anything proof of the power of their approach, not its lack of merit. E=MC2 is not "an untenable proposition" because it has been simply stated. Astonishingly, Engelmayer seems to have confused simple explanatory examples with the persuasive argument of the book. Luckily, I know of no other reader who has done the same.

There are many questions yet to be answered about principled negotiation in theory and practice, but Mr. Engelmayer's shoddy exegesis fails to ask them. That is unfortunate, because we desperately need a better negotiating process than the one that is now producing a new arms race despite a massive global consensus in favor of disarmament, that fails to get food to starving millions despite an adequate supply, that has produced Vietnam and threatens repetition in El Salvador.

I believe "Getting to YES" points us in the right direction, but the more important question may be whether we will have time to follow its lead. Bruce M. Patton '77   Associate Director   Editor, "Getting to YES"