For A Global Power

To the Editors of The Crimson:

The Boston Study Group has written a very clear and well researched study of U.S. defense policy. Even those who disagree with them acknowledge the quality of their work. However, I think that to prevent misunderstandings, comments are necessary on two points relating to the book and the articles on it in The Crimson of May 4.

First, the impression given by both articles is that military policy is the issue with the Boston Study Group. This is not really true. The basic premise for their study is a foreign policy decision. As they say on the first page of their book, the force structure they envision supports defense of Western Europe, Japan and Israel only, and emphatically eliminates all other conventional capabilities. This is, in essence, a one-war strategy as opposed to the current one-and-a-half-war strategy. Such a reduction in contingencies (33 per cent) explains most of BSG's 40 per cent reduction in the defense budget.

One must note that this is a change in our foreign policy. Current U.S. foreign policy is tied implicitly or explicitly to the defense of many other nations--South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, to name a few. Our military capabilities are global because our foreign policy commitments are global. This has been true since World War II when we became the leading nation of the West, and it continues to be true.

In the wake of our Vietnam experience it can certainly be argued that these commitments are not appropriate. Perhaps we should not defend these countries or retain any military capability to intervene outside the industrial West. This is a major change, however, with profound implications for our Allies, for our energy policy and for our self image. It is in this light--as a change in our foreign policy--that the recommendations of BSG should be regarded.

I must also take issue with Mr. Walker's deceptive use of numbers in an otherwise objective presentation. It is often said about military analysis that how you count determines what you will find, and this is seen in the following quotation from Mr. Walker's article: "The current (military) budget is higher than any other period of U.S. history excepting World War II and Vietnam. It is higher now than during the Korean War and in the past fifty years of relative peace."

This is not entirely true as the chart on page four of his book indicates. Military spending today in constant dollars is at the same level as the years of peace since Korea (1954-1978). During this time, GNP has doubled in real terms, and non-military expenditures has tripled (even excluding huge increases in transfer payments). In other words, we spend as much on defense now as in 1954, even though we have twice as much to spend.

Furthermore, to compare current military expenditures to the period before World War II is not entirely honest. Before World War II, we were an isolationist country whose total ground forces numbered less than 300,000. We relied on Great Britain and France, the "Great Powers," to keep the military balance in Europe. Even BSG admits they cannot do this alone today. The military needs of such an isolationist foreign policy cannot be compared with the needs of a global power--even a limited one as BSG advocates. Mark F. Cancian '73