Carter and Geneva

LAST FALL, when Jimmy Carter was running for president, many of his detractors cited his inexperience in international affairs as one of his major weaknesses. In light of this pre-election criticism, and given the absence of a clearly-defined public consensus as to what America's role in world affairs should be, the energy and candor that have marked the Carter administration's efforts towards a Middle East peace settlement during the past ten months are both surprising and praiseworthy.

The administration has insisted that Israel must be willing to relinquish control of large parts of the occupied territories and, more important, accept direct representation of the Palestinian refugees in any Geneva peace negotiations, and that the Arabs and Palestinians, for their part, must be willing to recognize and guarantee Israel's right to exist. This insistence reflects a commendable willingness to confront the most basic--and hence controversial--issues involved in the Middle East dispute. Indeed, as all the parties involved have pointed out, a failure to reach an understanding on these questions and establish a mutually acceptable framework within which to negotiate a permanent agreement will only ensure the futility of the Geneva Conference.

Exactly how these areas of conflict may best be resolved is, admittedly, unclear. Still, through its willingness to identify the most important points of contention underlying the Middle East dispute and to press all the parties involved to compromise, the Carter administration has opened the dialogue that is a prerequisite to an equitable and lasting peace agreement.